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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers that are related to transportation economics,
housing economics, and the economics of discrimination.
The ﬁrst paper examines how much people are willing to pay (WTP), on aver-
age, to avoid road traﬃc near their residence using the housing market. The notion
is that traﬃc confers substantial negative externalities such as congestion delays,
air and noise pollution, and traﬃc accidents. Estimating these hedonic functions
are, however, extremely challenging with omitted variable bias and sorting of house-
holds. Hence, to circumvent these challenges, I rely on the sharp variation in traﬃc
conditions induced by the London Congestion Charge to recover the capitalization
of road traﬃc on housing values.
The second paper examines whether installing speed cameras reduces traﬃc acci-
dents and saves lives. Speeding is one of the major reasons why accidents occur, and
the velocity of the vehicles aﬀects the gravity of collisions. This paper sheds insights
on how the government could intervene and nudge drivers from risky behaviours
that could have serious consequences.
The third paper investigates whether facial attractiveness aﬀects sentencing out-
comes in courtrooms. I rely on a novel facial recognition system that locates various
features from inmate mugshots to compute facial symmetry as a measure of at-
tractiveness. This study is motivated by the burgeoning literature indicating that
judges allow extraneous factors, such as race and gender of defendants, emotions
and media attention, to inﬂuence their decisions, and the widespread discrimination
of appearance in multiple contexts.
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Chapter 1
Preface
This thesis consists of three essays related to transportation economics, housing
economics, and the economics of discrimination. Each essay addresses a topic that
is surprisingly neglected by the existing literature despite its importance. This is
largely due to the lack of quality data, the diﬃculty to measure the variable of
interest, and the presence of endogeneity issues that impede causal inferences.
Bearing these challenges in mind, in my ﬁrst paper, I am interested in:
"What is the average willingness to pay for less traﬃc near ones'
residence ?"
Traﬃc congestion is an ubiquitous problem that many major cities face. Road
traﬃc confers substantial negative externalities, including time delays being stuck
in the traﬃc, air and noise pollution, traﬃc accidents etc. Thus, homeowners are
likely to pay to avoid traﬃc near their residence. In this paper, I estimate the
hedonic house price function relying on micro data on housing transactions and
road traﬃc across Central London to measure the willing to pay (WTP) to avoid
traﬃc. The idea is that traﬃc conditions (e.g. traﬃc ﬂow or noise) vary across
space and are capitalized into home prices. If one is able to control for the other
diﬀerences between these property sales, the remaining variation in prices should
reﬂect the WTP to avoid traﬃc. In reality, recovering these estimates is extremely
challenging with omitted variable bias and the sorting of households across space.
To circumvent these challenges, this paper exploits the London Congestion Charge
(CC) as an instrumental variable (IV) for changes in local traﬃc conditions to re-
cover the WTP to avoid traﬃc. This charge forces drivers to internalize the negative
traﬃc externalities imposed on others by taxing them when they drive into the zone
during charge operating hours. Put diﬀerently, I am comparing the changes in traﬃc
volume and house prices before and after the CC is implemented. I observe that
the CC substantially improves traﬃc conditions and home prices after it is intro-
duced. On average, traﬃc is around 8.5% lower in the charge zone after the CC is
implemented and home buyers pay approximately 3.6% more. Putting these esti-
mates together, the IV estimates suggest that the direct elasticity between traﬃc
and house prices is around -0.43. These estimates are considerably larger compared
6to early OLS estimates, suggesting that previous studies have underestimated the
cost of traﬃc. These results remain stable and robust even when I limit the analysis
to sales around 500 metres from the charge perimeter, illustrating that the eﬀects
are not driven by unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences across the boundary.
Additional analyses reveal that the charge attributes to a displacement of traﬃc
across the charge boundary as drivers detour the zone to avoid the CC. Substantial
capitalization gains imply that the CC has created a windfall for homeowners in the
zone at the expense of poorer households living outside the zone, suggesting that the
CC is regressive. Hence, to ensure that the policy is equitable, policy makers could
consider removing the 90% discount for residents in the charge zone, taxing these
capitalization gains for home-owners in the zone, and redistribute these revenues on
enhancing and subsidizing the public transport system. Increasing the reliability
and quality of the public transit could further improve the eﬃcacy of the charge.
The next question I am interested in:
"Can speed cameras reduce accidents and save lives?"
Every year, based on estimates by the World Health Organization, approximately
50 million individuals are involved in traﬃc accidents, with 1.2 million eventually
succumbing to these injuries around the world. To improve road safety, various
laws and instruments have been introduced to ensure that drivers do not drive
recklessly. These measures include texting bans, speed limits, drinking and seat
belt laws with patrolling traﬃc police enforcing these regulations. Since the 1990s,
the U.K government have been installing ﬁxed speed cameras to penalize speeding.
Chosen sites are often accident "black" spots - roads that have a high number of
traﬃc collisions, injuries and deaths, and a sizeable percentage of drivers exceeding
speed limits. These cameras measure commuting speed and penalize drivers when
they exceed the stipulated limit. Over the next two decades, more than 3,000
cameras are introduced on the road network.
There are many other reasons why the eﬃcacy of speed cameras is of policy
interest. First, speed cameras are under the scrutiny of the public because of the
huge amount of ﬁnes they managed to rake. Many oppose vehemently to these
instruments, ﬁrmly believing that speed cameras are installed to generate revenues
and that alternative instruments (such as speed limit signs) have the same desired
impact. Second, there are concerns whether these devices cause more accidents as
drivers unaware of the location of cameras could become a road hazard by abruptly
dropping speed to avoid punishment. Finally, several areas in UK are forced to
switch oﬀ their cameras due to budget cuts. It will be paramount to understand
whether switching these devices oﬀ actually makes roads unsafe.
7Conducting the analysis on a sample of speed cameras across England, Scotland
and Wales, I document that speed cameras reduce both the number and severity of
collisions. After a speed camera is installed, the number of accidents and minor in-
juries are 20% and 19% lower than pre-installation levels, corresponding to 1.13 fewer
accidents and 1.33 fewer injuries per kilometre. As for seriousness of the crashes, the
number of fatalities and serious injuries are 58% and 31% lower, which amount to
0.20 and 0.33 per kilometre. Further analyses suggest that the eﬀects speed cameras
are greater along roads with higher speed limits and are highly localised to within
500 metres from the camera. Putting these estimates into perspective, installing
another 1,000 speed cameras reduce 1130 collisions, mitigate 330 serious injuries,
and save 190 lives annually, generating net beneﬁts of around ¿59 million. These
welfare estimates are computed after considering a wide array of beneﬁts and costs
associated these devices.
In my ﬁnal paper, I ask whether:
"Do judges discriminate against unattractive felons?"
The preferential treatment towards the attractive has been documented widely
in multiple contexts that include labor markets, politics and ﬁnancial markets.
Research has shown that "beautiful" people have better labour market outcomes
(Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998), attractive politicians are
more likely to win more votes (Berggren et al., 2010), and good-looking borrowers
can secure loans more easily (Duarte et al., 2012). At the same time, there is a
burgeoning literature that has shown that judges allow extraneous factors to inﬂu-
ence their decision making. Unimportant factors, such as outcome of football games
(Eren & Mocan, 2016), duration from food breaks (Danziger et al., 2011), media
attention(Lim et al., 2015), defendant's gender (Mustard, 2001) and race (Abrams
et al., 2012; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2014; Park, 2017), have been documented to sway
judicial rulings. Hence, it would not be surprising to observe if judges indeed "judge
the book by its cover".
Yet, the literature has been remarkably limited on the impact of physiognomy
on judicial outcomes due to empirical challenges. Firstly, given that "Beauty is
in the eyes of the beholder", diﬀerent people might have diﬀerent ideas on what is
attractive. Thus, it is challenging to objectively deﬁne what is beautiful. Previous
studies rely on multiple respondents to rate the same subjects to obtain an impartial
measure of attractiveness. This resource-intensive research set up, however, meant
that previous studies are limited to small sample sizes, questioning the external
validity of these studies. Secondly, unobserved factors could correlate with facial
attractiveness and inﬂuence sentencing outcomes. For instance, drug abuse could
8aﬀect physiognomy and could push drug abusers to recidivate or commit more crimes
that result in tougher punishments, biasing the eﬀects between attractiveness and
sentencing outcomes.
Bearing these challenges in mind, I apply facial recognition algorithms on more
than 200,000 mugshots of convicted felons in Florida from 1998 to 2015 to locate
various facial features (e.g eyes, nose, face-line, forehead etc.). Using these land-
marks, I am able to compute facial symmetry as a measure of attractiveness. I
further rely on the unusually rich set of information on inmates characteristics and
case-related facts to mitigate the risk of omitted variables from biasing my results.
The main ﬁnding is that judges hand out preferential sentences to felons with more
symmetrical facial features. The disparity in punishment between criminals with
more symmetric faces, at the 25th percentile, and criminals with less symmetric
faces, at the 75th percentile, is around 1.0% to 1.9% of the mean sentence length,
which amounts to between 17 and 32 days. Additional analyses reveal that this bias
against felons with less proportional faces could vary across race, gender and type
of crimes.
Concluding remarks
Although each of the essay is addressing a very diﬀerent question, the unifying
aim of the thesis is to perform rigorous empirical analysis on important questions
using quality data to inform policy-making. This is challenging because researchers
are required to not only obtain causal eﬀects of the policy, but must also consider
a wide spectrum of outcomes that the policy potentially aﬀects to inform on social
welfare.
To ensure that my estimates are causal, I emphasize on how to construct coun-
terfactuals to ensure that they are similar to those that being treated. This requires
a good understanding on how subjects are selected into treatment. I also pay close
attention to potential spillovers across treatment and control groups that could bias
the estimated eﬀects of policy.
To inform whether policies improve welfare, I further consider a wide array of
eﬀects associated with the policy. An insight from these analyses is that policies often
have unintended consequences, beneﬁting certain groups at the expense of others,
or achieving policy objectives by incurring some costs. For instance, the Congestion
Charge reduces traﬃc in the charge zone by displacing traﬃc to neighbourhoods
outside while speed cameras improve road safety by reducing commuting speed and
increasing travel time. Failure to account for these unintended eﬀects could overstate
welfare estimates. This is an area this thesis aims to improve on to better inform
policy making.
Chapter 2
The Cost of Traﬃc: Evidence from
the London Congestion Charge
2.1 Introduction
Traﬃc congestion is an urban disamenity from the agglomeration of economic
activities. Attracted by productivity gains and amenities in cities, ﬁrms and indi-
viduals congregate in urban areas and compete for space, attributing to outward
expansion of cities. With the proliferation of auto-mobiles, individuals are encour-
aged to drive and this surge in auto-mobiles on roads inevitably leads to traﬃc
congestion, an ubiquitous problem many cities around the world faces. These traf-
ﬁc delays aﬀected London as well. Average on-road commuting speed in the 1990s
was slower than that at the beginning of twentieth century before car travel became
prevalent (Newbery, 1990). By 2002, travel speed for motor vehicles during morning
peak hours fell by almost 30% compared to that in 1974, from 14.2 to 10.0 miles
per hour, and drivers spent, on average, 27.6% of their on-road time stationary
(Department of Environment & the Regions, 1998).
Traﬃc is also a major source of air pollution. According to ﬁgures from Environ-
mental Protection Agency, auto-mobiles contribute to more than 50% of the nitrogen
oxide, 30% of the volatile organic compounds and 20% of the PM10 in US1. These
emissions have detrimental eﬀects on health outcomes, increasing infant mortality,
reducing birth weight and inducing premature births (Currie &Walker, 2011; Knittel
et al., 2016). Heavier traﬃc can also increase traﬃc accidents and fatalities (Li et al.,
2012; Green et al., 2016). Bottlenecks can also aﬀect economic growth (Boarnet,
1997; Fernald, 1999; Graham, 2007), increase unemployment (Hymel, 2009) and re-
duce wages (De Borger, 2009). It is evident that traﬃc is undesirable and can aﬀect
the attractiveness of neighbourhoods, inﬂuencing household location decisions.
This paper measures the average marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) to avoid
negative traﬃc externalities (e.g noise pollution, traﬃc exhaust, elevated traﬃc ac-
cident risk and congestion delays) in and around the location of residence using the
1For more information, refer to https://www.epa.gov/air-pollution-
transportation/smog-soot-and-local-air-pollution
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housing market2. Because an explicit market for traﬃc does not exist, the hedonic
price method is broadly adopted in the literature to value non-market amenities3.
The idea is that traﬃc varies across space and, holding all other factors constant,
diﬀerences in home values should reﬂect the price paid to avoid traﬃc. While the
concept is simple, attempts to estimate the casual eﬀect of traﬃc on home prices have
been fraught with diﬃculties. First, traﬃc is not randomly distributed across space
and the heaviest traﬃc is usually around the city center where economic activities
are congregated. Unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences between these properties
across space are likely to confound the estimates. Further, more auent households
who incur costlier time delays have incentives to sort themselves into the city center
to reduce the need to commute. The concern is whether the WTP to avoid traﬃc
could be confounded with the WTP for better neighbourhoods.
Bearing these challenges in mind, this paper exploits the substantial but localised
changes in traﬃc conditions induced by the London Congestion Charge4 (CC) to
recover the cost of traﬃc. The charge boundary is drawn around the city centre
to alleviate congestion from the most gridlocked roads in London. A ﬂat fee of
¿5 is imposed for driving into the cordoned area during weekdays from 7:00am
to 6:30pm, excluding public holidays. This Pigouvian tax equates the marginal
private and social cost of transport to ensure that drivers incorporate congestion
externalities into their private cost of travel (Pigou, 1924; Vickrey, 1963). The
eﬀects were immediate. Six months into implementation, the volume of cars into
Central London fell by 27% and average travel speed was 20% higher than before
(TfL, 2003a).
Estimation is based on a quasi-experimental instrumental variable (IV) approach.
I exploit the introduction of the Congestion Charge as an instrumental variable for
changes in local traﬃc conditions in hedonic house price regressions. Put diﬀerently,
I am utilizing the sharp variation in traﬃc conditions in and around the charge
zone and comparing the changes in traﬃc volume and house prices before and after
the CC is implemented to recover the WTP to avoid traﬃc. To obtain consistent
estimates for the MWTP to avoid traﬃc, several conditions must be satisﬁed. Other
than the fact that the charge must signiﬁcantly aﬀect traﬃc ﬂow, it is imperative
that the mean diﬀerences in unobservables (e.g neighbourhood amenities, housing
2For convenience, this will be referred as the willingness to pay for less traﬃc or the
cost of traﬃc across this paper.
3The hedonic approach has been used extensively in the literature to value non-market
amenities since it is formalized by Rosen (1974). Some examples include school quality
(Black, 1999; Bayer et al., 2007; Gibbons et al., 2013), air quality (Chay et al., 2005),
health hazards (Gayer et al., 2000; Davis, 2004; Currie et al., 2015), crime (Thaler, 1978;
Gibbons, 2004) and transportation accessibility (Gibbons & Machin, 2005).
4Other cities that managed to introduce the CC include Singapore, Dubai, Milan,
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Durham.
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characteristics) between transactions across the CC boundary are not correlated
with the implementation of the charge and the charge inﬂuences house prices only
via traﬃc (also known as exclusionary restriction).
To attenuate unobservable diﬀerences between property sales, I partial out any
time-invariant housing and neighbourhood characteristics by including postcode
ﬁxed eﬀects. This is equivalent to comparing changes in sale prices and traﬃc con-
ditions before and after the charge is implemented within a postcode. A postcode
represents a building usually and there are approximately 17 sales in a postcode.
In addition, I control for an extensive set of property and location characteristics
surrounding each sale to reduce the risk of observable diﬀerences from confound-
ing my estimates. Furthermore, I progressively limit the analysis to transactions
that close to the charge zone (up to 500 metres in and out of the cordoned area)
to mitigate unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences across the CC boundary. This is
only possible because Central London is densely built with many residential sales
over the sample period and the CC generates sharp changes in traﬃc conditions
across the CC boundary. By doing so, I am comparing properties sharing common
amenities (e.g school quality, parks, crime rate) and neighbourhood demographics
(e.g unemployment rate), but enjoying contrasting traﬃc conditions due to the CC.
I further identify several possibilities that the exclusionary restriction could be
violated. First, home purchasers could be paying more to re-locate into the cordoned
area because residents in the zone enjoy a 90% discount to the CC. Exploiting a
sub-sample of sales outside the charge zone but are entitled to the CC discount, I
show that this discount to the charge has a negligible eﬀect on home prices. Second,
auent neighbours, who incur higher cost of being caught in the traﬃc, could sort
themselves into the charge area. Relying on micro level census data in and around
the charge zone, I demonstrate that there are no evidences of sorting of "better"
neighbours into the CCZ/WEZ that could confound the WTP to avoid traﬃc.
The headline ﬁnding is that homeowners moving into the cordoned charge zone
pay more to enjoy better traﬃc conditions. After the CCZ is implemented, I ob-
serve that traﬃc volume declined by about 8.5% (1,779 fewer vehicles every day)
relative to neighbourhoods outside the cordoned area, illustrating the eﬃcacy of the
CC in reducing traﬃc. Corresponding to this improvement in traﬃc conditions,
home prices are approximately 3.6% (¿40,968) higher in the zone. Putting these
results together, the instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that the elasticity
of housing values with respect to traﬃc volume is around -0.43. These estimates of
the average MWTP to avoid traﬃc are robust across a range of sensitivity analyses
and when I constrain the analysis to sales just in and out of the CCZ/WEZ. I also
observe that the MWTP to avoid traﬃc are much higher for residents moving into
the WEZ. This could be because they incur higher cost of delay, are more likely to
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drive, and live further away from their workplace. Additional analyses reveal that
this WTP for less traﬃc could stem from better air quality and reduction in traﬃc
collisions in the charge zone after the CC is enforced.
These estimates imply that the implementation of the CC that has generated
substantial windfall for homeowners relative to neighbours outside the zone. Multi-
plying the capitalization gains with the number of dwellings in the cordoned area,
the aggregate increase in housing values in the zone CCZ and WEZ amount to
¿3.11billion and ¿11.91 billion respectively. These substantial gains measure the
present value of the local beneﬁts associated with the CC and is approximately 14%
of the cost of implementing the charge. This is tenable considering the myriad of
beneﬁts with the CC that are not quantiﬁed in this study. These results, however,
also suggest that the CC is regressive as it beneﬁts richer homeowners inside the
zone at the expense of poorer households living outside. Hence, to ensure that the
CC is more equitable, policy makers could consider creaming oﬀ this windfall via
taxes and remove the charge discounts given to residents in the zone. Revenues
can be redistributed via public transport subsidies and investment on improving on
public transport system. Finally, the elasticity of housing values with respect to
traﬃc obtained from this study could be useful in estimating the potential welfare
gains or losses associated with transportation infrastructures (e.g roads, congestion
charges, public transit) before embarking on these projects given how cost intensive
some of them are.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview on the Congestion Charge in London. Section 3 describes the existing
literature on this subject. Section 4 outlines the data and Section 5 illustrates
the identiﬁcation strategy. Findings are then discussed in Section 6 and Section 7
concludes.
2.2 Road Pricing in London
The initial Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ5) covered a total of 21 square kilo-
metres (slightly more than 1% of the Greater London Area) and encompassed the
ﬁnancial centre (Bank), parliament and government oﬃces (Palace of Westminster),
major shopping belts (Oxford Circus) and tourist attractions (Trafalgar Square,
Westminster Abbey, Big Ben, St Paul Cathedral etc). Figure 2.1 shows the CCZ,
the area shaded in green. The boundary was drawn to isolate the most congested
areas in Central London and does not appear to be constrained by any physical fea-
tures (rail lines, green spaces and rivers etc). It was bordered by major Inner Ring
5The initial Congestion Charge Zone will be abbreviated as the CCZ while the Western
Extension Zone will be abbreviated as WEZ from this point onwards
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Roads such as Edgeware, Vauxhall Bridge, Pentonville, Park Lane, Marylebone,
Tower Bridge and Victoria to divert traﬃc displaced by the charge. Commuters
travelling on these roads are not required to pay unless they turn into the zone. To
protect residents and businesses outside the zone, oﬀ-street parking enforcement is
improved to deter anyone from parking outside and walking into the charge zone
to avoid paying the charge. The CCZ crosses the River Thames to the South and
covers parts of the Lambeth and Southwark boroughs. Although this is an area not
typically considered as Central London, it was incorporated for the ease of imple-
mentation and operation (Richards, 2006).
On the 17th of February 2003, a ﬂat fee6 of ¿5.00 was levied on commuters
driving into the zone between 7:00am to 6:30pm from Monday to Friday, excluding
public holidays. Residents living in the zone and some living outside but in discount
zones are entitled to a 90% waiver7 to the CC for their ﬁrst registered vehicle. These
discount zones are shaded in purple as shown in Figure 2.1. Residents residing in
these areas are entitled to the discount because they are required to enter the CCZ
or WEZ when driving home8. This policy was an outcome of extensive consultations
with various stakeholders. Other than to reduce congestion, the CC is implemented
to generate revenues to increase the frequencies and routes of buses and tube to
enhance the public transit. Reduced travel time and enhanced reliability could
encourage commuters to switch from private to public transport when commuting
into the zone.
The tax levied was substantially increased to ¿8.00 on the 4th July 2005 to
further reduce traﬃc and raise revenues. On the 19th of February 2007, charging was
extended to Central West London (known as the Western Extension Zone - WEZ)
because of congestion in that area. Operating hours of the CC were reduced by half
an hour from 7:00am to 6:00pm. The westward extension is circumvented by Harrow
Road, Scrubs Lane, West Cross Route, the Earls Court One-Way system, Chelsea
Embankment and the River Thames 9 to the South. Refer to the area shaded in pink
6The rationale for levying a ﬂat fee, other than the diﬃculty in imposing time varying
fees to reduce congestion during peak hours, is that vehicular volume on roads seem fairly
uniform across the day.
7Other groups excluded from the charge include public transport(taxis and buses),
motorcycles, bicycles, environmentally friendly vehicles (battery powered or hybrid cars),
vehicles driven by disabled individuals (blue badge holders), vehicles with 9 seaters or more
and emergency service vehicles.
8This is a concern as home purchasers moving into the CCZ or WEZ could be paying
more for homes for the CC discounts, violating exclusionary restriction. I will show in
results later in Table 2.1 that home buyers are not paying more for these CC discounts by
exploiting a unique part of the CC policy that permits home owners living outside by near
to the CCZ/WEZ a 90% waiver of the charge.
9Unlike the Original CCZ, the WEZ is bounded by physical features. There is a concern
whether the the neighbourhoods South of River Thames are diﬀerent from those in the
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Figure 2.1: Map of the Original Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ) & Western Exten-
sion Zone (WEZ)
in Figure 2.1. However, under tremendous pressure from residents and businesses
in West London, on the 24th of December 2010, the WEZ was scrapped. Between
2011 to 2015, the charge in the original CCZ underwent another two hikes. The
CC was raised from ¿8 to ¿10 on the 4th January 2011 and from ¿10 to ¿11.50 on
16th June 2014. Overall, the CC experienced an average 10.83% growth per annum
since introduction and this might have a compelling eﬀect on commuters relying on
private transport.
Initial impact assessment by Transport for London (TfL) showed signiﬁcant im-
provement in traﬃc conditions after the charge is enforced in 2003. These results
are very consistent with those reported in this study. All day travel speeds were
almost 20% higher (from 14.3km to 16.7km per hour) and minutes of delay fell by
30% compared to uncongested traﬃc conditions (TfL, 2003a). This was largely due
to a 27% overall drop in the number of private auto-mobiles into Central London.
A change in composition of inbound traﬃc into the zone was observed: the volume
of bicycles, buses and taxis went up by 28%, 21% and 22% respectively. Surveys
conducted echoed similar ﬁndings with the majority of the drivers switching to pub-
North such that it might not be a suitable control group. Hence, I exclude transactions
south of River Thames in my robustness test (refer to Table2.8). This has an immaterial
eﬀect on my estimates.
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lic transport and others travelling during oﬀ-charging hours (TfL, 2005). Though
the number of commuters using rail did not increase, the number of bus passengers
during morning peak periods were 38% higher(TfL, 2004). There was no apparent
displacement of traﬃc into neighbouring uncharged roads and weekends as traﬃc
conditions were fairly similar compared to those during pre-charged periods. As for
air quality, the CC led to a 12% reduction in both NO and PM10 in the cordoned
area (TfL, 2004). Overall, evidences suggest that residents living in the charged
zone are beneﬁting from the charge.
2.3 Literature Review
To estimate the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) to avoid traﬃc, the hedonic
property value approach is widely adopted in the existing literature. An association
between traﬃc externalities, measured by traﬃc volume (Hughes & Sirmans, 1992)
or noise (Palmquist, 1992; Andersson et al., 2010), and housing prices are established
using regression adjusted for diﬀerences in observable housing and neighbourhood
characteristics. A review of the previous literature indicates that the doubling road
traﬃc volume could reduce home values by 0.5%-3.0%, while every decibel increase
in traﬃc noise corresponds to a 0.3%-0.6% reduction in transacted home prices.
Estimates, however, appear to vary across studies that adopt diﬀerent speciﬁcations
and perverse relationships are sometimes reported. These results suggest that cross-
sectional estimates could be biased due to unobserved diﬀerences in neighbourhood
and housing quality between sales that are correlated with traﬃc conditions.
Several studies address the issue of omitted confounders by focusing on "natural
experiments" that produces a shock to the amenity of interest10. Chay et al. (2005)
rely on the implementation of the Clean Air Act in the 1970s to identify exogenous
variation in air quality and examine its impact on housing prices. Davis (2004) take
advantage of a sharp rise in paediatric leukaemia cases from a secluded county in
Nevada to measure the health risk using home values. Gibbons & Machin (2005)
appraises the price for better public transport accessibility by examining the impact
of a new metro line on the housing market. Black (1999) and Gibbons et al. (2013)
quantify the value of good schools by comparing sale prices of homes proximate to
one another but on diﬀerent school districts. In similar fashion, this study relies
on the implementation of the CC that induces sharp variation in traﬃc conditions
across the CC boundary to recover the MWTP to pay to avoid traﬃc.
Previous literature shows that the Congestion Charge reduce traﬃc jams and
improve air quality. Beevers & Carslaw (2005) show that air quality inside the
10For the advantages associated with quasi-experimental approaches of hedonic methods
for environmental valuation refer to Kuminoﬀ et al. (2010).
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charge zone improved after the CC is implemented. The levels of CO2, NO and
PM10 fell by 19.5%, 12% and 11.9% respectively. Similar results are echoed by
Green et al. (2018) although they show that the concentration of NO2 has increased
after the CC is enforced. They propose that this could stem from the substitution
of diesel-based vehicles, such as buses and taxis, in the zone as they are waived from
the charge. This combustion of diesel contributes to more nitrogen oxides than the
combustion of petrol.
Roads in the zone are also reported to be much safer after the CC is implemented.
Li et al. (2012) reveal that car casualties fell by 5.2% although there are more
fatalities associated with motorcycles (1.8%) and bicycles (13.5%). This could be
driven by the switch to two wheelers that are not subjected to the charge. Larger
eﬀects are observed by Green et al. (2016). The CC coincides with a 32%-36% fall in
accidents and 25%-35% decline in serious injuries and fatalities and no displacement
of collisions to neighbouring areas outside the cordoned area are documented.
There have been several previous attempts to quantify the beneﬁts associated
with the charge using the housing market. Most of these studies have surprisingly
documented insigniﬁcant or negative eﬀects. The closest to this study is unpublished
research conducted by Zhang & Shing (2006). They examine the eﬀect of the CCZ
in 2003 on a sample of residential sales in London from 2000 Q1 to 2006 Q1 and show
that home prices are 8.5% lower in the zone after the charge is implemented. Percoco
(2014) investigate the eﬀect of the Milan EcoPass on housing prices. Examining
average property values across 192 Micro-zones between 2006 and 2009, he reports
that prices fell by 1.2% to 1.8% after the tax is introduced. Given that the CC
improves local traﬃc conditions, it is surprising to observe that house prices are
lower within the charge perimeter after the CC is implemented. The contradictory
relationship documented in these studies could stem from omitted confounders due
to the lack of controls, the incorporating of transactions fairly far from the charge
boundary and the adoption of coarse spatial ﬁxed eﬀects11. Agarwal et al. (2015)
improve the estimation by removing time-invariant neighbourhood unobservables
with postcode ﬁxed eﬀects. They examine the eﬀects of an increase in the Singapore
Electronic Road Pricing (approximately ¿0.50) on retail, oﬃce and residential prices.
While retail property values are adversely aﬀected by the hike, residential property
values remain unchanged. This is anticipated considering that an immaterial hike in
the charge is unlikely to signiﬁcantly improve traﬃc conditions to inﬂuence housing
values12.
11In unreported parsimonious speciﬁcations without micro-level ﬁxed eﬀects, I observe
results that are fairly similar to these studies. Results are available upon request.
12This point is reinforced by my results in Table 2.10 summarized in Data Appendix.
Most of the CC increments do not have perceptible eﬀects on traﬃc and housing values.
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In contrast, this research improves on the existing literature on several fronts.
This is the ﬁrst paper that links the eﬀects of the CC on house prices via traﬃc
using an instrumental variable framework. This is an important "ﬁrst stage" that
explains the mechanism for house price changes associated with the CC that is miss-
ing in the existing literature due to the absence of quality traﬃc ﬂow data. Second,
by relying on the CC as a natural experiment to tackle the issue of omitted con-
founders, this research is a signiﬁcant improvement to the existing literature that
rely on cross-sectional hedonic regressions. Third, this study draws inferences from
a representative sample of more than 80,000 property sales from almost 10,000 post-
codes in the vicinity of the CCZ/WEZ. This further allows the restriction of property
sales physically close to the charge boundary to mitigate unobserved neighbourhood
diﬀerences between properties in and out the charge zone.
2.4 Data
Average annual daily traﬃc ﬂow (AADF)13 collected at each count point (CP)
from 2000 to 2014 is retrieved from Department of Transport (DfT). These count
points are located along roads and traﬃc is manually counted at these locations to
provide junction-to-junction traﬃc ﬂow. There are a total of 2,774 CPs in London,
most of them clustered around Central London as shown in Figure 2.2. To accurately
measure the local traﬃc conditions for each transacted property, I ﬁrst match the
count points and roads based on location and road names . Subsequently, I draw 100
meter buﬀers14 from this sample of matched-roads. The traﬃc conditions for each
property will be determined by the traﬃc ﬂow from the nearest road. Properties
outside this 100 meters buﬀer will be omitted from the analysis as I could not reliably
measure traﬃc conditions. For an illustration, refer to Figure 3.2.
Housing transactions from the 1st quarter of 2000 to the 4th quarter of 2015
are collected from Land Registry database. Property characteristics include sale
price, property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, ﬂat or maisonette), tenure
(leasehold or freehold) and whether the property is new or second-hand. Land
Registry covers all the transactions made in United Kingdom. Given that terrace
and ﬂat housing constitute bulk of the transactions in Central London (close to 95%),
13Each site is counted by a trained enumerator on a neutral day in that year for a twelve
hour period. A neutral day is a weekday between March and October, excluding all public
holidays and school holidays. The idea is that traﬃc on these days are reﬂective of an
"average" day across the year. There are a total of 10,000 manual count points across UK.
14Concerned that 100 meters buﬀer might be too big to accurately measure local traﬃc
conditions, I reduce this buﬀer to 50 meters. I further re-weight my estimates, giving
heavier weights to transactions that are closer to the roads with traﬃc data. None of these
speciﬁcations appear to materially inﬂuence the results and are summarized in Table 2.8.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of count points 5km from the CCZ
Figure 2.3: Illustration on how traﬃc conditions are measured for each property.
other property types are removed from the analysis to reduce heterogeneity in the
sample that could raise endogeneity concerns. All the transactions are geo-coded
using the address postcode. For a subset of transactions, more property information,
such as ﬂoor area, number of bathrooms and bedrooms and age, are merged from
Nationwide transaction database for balancing tests.
Information on the boundaries of the CCZ and WEZ and the areas entitled to
90% resident discount are from the shape-ﬁles provided by Transport of London
(TfL). Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping, together with the of-
ﬁcial dates of implementation/announcement of the CC from TfL, I assign postcodes
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into treatment and control groups and compute nearest euclidean distance from the
CC boundary. Further information on the locations of tube stations and bus stops
are retrieved from TfL Open data source. I measure public transport accessibility
based on the distance of each postcode from the nearest public transport node using
GIS.
Census Data at Output Area15 (OA) level are collected from 2001 and 2011 to
measure the quality of neighbourhoods. This include the percentage of (1) minority
residents and (2) uneducated residents, (3) unemployment rate and the percentage of
(4) lone parent households. I assign the data from Census 2001 for any transactions
before 2006 and data from Census 2011 for transactions made after 2006.
Shape ﬁles detailing the location of heritage buildings and parks are provided
by MAGIC 16. Using GIS, I measure the distance of each postcode from the nearest
Grade 1 park - with international and historical signiﬁcance. I further draw a 200
meter buﬀer around each postcode and compute the number of Grade 1 heritage
buildings within these buﬀers. Designation is done by Historic England and is
determined by the age, historical and architecture signiﬁcance of the building. Only
the top 2.5% of the buildings are classiﬁed as Grade 1. Maps for Thames River is
obtained from Digimap. A buﬀer of 200 meters is drawn from Thames River and
postcodes inside this area are assumed to have a river view.
2.5 Identiﬁcation Strategy
2.5.1 Research Methodology
Traditionally, hedonic regressions estimating the eﬀects of traﬃc on house prices
adopt the following speciﬁcation:
Yijt = β
OLSTijt +X
′
ijφ+ V
′
jtω + τt + εijt, εijt = αi + θijt (2.1)
where Yijt is the logarithm of price for property i in neighbourhood j sold at time t
and Tit is the logarithm of local traﬃc conditions measured by local traﬃc volume
near property i at time t. The key variable of interest, βOLS, denotes the percentage
change in home prices from 1% change in local traﬃc ﬂow. This exercise exploits the
variation of traﬃc conditions and home prices across space and over time. To min-
imise salient diﬀerences between housing transactions, researchers usually control for
observable property speciﬁc X ′i (e.g number of bedrooms, property size, garage) and
15The smallest geographical area if which Census data is collected. There are a total of
175,434 OAs across England and Wales (25,053 OAs in London) with around 110 to 140
households per OA.
16For more information, refer to http://magic.defra.gov.uk/.
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neighbourhood characteristics V ′jt (e.g crime, unemployment rates). For consistent
estimation, the least square estimator of βOLS requires E[εijt, Tijt] = 0.
In reality, however, this assumption is likely to be violated if there are omitted
time invariant (αi) or time-variant unobservable (θijt) that could covary with traf-
ﬁc conditions and inﬂuence home prices. The heaviest traﬃc are usually found in
neighbourhoods around the Central Business District and they are quite diﬀerent
from areas further out. Properties near to the city center are usually better con-
nected to transportation nodes and are closer to major shopping belts and business
districts. If these diﬀerences are unaccounted for and enter into the speciﬁcation, it
is likely to underestimate the WTP to avoid traﬃc. The straightforward solution
widely used in the literature is to include property ﬁxed eﬀects (αi) to partial out
these time-invariant unobservables. Put diﬀerently, I am now comparing changes in
home prices with changes in traﬃc conditions over time.
There are major issues employing this strategy. First, it requires repeated trans-
actions of the same property that is unlikely given the illiquid nature of real estate
due to high transaction costs. Second, it is improbable to observe much variation
of traﬃc in a particular location over time unless these areas experience major new
developments that generate economic activities and attract more road traﬃc. The
concern is whether these shocks also make neighbourhoods more attractive and in-
ﬂuence local home prices. As a result, traﬃc conditions are likely to covary with
unobserved time-variant shocks to house prices (θijt) such that E[θijt, Tijt] 6= 0.
Hence, to overcome these challenges, I instrument local traﬃc conditions (Tit)
using the London Congestion Charge (LCC). In other words, I am now exploiting
the sharp variation in traﬃc conditions induced by the LCC to measure the cost of
traﬃc. The system of equations to be estimated includes:
Tijkt = λk + γCCit +X
′
jtρ+ V
′
jtκ+ ψt + νijkt, (2.2)
Yijkt = pik + ζCCit +X
′
jtδ + V
′
jtη + υt + ijkt, (2.3)
Yijkt = α
IV
k + β
IVT̂ijkt +X
′
jtφ
IV + V ′jtω
IV + τ IVt + εijkt, (2.4)
where CCit is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when property i is
located in the charge zone and sold after the LCC is implemented. I utilize both
the implementation of the Congestion Charge Zone in 2003 (CCZ) and the Western
Extension Zone (WEZ) in 2007 as instruments in separate regressions. I constrain
the analysis to a sample of transactions two years before and after the charge is im-
plemented to ensure that the various charge events do not overlap with one another.
Refer to the time-line in Figure 2.4 for more information. I further examine the
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eﬀects of the various charge increments in 2005, 2011 and 2014, and the removal of
the WEZ in 2011 on traﬃc and house prices. Due to space constraints, I relegate
these ﬁndings to the appendix. In short, these events do not aﬀect traﬃc conditions
and home prices. For more details, refer to Table 2.10 in Data Appendix. Given
the lack of repeated sales17 of the same unit over the sample period, postcode ﬁxed
eﬀects (αk;λk; pik) are included instead. There are, on average, 17 units sharing
one postcode across United Kingdom and they are usually properties in the same
building.
Figure 2.4: Sample window for the diﬀerent CC events (T=1 denotes Treatment
Period)
Equation 2.2 is the ﬁrst stage regression that estimates the eﬀectiveness of the
CCZ/WEZ in reducing local traﬃc ﬂow surrounding each property. The dependent
variable, Tijkt, is the natural logarithm of the average daily road traﬃc ﬂow from
vehicles with four or more wheels. The eﬃcacy of the charge is captured by γ
that measures the percentage change in the traﬃc ﬂow in the charge zone after
the CCZ/WEZ is implemented. Equation 2.3 is the reduced form regression that
measures the impact of the CCZ/WEZ on home prices. ζ captures the percentage
change in house prices in the charge zone after the CCZ/WEZ is introduced. If the
implementation of the CC reduces traﬃc ﬂow within the charge perimeter, and that
new home buyers moving into the zone value this improvement in traﬃc conditions,
I expect γ to be <0 and ζ to be >0.
These regressions combine to form the instrumental variable regression in equa-
tion 2.4 that identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of traﬃc on home prices. The main results
of this paper come from the estimation of βIV , which measures the direct elasticity
17Including address ﬁxed eﬀects signiﬁcantly reduces the sample by more than 70% as
there are limited repeated sales of the same property.
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of traﬃc and house prices. T̂ijkt denotes the traﬃc conditions instrumented with
CCit. Since βIV , is exactly identiﬁed, it is simply the ratio of the two reduced form
parameters such that βIV =
ζ
γ
. For the instrumental variable estimator to provide
a consistent estimator of the hedonic price schedule gradient, the conditions are
that conditional on property and neighbourhood characteristics, and postcode ﬁxed
eﬀects:
 CCit aﬀects local traﬃc conditions [γ 6= 0] (Relevance)
 CCit is as good as randomly assigned. (Independence)
 CCit inﬂuences home prices only through changes in traﬃc conditions. (exclusionary
restriction)
2.5.2 Testing the Identiﬁcation Assumptions
In this section, I will highlight instances that could violate identiﬁcation as-
sumptions and address them to ensure that the instrumental variable regression
framework is able to consistently estimate the MWTP to avoid traﬃc.
While it is straightforward to show the test the relevance from F-statistics from
ﬁrst-stage regressions (equation 2.2), it is challenging to ensure that the other condi-
tions are not violated. To begin with, it is improbable that the charge zone is drawn
exogenously as the policy is targeted towards curtailing traﬃc along the most con-
gested roads in Central London. This is clearly the case as the charge zone overlaps
with the Central Business Districts, major tourist attractions and shopping belts.
Therefore, I progressively restrict the analysis to properties physically close to the
charge zone, up to 500 meters left and right of the charge boundary. To visualize,
refer to Figure 2.5. The assumption now is that the CCZ and WEZ are as good
as randomly drawn between analogous neighbourhoods close to one another in and
around the charge boundary. This strategy is possible because the charge induces a
sharp discontinuous change in traﬃc around the boundary.
For exclusionary restriction to hold, the charge must only aﬀect home prices
only through traﬃc. There are at least three instances that this condition could be
violated. First, the policy allows residents staying in the zone to a 90% waiver of
the charge. The concern is whether new residents are paying more for homes in the
zone to enjoy the CC discounts. Hence, the capitalization eﬀects, if there are any,
could be capturing the present value of these congestion charge savings. To address
this concern, I exploit a feature of the CC policy that allows some homeowners close
to but outside the zone a 90% discount to the charge. The reasons for extending
the discount to these neighbourhoods are due to parking and severance issues (TfL,
2009). Some of the residents living outside the zone might have their designated
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Figure 2.5: The CCZ (shaded) and 1 kilometre buﬀers from the CC boundary
parking lots inside the zone. Also, the nearest services and amenities (e.g hospitals,
libraries etc) for these residents could also be in the charged area. These discount
zones are shaded in purple-striped for the WEZ and in grey for the CCZ in Figure
2.1. To examine whether homeowners pay for the 90% waiver of the charge, I
estimate the following regression:
Yijkt = pik + ζCCit + ψDisit +X
′
jtδ + V
′
jtη + υt + εijkt, (2.5)
where Disit that denotes properties in the discount zone that were sold after the
implementation of the CCZ/WEZ. The key parameter of interest, ψ, captures the
willingness to pay for the 90% CC discount. If new homeowners are paying more
to live in the CCZ/WEZ for better traﬃc conditions and not for the discounts, I
expect ψ to be indistinguishable from zero. Looking closer, this regression resembles
equation 2.3 other than the inclusion of properties sold in the discount zone.
As there are limited transactions18 outside CCZ eligible for the CC savings, the
focus will be on the discount zone of the WEZ that has a larger sample of 15,976
sales. Panel A of Table 2.1 presents the estimates. Home prices in the discount
zone are not materially aﬀected after the WEZ is enforced, suggesting that new
home buyers are not paying more to enjoy the 90% discount of the CC. No house
price changes are observed even when the discounts are taken away after the WEZ
is removed. Taken together, these results suggest that homeonwers do not pay more
18In particular, there are only 936 sales in these areas. Considering the fact that home
owners living near the WEZ, on average, earn higher income, have a higher tendency to
drive and stay further from their work place compared to those bordering the CCZ, I would
expect the WTP for the CC discounts to be more magniﬁed for the homeowners in the
WEZ discount zone.
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for their homes to enjoy the CC discounts.
However, the traﬃc conditions in the discount zone might be aﬀected by the
charge, therefore confounding the WTP for these CC discounts. To verify, I conduct
similar regressions but with traﬃc ﬂow as the dependent variable. I relegate these
results to Table 2.14 in Data Appendix due to space constraints. In short, the
results show that the enforcement of the WEZ do not aﬀect traﬃc conditions in
these discount zones. Overall, evidence suggests that the CCZ/WEZ is not aﬀecting
home prices through the charge discounts.
Table 2.1: Reduced form estimates of the Congestion Charge Discount
on House Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5km 4km 3km 2km 1km
Discount 0.0173 0.0117 0.0118 0.0104 0.0258
(0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0228) (0.0257) (0.0310)
WEZ 0.0579a 0.0534a 0.0500a 0.0477a 0.0458b
(0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0170) (0.0195)
Obs 55849 47117 37603 28033 17997
R2 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.74
No.of Postcodes 9021 7503 5868 4329 2665
Discount -0.0097 -0.0095 -0.0088 0.0046 0.0294
(0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0236) (0.0258) (0.0298)
RemWEZ 0.0219 0.0211 0.0182 0.0242 0.0248
(0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0170) (0.0184) (0.0209)
Obs 68415 57710 46289 33702 21236
R2 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.76
No.of Postcodes 9698 8034 6316 4653 2874
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to sales
within 5km (Column 1) to 1km (Column 5). Discount is a binary vari-
able equals to one for sales made inside the discount zone after the WEZ
is introduced. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the transacted
property prices. Robust standard errors clustered at output area are reported
in parenthesis.c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Secondly, there could be sorting of better households into the charge zone after
the charge is implemented. If auent homeowners, who incur higher congestion
delays due to higher wages, are incentivised to move into the zone after the CC
is introduced, the issue is whether the WTP to stay in the CCZ/WEZ could be
confounded with the WTP to reside in better neighbourhoods, violating the exclu-
sionary restriction. To investigate, I examine the changes in various neighbourhood
characteristics across the boundary before and after the charge is implemented in
Figure 2.6. This include percentage change (% ∆) of (1) residents who are ethnic
minorities, (2) unemployment rate, (3) residents with no education, (4) lone-parent
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households, (5) households with cars and (6) residents driving to work. These ﬁg-
ures are constructed by taking the long diﬀerences of neighbourhood characteristics
from Census Data collected at Output Area19 in 2001 (before) and 2011 (after), be-
fore regressing these changes on the interaction of the CCZ dummy with distance to
boundary ﬁxed eﬀects. Each point in the ﬁgure, which is the coeﬃcient of the respec-
tive distance dummies (in 100 meters bandwidth), denotes the conditional average
change in neighbourhood characteristics at a given distance from the CC boundary.
Negative distances, to the left of the dashed line, indicate neighbourhoods in the
CCZ. As shown, there are no sharp changes across various demographics, driving
habits and car ownership in and around the CC, suggesting that there is no sorting
across the boundary after the charge is enforced. Due to space constraints, a similar
set of ﬁgures for the WEZ is moved to Figure 2.10 in the Data Appendix. These
results are fairly congruent to that reported for the CCZ.
Finally, by replacing address with postcode ﬁxed eﬀects, I am assuming that
there are no changes in quality/characteristics for units sold in the same postcode
(or building) after the charge is implemented. Exclusionary restriction could be
violated if the WTP for the CCZ/WEZ are driven by the quality diﬀerences of the
units sold in a postcode after the CC is enforced. This is possible if more auent
households move into the charged zone after the CC is implemented such that better
units (e.g penthouses) in the same building are sold after the charge is enforced.
To address this concern, I conduct a battery of balancing tests on various observ-
able housing characteristics. Results are summarized in Table 2.2. The speciﬁcation
is similar to that in Equation 2.3 but the dependent variable is replaced with hous-
ing characteristics, including ﬂat dummy, leasehold dummy, ﬂoor area, availability
of central heating and garage, number of bedrooms and bath, and the age of unit.
Columns 1 to 2 summarize results from a larger sample from the Land Registry,
while columns 3 to 8 entail ﬁndings from a sub-sample of residential sales from the
Nationwide sales database with a richer set of housing characteristics. The analy-
sis incorporates transactions within 3 kilometres of the CC boundary. As observed,
there are no signiﬁcant changes in the composition of transactions within a postcode
before and after the introduction of the CC, mitigating the risk that estimates are
driven by the change in quality of housing units20.
19Output Area is the lowest geographical level at which census estimates are provided
in UK. There are a total of 175,434 Output Areas in England and Wales.
20I also estimated equation 2.3 with these hedonic characteristics as controls for the
sample of transactions from Nationwide Database. The results are very similar to that
reported in Table 2.5. However, due to the small sample size (less than 1,000 observations),
I do not report the ﬁndings in this paper although it is available upon request.
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(a) Minority ethnicity
(b) Lone parent households
(c) Driving to work
(d) Uneducated
(e) Unemployment Rate
(f) Car ownership
Figure 2.6: Census demographics around the CCZ. The solid line represents the
conditional average change of various demographics at a given distance from the
CC boundary and the dashed line represents the 95% conﬁdence interval. It is
constructed by regressing the % ∆ in demographics at Census Output Area with
boundary ﬁxed eﬀect and 100 meters distance bandwidths and coeﬃcient of each
distance dummy is plotted. Distance is negative when it is in the charged zone (Left
of dashed Line). There are a total of 1,727 output areas within 1.5 kilometres in
and out of the CCZ.
2.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I estimate the eﬀects of the Congestion Charge on traﬃc and
house prices. First, I describe the dataset with summary statistics. Next, I examine
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Table 2.2: Balancing Test for Housing Characteristics for a subsample of transactions within 3km from
the CC boundary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flat Leasehold Floor Area Bathrooms Bedrooms Central Heat Garage Age
CCZ -0.00498 -0.00361 -2.349 0.0338 0.00295 -0.0122 -0.113 -3.041
(0.00352) (0.00348) (3.699) (0.125) (0.0709) (0.0933) (0.212) (6.795)
N 110719 110719 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288 5288
WEZ 0.00188 0.00686 -5.041 -0.102 0.0288 -0.238 -0.381 -1.628
(0.00533) (0.00461) (11.22) (0.116) (0.193) (0.251) (0.349) (4.779)
N 62952 62952 3283 3283 3283 3283 3283 3283
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. All regressions include post code and year quarter ﬁxed eﬀects.
Dependent variable is the respective housing characteristics as labelled. Flat (1) is a binary variable indicating
whether property sold is a ﬂat. Leasehold (2) is a binary variable representing whether unit sold is leasehold. Floor
area (3) is the size of unit in square meters. Bathrooms (4) and Bedrooms (5) is the count of Baths and Bedrooms
in the unit. Central heating (6) and Garage (7) is a binary variable that denotes if unit has such facilities. Age
(8) is the number of years since the unit is built. Columns 1 & 2 comprise of transactions from Land Registry
while Columns 3 to 8 comprise of sales from Nationwide Database. Robust standard errors clustered at output
area are reported in parenthesis.
the impact of the CCZ and WEZ on both traﬃc and home prices before combining
the estimates to recover the MWTP to avoid traﬃc. Subsequently, I constrain the
analyses to properties up to 500 metres from the CC boundary to minimize unob-
served neighbourhood diﬀerences between sales across the CC boundary. Finally,
I show that the results remain robust to a battery of tests that relaxes the identi-
ﬁcation assumptions, before discussing the policy implications associated with the
ﬁndings.
There are two main results from the analysis. First, the implementation of
the CCZ and the WEZ improve traﬃc conditions in the cordoned area relative
to neighbourhoods outside. The eﬀects are notably weaker associated with the
WEZ, raising questions of its suitability as an instrument. New homeowners moving
into the charge zone appear to pay more after the charge is implemented. Second,
naive OLS speciﬁcations produce inconsistent estimates while instrumental variable
estimates are much larger, more robust and stable, suggesting that previous studies
have underestimated the willingness to pay to avoid traﬃc.
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the estimation sample of sales within
5 kilometres of the CCZ (Panel A) and WEZ (Panel B). I further breakdown the
sample into inside and outside the charge zone. There are a total of 239,909 sales
from 27,430 unique postcodes within 5 kilometres from the CCZ. The sample is
slightly smaller for the WEZ. There are 136,375 transactions from 20,686 diﬀerent
postcodes within 5 kilometres from the WEZ. The sheer number of sales illustrates
how densely built Central London is. Approximately 33% and 45% of the sales took
place within the CCZ and the WEZ after the charge is implemented.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Estimation Sample for the CCZ & WEZ
Inside CCZ Outside CCZ Inside WEZ Outside WEZ
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sale Price 377424.44 354914.12 306406.18 253006.11 909496.17 1086279.62 394369.52 344095.99
Traﬃc Volume 18804.53 13546.04 19244.95 15326.21 17358.16 15279.52 16504.42 15327.01
CCZ/WEZ Treatment 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00
New build 0.22 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.31
Flat/Mansionette 0.95 0.23 0.73 0.44 0.83 0.38 0.74 0.44
Terraced house 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40
Leasehold 0.95 0.22 0.74 0.44 0.83 0.37 0.75 0.44
Dist to Park 1115.82 747.54 2419.50 1309.43 692.40 369.66 2451.62 1296.88
Heritage buildings (200m) 0.91 1.65 0.05 0.39 0.14 0.45 0.05 0.37
Thames River View 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27
% with no education 12.99 9.84 16.42 10.58 8.16 6.64 13.07 9.26
Unemployment Rate 4.19 2.53 4.74 2.42 3.61 2.28 4.62 2.52
% of Lone Parent Households 3.99 4.38 6.01 4.88 3.24 3.39 6.27 5.15
% of Minority Race 25.41 12.90 27.69 15.66 25.36 13.10 31.99 16.81
Sample Size 239909 136375
No. of Postcodes 27430 20686
Sample of sales are 5km or less from the CCZ/WEZ boundary. Inside (Outside) CCZ/WEZ are property sales/roads within (outside) the
charge zones.
The ﬁrst row shows that the average transacted prices are much higher in the
charged zone. The mean sale price in the CCZ (¿377,424) is more than ¿70,000
higher than sales outside the zone (¿306,406). This is expected given that proper-
ties in the CCZ are more desirable as they are better connected to transportation
nodes, major shopping belts and the CBD. This disparity in transacted prices is
even greater in the WEZ. The average house prices are more than twice inside the
WEZ (¿909,496) relative to outside (¿394,370). The stark divergence in sale prices
highlights the presence of "super-rich" neighbourhoods in the WEZ. The second row
indicates that traﬃc conditions are about the same in and out of the CCZ and WEZ
across the sample period. While the average daily traﬃc ﬂow is just slightly higher
in the WEZ (17,358) compared to outside (16,504), traﬃc is lighter in the CCZ
(18,804) compared to neighbouring areas outside the zone (19,245). Furthermore,
across the boundary, properties in the charge zone are more likely to be leasehold
multi-family ﬂats. They are also located closer to parks and are more likely to be
surrounded by buildings with heritage value.
Surrounding neighbourhood characteristics, residents inside the CCZ and WEZ
are more educated and are less likely to be unemployed. Also, households inside the
zone are less likely to be single parent households with smaller minority race repre-
sentation. Although there are diﬀerences in observable housing and neighbourhood
characteristics, these disparities across the CC boundary will be minimized once I
exploit (1) variation of property prices and traﬃc within postcodes and over time
and (2) limit the analysis to sales and roads very close to the CC boundary.
To illustrate how neighbourhoods and properties are more similar when I limit
the analysis to just in and out of the charge zone, I tabulate the diﬀerence-in-
means of the average observable neighbourhood and housing characteristics between
sales from 900 to 500 metres from the CC boundary. Results are summarized in
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Panel A of Table 2.4 for the CCZ and Panel B for the WEZ. One can observe the
convergence in house prices, neighbourhood and housing characteristics once as soon
as I limit the analysis to sales closer to the charge zone. Conversely, the diﬀerence in
traﬃc conditions exacerbates when I constrain the comparison to areas proximate
to the charge perimeter. These results further emphasize the presence of traﬃc
displacement across the boundary after the charge is implemented. Because Central
London is so densely built, even when I constrain the analysis to 500 metres from the
CCZ boundary, my sample is still fairly representative with 28,850 transactions from
3,344 postcodes. The sample size is slightly smaller for the WEZ with 18,571 sales
from 1,839 postcodes. The sizeable number of transactions mitigates the concern
that my study is drawing inferences from an unrepresentative sample of sales around
the charge boundary.
To further show how the CC inﬂuences house prices and traﬃc conditions around
the charge perimeter, I plot the conditional changes of house prices and traﬃc at
every 100 metre from the CCZ boundary after the CC is implemented. These esti-
mates are constructed by regressing traﬃc volume and house prices against postcode
and year-month ﬁxed eﬀects, observable housing and neighbourhood covariates, 100
metre distance bandwidth dummies interacted with an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 for observations after the CC is implemented, and the interaction of
these dummies with an indicator variable whether this observations are found in
the CCZ, before plotting the coeﬃcient of these distance dummies21. These results,
analogous to those found in Figure 2.6, are summarized in Figure 2.7. Due to space
constraints, similar results for the WEZ are reported in Figure 2.11 in Data Ap-
pendix. The general observation is that traﬃc volume is lower while home prices
increase in the charge zone after the CCZ is implemented. These magnitude of the
eﬀects diﬀers across space but the direction is largely consistent. Substantial traf-
ﬁc displacement is observed across the CC boundary as areas closest to the border
experience a 12% increase in traﬃc ﬂow.
21In other words, coeﬃcients for the distance bandwidths inside the charge zone will be
taken from the CCit*Distance-bandwidth dummies (See equation 2.3), while those outside
will be taken from Postit*Distance Bandwidth dummies where Postit is equal to one for
observations after the CCZ is enforced.
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Figure 2.7: The eﬀects of the CCZ on Traﬃc (Top) and House Prices (Bottom)
across distance around the CC boundary. Distance is negative when it in the
charged zone (Left of dashed line). The plotted coeﬃcients denote the localised
conditional changes of traﬃc/house prices at a given distance from the CC bound-
ary. Tails marks the 95% conﬁdence interval. They are constructed by regressing
traﬃc volume or house prices against postcode and year-month ﬁxed eﬀects, ob-
servable housing and neighbourhood covariates and 100 metres distance-bandwidth
dummies interacted with Postit and distance-bandwidth dummies interacted with
CCit. Postit is equal to one for observations after the CCZ is enforced, while CCit
takes the value of one for observations in the charge zone after the CCZ is enforced.
This ﬁgure plots the coeﬃcients associated with these distance dummies in and out
the charged zone.
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2.6.2 Eﬀects of the London Congestion Charge on Traﬃc and
Home Prices
Table 2.5: Estimates on the Impact of the CCZ/WEZ on Traﬃc & House
Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5km 4km 3km 2km 1km
Panel A - First Stage (Log Traﬃc)
CCZ -0.0523b -0.0581a -0.0711a -0.0751a -0.0816a
(0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0223)
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
∆ Traﬃc -1194 -1324 -1609 -1696 -1779
1st Stage F-statistics 6.42 7.76 11.66 13.34 13.38
WEZ -0.0397a -0.0401a -0.0303a -0.0267a -0.0172c
(0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0100)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
∆ Traﬃc -832 -839 -637 -562 -366
1st Stage F-statistics 28.06 24.94 14.06 11.00 2.99
Panel B - Reduced Form (Log House Price)
CCZ 0.0305b 0.0271b 0.0245c 0.0259c 0.0349b
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0150)
R2 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.73
∆ HP 36320 32259 29089 30757 40968
Obs 85106 72001 54149 37433 23504
No.of Postcodes 9861 8329 6360 4258 2574
WEZ 0.0695a 0.0679a 0.0636a 0.0658a 0.0689a
(0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0215)
R2 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.75
∆ HP 109227 106635 99589 103141 106074
Obs 44056 36636 29126 21328 12490
No.of Postcodes 7222 5938 4639 3360 1896
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to properties
within 5 kilometres (Column 1) to 1 kilometre (Column 5) from the CCZ/WEZ
boundary. Panel A reports ﬁrst regression estimates (γ) from equation 2.2 and
Panel B reports reduced form estimates (ζ) from equation 2.3 for both the CCZ
and WEZ. Dependent variable is the logarithm of annual average daily traﬃc
volume for vehicles with 4 wheels or more for Panel A and the logarithm of trans-
acted house prices for Panel B. All regressions are estimated with postcode and
year quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. Other control variables include housing characteristics
(leasehold, newbuild and terrace dummies), neighbourhood characteristics by-year
(% of residents with no education qualiﬁcations, % of residents with minority races,
unemployment rate and % of lone parent households) and location characteristics
by-year (Thames river view dummy, counts of heritage buildings within 200m, dis-
tance of the property from nearest park and from the CCZ/WEZ boundary). For
more information on the variables, refer to Table 4.6 in Data Appendix. ∆ Traﬃc
is the absolute reduction in average daily traﬃc volume and ∆ HP is the absolute
eﬀects on house prices converted to 2015 pound(¿) value. Robust standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered at output area. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the eﬀects of the CCZ and the WEZ on traﬃc
volume. These estimates illustrate the eﬃcacy of the CC in curbing congestion and
the validity of the CC as an instrumental variable for traﬃc ﬂow. Moving from
column (1) to (5), I progressively restrict the sample to areas from 5 kilometres to
1 kilometre left and right of the CC boundary. After the introduction of the CC in
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2003 (CCZ), I observe that traﬃc ﬂow in the zone is 5.37%22 lower when compared
to neighbourhoods outside but within 5 kilometres from the boundary. The charge
eﬀects remain fairly stable when I streamline the sample to more comparable neigh-
bourhoods in proximity to the zone. Within 4 kilometres, the eﬀect increases to
5.98% and within 3 kilometres, the eﬀect is 7.37%. These impact further increases
to 7.80% when I constrain the sample to areas within 2 kilometres from the charged
boundary and is even larger at 8.50% within 1 kilometre from the CC boundary. In
absolute terms, I am looking at between 1,194 and 1,779 less vehicles23 inside the
zone everyday compared to areas outside the CCZ.
Magniﬁed eﬀects when constrained to areas near the boundary suggest the pres-
ence of traﬃc displacement across the CC boundary. Evidence implies the charge
could have forced drivers to detour the charge area, inducing a surge in traﬃc for
roads close to but outside the CCZ/WEZ. This displacement of traﬃc, although
not an ideal outcome for the CC, induces substantial variation in traﬃc conditions
between proximate neighbourhoods around the charge boundary. This makes the
policy an ideal instrument for identifying the MWTP to avoid traﬃc because it per-
mits the comparison of nearby properties around the charge perimeter to mitigate
unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences.
The implementation of the WEZ (WEZ) reduces traﬃc by 4.04% in the charged
zone relative to areas outside but within 5 kilometres from the boundary. Within
4 kilometres, the eﬀect is 4.09% and is 3.07% when I constrain the analysis to
neighbourhoods 3 kilometres from the boundary. When I examine areas within 2
kilometres from the charged zone, the impact falls to 2.71%. As soon as I limit the
analysis to districts 1 kilometres or less from the WEZ boundary, the impact further
drops to 1.72%. In absolute terms, I am observing around 366 to 839 less vehicles
every day after the WEZ is enforced. These eﬀects are less than half compared to
that reported in the CCZ. The WEZ is no longer a valid instrument when construed
to areas 1 kilometre or less from the WEZ boundary, as evidenced by the low 1st
stage F-statistics of less than 10.
Panel B of Table 2.5 summarizes the impacts of the CCZ and WEZ on transacted
property values. Similar to before, I restrict the analysis to a sample of properties
that are physically close to the CC boundary to mitigate unobserved heterogeneity
in neighbourhood amenities between sales in and out the charged zone. I observe
signiﬁcant house price appreciation in the charge zone after the CCZ is introduced.
When compared to residential sales within 5 kilometres from the boundary, house
22As it is a log-linear model, capitalization eﬀects are computed by taking the expo-
nential of the point estimates before subtracting by one. For instance, Exp(0.0523)− 1 ≈
5.37%. The same conversion is applied for housing prices.
23This is obtained by multiplying the point estimates with the average pre-treatment
traﬃc volume.
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prices in the charge zone are 3.10% higher. Estimated eﬀect drops to 2.75% relative
to houses within 4 kilometres and 2.50% within 3 kilometres. Restricting the analysis
to housing units just 2 kilometres in and out the CC boundary, I observe stable price
responses at around 2.62%. Finally, looking at sales 1 kilometre or less from the
CC boundary, which reduces the sample by almost 80%, I document that property
values are 3.55% higher than before. In absolute monetary terms, the CCZ increases
housing values in the charge zone by a magnitude of between ¿29,089 and ¿40,96824.
All these estimates are signiﬁcant at least at 5% level.
House prices in the charge zone also increase after the WEZ (WEZ) is intro-
duced. Capitalization eﬀects are around 7.20% when compared to transactions out-
side but within 5 kilometres of the boundary. Within 4 kilometres, the eﬀect falls to
around 7.02% and within 3 kilometres, impact further decreases to 6.57%. Restrict-
ing to housing units just 2 kilometres from the boundary increases price response
marginally to 6.80%. Comparing units not more than 1 kilometre in and out the CC
boundary, which cuts the sample size by about 75%, I observe that the house price
appreciation is around 7.13%. All of the estimates are signiﬁcant at least at 10%
level. In monetary terms, homeowners are paying between ¿99,589 and ¿109,227
to enjoy better traﬃc in the WEZ. These absolute eﬀects are much larger as home
prices are, on average, much higher in Central West London.
Overall, these results indicate that the implementation of the CCZ and WEZ
resulted in substantial improvement in traﬃc conditions and property values in the
charge area relative to areas outside the zone. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that the
strength of the CC as an instrument for local traﬃc conditions.
2.6.3 Regression estimates of Marginal Willingness to Pay to
avoid Traﬃc
Table 2.6 summarizes the estimates of the average MWTP to avoid traﬃc. Like
before, I progressively restrict the sample of property sales from 5 kilometres to 1
kilometre from the CCZ/WEZ boundary moving from columns (1) to (5). In Panel
A, I present naive Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates (βOLS) from equation 2.1.
These estimates are essential because they not only allow us to compare the instru-
mental variable (IV) estimates with the typical results reported in the literature,
but they also illustrate how exploiting the exogenous variation in traﬃc conditions
induced by the CC could improve identiﬁcation of the WTP to avoid traﬃc.
24This is computed by multiplying the estimates on the pre-treatment average home
prices adjusted to 2015 price levels in the cordoned area within the distance bandwidth
from the CC boundary.
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Table 2.6: OLS & IV estimates of the eﬀect of Traﬃc on House Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5km 4km 3km 2km 1km
Panel A - Naive OLS
ln(Traﬃc) - CCZ -0.0113 -0.0140 -0.0174 -0.0170 -0.0530c
(0.0132) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0193) (0.0302)
R2 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.73
ln(Traﬃc) - WEZ -0.0303 -0.0365 -0.0358 -0.0576 -0.0135
(0.0312) (0.0357) (0.0441) (0.0582) (0.0625)
R2 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.75
Panel B - IV Regressions
ln(Traﬃc) - CCZ -0.5827c -0.4664c -0.3443 -0.3444c -0.4276b
(0.3229) (0.2738) (0.2110) (0.2017) (0.2035)
Obs 85106 72001 54149 37433 23504
R2 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.73
No.of Postcodes 9861 8329 6360 4258 2574
1st Stage F-statistics 6.42 7.76 11.66 13.34 13.38
ln(Traﬃc) - WEZ -1.7498a -1.6950a -2.0990a -2.4656b -4.0071
(0.5219) (0.5361) (0.8062) (1.0347) (2.6389)
Obs 44056 36636 29126 21328 12490
R2 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.61
No.of Postcodes 7222 5938 4639 3360 1896
1st Stage F-statistics 28.06 24.94 14.06 11.00 2.99
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression that measures the direct elasticity
between traﬃc volume and house prices. Dependent variable is the logarithm
of transacted house prices. Panel A reports naive OLS estimates (βOLS) from
equation 2.1 and Panel B reports IV estimates (βIV ) from equation 2.4. Sample is
constrained to properties within 5 kilometres (Column 1) to 1 kilometre (Column
5) from the CCZ/WEZ boundary. For CCZ, the instrument is the binary variable
that takes the value of 1 for properties in the CCZ that are sold after the charge is
implemented on the 17th February 2003. For WEZ, the instrument is the binary
variable that takes the value of 1 for properties in the WEZ that are sold after the
charge is implemented on the 19th February 2007. See notes in previous tables for
details on the control variables included. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at output area. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
Consistent with the previous literature, these OLS estimates are very small and
highly unstable depending on the sample analysed. To interpret, a 1% increase in
traﬃc is associated to a reduction in housing values that ranged between 0.01% to
0.05%. None of these estimates appear to be statistically distinguishable from zero
except when I restrict the sample to just 1 kilometre in and out the CCZ boundary.
The reported eﬀects are now more than 5 times larger and are statistically signiﬁcant
at 10% level. Smaller eﬀects for regressions incorporating transactions further away
from the CC boundary is consistent with the idea that unobserved neighbourhood
heterogeneity between properties could induce the underestimation of the cost of
traﬃc. Next, I present OLS estimates for the properties in the WEZ. Likewise,
the direct elasticity between traﬃc and house prices is very small between 0.014 and
0.058, and none of these estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. Taken together, these
results suggest that either home buyers do not care about local traﬃc conditions or
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conventional OLS estimates are severely biased by omitted variables.
Panel B of Table 2.6 summarizes IV estimates (βIV ) of the MWTP to avoid
traﬃc from Equation 2.4 using either the CCZ or WEZ as instruments. These
estimates are simply the ratio of ζ and γ from Table 2.5. Results reveals that a 1%
increase in traﬃc volume corresponds to 0.34% - 0.58% lower transacted housing
values. Compared to the traditional OLS estimates, the IV estimates are at least 10
times larger. This is a phenomenon that is congruent with the ﬁndings reported by
Chay et al. (2005) for air quality. Most of the eﬀects are signiﬁcant at conventional
levels except for sales within 3 kilometres in and out of the CCZ. Even so, the
estimated eﬀect remain similar in size although it is less precisely estimated. It
is also reassuring to observe that the IV estimates are far less sensitive to sample
chosen compared to the OLS estimates.
I further report IV estimates from the WEZ and these eﬀects appear 4 to 5
times larger than those reported in the CCZ, suggesting that home owners in the
WEZ are more willing to pay to avoid traﬃc. In particular, a 1% increase in traﬃc
leads to a 1.70% to 2.47% decrease in housing values. This is not surprising given
that earlier results from Table 2.5 show that home buyers pay much more for a
negligible improvement in traﬃc from the WEZ. This much larger WTP to avoid
traﬃc commands more attention.
Dwelling deeper into the demographics of home owners in both the CCZ and
WEZ25, I observe that residents in the WEZ are more likely to drive and incur much
higher costs being stuck in the traﬃc. Homeowners living in the WEZ earn (¿4,095),
on average, much higher wages compared to those living in the CCZ (¿3,517). It
is also more likely for households in the WEZ (49%) to own a auto-mobile than
those living in the CCZ (37%). There is also a higher tendency for those staying in
the WEZ (25%) to drive to work when compared to residents in the CCZ (13%).
This is probably because homeowners in the CCZ stay closer to their work place.
42% of the residents in the CCZ stay less than 2 kilometres from their workplace,
compared to 25% of the residents in the WEZ. All these factors could explain why
home owners in the WEZ are more willing to pay to avoid traﬃc. This disparity in
the WTP is consistent with the idea that individuals have heterogeneous preferences
on travel time (Small et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, it is paramount to point out that as soon as I constrain the sample
to 1 kilometre or less, the validity of the WEZ as an instrument is put into question as
evidenced by the weak ﬁrst-stage F-statistics. Moreover, earlier summary statistics
reveal sizeable diﬀerences in sale prices between properties inside and outside the
WEZ even when I restrict to sales around the charge perimeter (See Table 2.4).
25Data is collected from Census 2001 and 2011 and is weighted according to the geo-
graphical distribution of transactions analysed in this study.
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This further exacerbate the risk that house price eﬀects across the WEZ boundary
could be driven by unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences. Hence, from this point
onwards, further analyses will rely only the variation in traﬃc conditions induced
by the CCZ. Similar analyses for the WEZ can be found in the Tables 2.12 and 2.13
in Data Appendix.
2.6.4 Estimates Restricted To Proximate Transactions
Table 2.7: First Stage, Reduced form & IV estimates from sample 900m
to 500m from the CCZ Boundary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
900m 800m 700m 600m 500m
Panel A: First Stage (Log Traﬃc)
CCZ -0.0833a -0.0924a -0.0883a -0.0908a -0.0847a
(0.0229) (0.0248) (0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0263)
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
∆ Traﬃc -1818 -1966 -1879 -1852 -1780
Panel B: Reduced Form (Log House Price)
CCZ 0.0349b 0.0434a 0.0373b 0.0365b 0.0390b
(0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0181) (0.0188)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
∆ HP 41213 50203 43425 43003 46066
Panel C: IV Regressions
ln(Traﬃc) -0.4192b -0.4697b -0.4231b -0.4023c -0.4603c
(0.2099) (0.2049) (0.2123) (0.2199) (0.2530)
Obs 21843 19719 17866 15775 14072
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
No.of Postcodes 2380 2177 1962 1765 1555
1st Stage F-stats 13.22 13.90 11.27 11.45 10.37
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to prop-
erties within 900m (Column 1) to 500m (Column 5) from the CCZ/WEZ
boundary. See notes in previous tables for details on the control variables in-
cluded. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at output area.
c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
Next, I restrict the analysis to transactions that are even closer to the CC bound-
ary from 900 metres in Column (1) to 500 metres in Column (5). This strategy
further abates the risk of unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences from driving the re-
sults. Results are documented in Table 2.7. Panel A presents ﬁrst stage estimates.
It is comforting to observe eﬀects that are not only comparable in size to earlier
results, but are also stable across the various distance bandwidths. Overall, the
enforcement of the CCZ attributed to signiﬁcant reductions in traﬃc in the zone of
between 8.70% and 9.68%, which amount to between 1780 and 1966 fewer vehicles
every day. Strong ﬁrst stage F-statistics across the regressions reinforce the validity
of the instrument even for adjacent roads bordering the CCZ.
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Panel B reports the reduced form estimates of the CCZ on housing prices. Con-
forming with earlier ﬁndings, I document signiﬁcant house prices changes that are
remarkably robust even when I conﬁne the analysis to sales 500 metres from the CC
boundary. Speciﬁcally, housing values are approximately 3.55% - 4.43% higher in
the charge zone after the CCZ is implemented. In absolute terms, these increments
range between ¿41,232 and ¿50,203, depending on distance from the CC boundary.
Putting these two estimates together in Panel C, I am not surprise to observe a
robust association between traﬃc volume and house prices. In particular, the direct
elasticity between traﬃc volume and housing values ranges between -0.40 to -0.47,
analogous to earlier estimates in Table 2.6. These IV estimates are also appear
strikingly stable in size across the board. This is because the magnitude of the
house price changes vary with the relative changes in traﬃc ﬂow across the distance
bandwidths, lending support that what I am capturing from the house prices is the
WTP to avoid traﬃc.
Overall, these results conﬁrm that the estimates of the MWTP to avoid traﬃc
are not susceptible to unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences that are attenuated by
limiting the analysis to properties just in out of the CCZ/WEZ.
2.6.5 Robustness and Placebo Tests
Table 2.8 summarizes the ﬁndings from a battery of robustness and placebo tests
that further addresses the challenges that impede identiﬁcation to provide more
assuring evidences. It is shown earlier that estimates restricted to sales very close
to the CC boundary (See Table 2.7) are fairly similar to the eﬀects documented
for sales within 1 kilometre from the CCZ. Therefore, the rest of the sensitivity
analyses are conducted for sales within this distance bandwidth to balance between
the representativeness of the ﬁndings and the potential bias driven by unobserved
neighbourhood heterogeneity across the boundary.
Announcement Eﬀects: In Column (1), I replicate earlier results but with an-
nouncement dates. This addresses the concern26 whether there are any spurious
house price or traﬃc responses to the release of the news for the charge before the
actual implementation of the CC. The treatment period is deﬁned as the day the
CC event is oﬃcially announced by TfL and ends the day before the CC event is
implemented27. Although I observe traﬃc is marginally heavier after the CCZ is
26Another concern is whether there are negative house price eﬀects that predate the
CC implementation such that any eﬀects documented earlier is merely capturing mean
reversion of home prices. As observed, this is not a concern as home prices are unaﬀected
by the announcement of the CC.
27As hikes are announced only a few months before being enforced, there are insuﬃcient
pre-treatment property transactions. Hence, announcement eﬀects are computed only for
the initial implementation of the CCZ and WEZ (refer to ﬁgure 2.4 in Data Appendix)
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announced, homebuyers do not respond to the news. This could be explained by
the uncertainty of the residents over the eﬀectiveness of the novel policy to curb
congestion. This is consistent with the survey conducted by TfL that indicated that
the respondents are unsure about whether the CC can reduce traﬃc and improve
accessibility (TfL, 2003b).
CBD Eﬀects: Another concern is whether the eﬀects on traﬃc and house prices
documented earlier could be associated with changes to the Central Business Dis-
trict (CBD), violating the exclusionary restriction. This could be an issue since
the charge zone overlaps with the CBD. There is considerable decentralization of
economic activities from the CBD with the emergence of Canary Wharf28 around
the implementation of the CC. This shift in economic activities could reduce the
attractiveness of the CBD, leading to a fall in house prices and traﬃc in the zone
unrelated to the CC and thereby confounding the average MWTP to avoid traﬃc.
Although limiting the analysis to sales bordering the CCZ/WEZ could potentially
mitigate this problem, to further allay this concern, I create artiﬁcial treatment
areas by shrinking and expanding the CCZ by 1 kilometre. For the shrank zones,
neighbourhoods at 0 to 1 kilometre from the boundary inside the CCZ are denoted
as control areas (Shrank Control Area) and neighbourhoods beyond 1 kilometre from
the boundary in the cordoned area are denoted as treated areas (Shrank Treatment
Area). Conversely, for expanded CC zones, areas between 0 and 1 kilometre outside
the actual CC zone are ﬂagged as treated areas (Expanded Treatment Area) while
areas between 1 and 2 kilometres outside the actual CC zone are denoted as control
units (Expanded Control Area). For an illustration, refer to Figure 2.8. Column (2)
and (3) report estimates associated with these shrank and expanded placebo areas.
As observed, I do not document any spurious eﬀects on traﬃc ﬂow and house prices
in these artiﬁcially created charge zones. This suggest that earlier ﬁndings are not
confounded by the emergence of other commercial areas around London.
28From 1999 to 2005, the employment force in Canary Wharf surged by more than
100% from 40,000 to 87,000. This could be attributed to the development and opening
of at least 10 commercial developments, including 8 Canada Street, One Churchill Place
etc. For more information, refer to https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/
gla_migrate_files_destination/londons-cbd-jan08.pdf
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Figure 2.8: The Shrank and Expanded Placebo CCZ
Insuﬃcient Transactions: Another issue is that there could be inadequate re-
peated observations within some postcode and outliers could be driving the esti-
mates. Thus, I drop any postcodes with less than 5 repeated transactions over the
sample period in Column (4). This reduces the number of observations marginally
by about 14%. Again, this did not matter as results are similar to those reported
earlier.
Physical Barriers: An additional concern is whether the CCZ boundary overlaps
with physical constraints (hills, rivers, forest etc.) or major infrastructures (railways,
ﬂyovers etc.). If the CC boundary coincides with these features, even restricting to
proximate areas on diﬀerent side of these features might not eliminate unobserved
neighbourhood diﬀerences. While the CCZ crosses the Thames River due to the
ease of charge implementation, the south of the WEZ is bounded by Thames River.
The concern that properties to the south of the river are diﬀerent from those in
the north is not unfounded as these areas are typically not considered as part of
Central London. Thus, I exclude housing transactions located south of the Thames
River from the estimation in Column (5). Doing so has no discernible impact on
the estimates although the CCZ is no longer a relevant instrument as reﬂected by
the slightly lower ﬁrst stage F-statistics.
Removal of Sales closest to the CC boundary: I further remove property sales
than are within 100 metres from the CC boundary. The notion is that although
restricting to properties closest to the charge boundary can minimize unobserved
neighbourhood diﬀerences, the spillover eﬀects could be greater as well. For instance,
pollutants from traﬃc emissions could travel across the boundary to neighbouring
areas inside the zone. Moreover, properties very close to the CC boundary but
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inside the CCZ could be near to these congested ring roads circumventing the zone.
Home-owners living in these areas, despite being inside the CCZ, might receive
considerable negative traﬃc externalities that cross the boundary, resulting in an
underestimation of the WTP to avoid traﬃc. Results are summarized in Column (6).
Removing these roads and property sales close to the CC boundary do not matter
much. It appears that although home owners pay more for properties further inside
the CCZ, the impact of the charge on traﬃc is larger as well, resulting in an elasticity
that is within the range reported previously.
Public Transport Capitalization Eﬀects: One of the correlated eﬀects associ-
ated with the implementation of the CC is the channelling of charge revenues on
improving public transport facilities. This could increase the values of homes that
are better connected to public transportation nodes and is especially the case for
houses outside the cordoned area as driving into the zone is more expensive. To
partial out these eﬀects, I add a vector of controls that include: (1) a binary vari-
able denoting whether postcode j is within 200 metres of a tube station and (2)
the count of bus lines from bus stops within 200 metres of the postcode. Both are
interacted with year dummies as they are time-invariant. As seen in Column (7),
upon controlling for these covariates, the eﬀects on housing prices are marginally
larger now compared to earlier results from Table 2.5. This is consistent with the
idea that house prices outside of the CCZ but close to transportation nodes have
appreciated more and accounting for this attribute to larger MWTP to avoid traﬃc.
Measurement Error: One may also argue that the local traﬃc for each property
could be inaccurately measured by assigning road traﬃc conditions that are up to
100 metres away from the property (See Figure 2.3). This measurement error could
lead to attenuation bias. To mitigate this concern, I adopt several strategies to more
reliably quantify local traﬃc ﬂow. In Column (8), I only incorporate sales that are
within 50 metres from the roads that I could accurately measure traﬃc conditions.
Here, I observe more pronounced eﬀects of the CCZ on both traﬃc and housing
prices. Putting them together, a 1% increase in traﬃc corresponds to a 0.50% fall in
home prices, which is congruent to earlier ﬁndings. In Column (9), I re-weight the
estimates inversely based on the euclidean distance of the property from the nearest
road. Put diﬀerently, like before, I am placing more emphasis on sales that I can
more precisely determine traﬃc conditions. Again, the impacts on the estimates are
modest.
Spurious time eﬀects: Next, I address the concern whether eﬀect of the CCZ on
home prices29 could be documented spuriously during pre-treatment periods. To do
so I generate rolling 1-year pre-treatment placebo windows for the CCZ. Placebo
29As I only have yearly traﬃc ﬂow from 2000 onwards, I am unfortunately not able to
perform a similar analysis for traﬃc ﬂow.
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treatment period is between tfalse and tfalse+1year and the placebo window is from
tfalse − 1year to tfalse + 1year where tfalse represents every quarter from 1996Q1
onwards till 2002Q1. For instance, for 1996Q1, the pre-treatment period is from
1995Q1 to 1995Q4 and the treatment period is from 1996Q1 to 1996Q4. The new
key regressor - CCZ ∗ tfalse - is the interaction of a binary variable of whether the
property i in the CCZ is sold during the false treatment period. This falsiﬁcation
test incorporates transactions within 1 kilometre from the CCZ boundary.
Placebo estimates are summarized in Figure 3.8. Each dot represents estimate from
a diﬀerent placebo regression and the tails denote the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
dashed line denotes the implementation eﬀects from Column (5) of table 2.5. As
observed, none of the placebo estimates, except for 1998Q1, is statistically diﬀerent
from zero and most of the estimates are smaller than the implementation eﬀects.
These ﬁndings increase the conﬁdence that eﬀects documented earlier are not spu-
riously reported in non-treatment periods.
Figure 2.9: The CCZ Placebo Estimates during pre-treatment period. Each point
represents a diﬀerent regression where the treatment period is 1-year rolling win-
dow from the corresponding quarter and the pre-treatment period is 1 year before
the quarter. The tails represent 95% conﬁdence interval. Cross indicates that the
estimate is signiﬁcant at least at 10%, while dot shows otherwise.
2.6.6 Discussion
In this section, I employ earlier estimates to compute the localised economic
beneﬁts associated with the charge. To simplify things, I make the following as-
sumptions: (1) the preferences for traﬃc are identical across individuals living in
2.6. Empirical Results 44
the same cordoned area but could diﬀer between the CCZ and WEZ and (2) the
relationship between traﬃc and house price is linear. The implementation of the
charge, on average, induces home prices to increase by ¿33,879 and ¿104,93330 in
the CCZ and WEZ respectively. Based on the Census estimates on the number
of dwellings, which indicates that there are around 91,848 and 113,535 houses in
the CCZ and WEZ in 2011 respectively, this implies that the CCZ and WEZ have
generated an aggregate windfall of around ¿3.11 billion and ¿11.91 billion relative
to those outside the zone. This ﬁgure is meaningful as it presents monetary measure
of the local beneﬁts associated with the charge.
Although these eﬀects seem large at ﬁrst sight, it is not as it measures the WTP
for improvement in traﬃc conditions in perpetuity given the long-lived nature of
real estate. But are they tenable? To answer this, I compare the beneﬁts to the
cost of implementing the charge. I did some adjustments to the operating costs of
running the London Congestion Charge provided by Leape (2006). Estimating the
ﬁrst year cost to be around ¿163 million and the subsequent annual operating cost
equal to ¿140 million (¿23 million is the set up cost), the present value net cost
of implementing the charge for the next 30 years at 2015 ¿value is around ¿4.15
billion. This is computed by assuming an inﬂation rate of 2.7% and a discount rate
of 3.0%. The net house price gains, which measures the beneﬁts for home owners
in the zone, covers almost 75% of the net cost. This is just about right considering
the array31 of beneﬁts enjoyed by others that are not quantiﬁed in this study.
There are policy implications associated with this study. The main reason why
many individuals are against the Pigouvian tax is that it is regressive. The huge
windfall enjoyed by residents in the zone at the expense of poorer households living
outside the cordoned area suggests that this is true. Hence, policy makers should
ensure that the charge is more equitable for individuals residing outside the zone.
For one, the 90% waiver of the charge that is given to homeowners living in the
CCZ/WEZ should be either removed or reduced since they have beneﬁted tremen-
dously from better traﬃc conditions and higher home values. Furthermore, policy
makers could consider implementing a tax to cream oﬀ these capitalization gains.
Channelling these additional revenues or taxes to enhance the reliability and quality
of public transit could further improve the eﬃcacy of the charge and provide a more
equitable redistribution of beneﬁts to home-owners living outside.
Finally, I investigate the impact on the LCC on traﬃc accidents and air quality.
As this is out of the purview of this study, I move these results to Table 2.15
30This is computed by simply taking the average of the capitalization eﬀects across the
diﬀerent distance bandwidths from Table 2.5.
31Other beneﬁts that are not localised include the time savings for those living outside
the zone and the overall improvement in air quality with less traﬃc.
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and Table 2.16 in Data Appendix. In short, these results show that the CC not
only reduces the number of traﬃc collisions, but also improves air quality in the
cordoned area. Speciﬁcally, compared to areas outside but within 3 kilometres from
the charged zone, the number of accidents and injuries decline by around 5%, while
the concentration of PM10 decrease by 4% after the CC is implemented. These
eﬀects are weaker associated with air quality as, depending on wind speed and
direction, air pollutants could travel across the boundary into the charge zone. This
is observed for lighter air pollutants such as NOX and NO2. Another explanation
purported by Green et al. (2018) for the increase in these nitrogen oxides is the
substitution of diesel based vehicles into the cordoned area as taxis and buses are
not charged. Combustion of diesel could lead to higher content of nitrogen oxides.
Nevertheless, these ﬁndings largely support the notion that the cordoned area has
become a more pleasant area after the charge is implemented, which could explain
why home prices are higher.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper exploits the sharp but localised changes in traﬃc conditions induced
by the London Congestion Charge (LCC) in the Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ) and
the Western Extension Zone (WEZ) to estimate the cost of traﬃc by estimating the
hedonic house price function. Using the LCC as an instrumental variable for traﬃc
conditions, this study is an improvement from the typical cross-sectional approaches
that are blighted by omitted variable bias and sorting.
The evidence suggests that the introduction of the CC in the CCZ and WEZ are
associated with declines in traﬃc volume and increments in housing values. Com-
paring properties just inside and outside the Congestion Charge (CC) boundary to
reduce unobserved neighbourhood diﬀerences, I observe that new homeowners pay,
on average, 3.6% (¿40,968) more for their homes to enjoy 8.5% (1,779 vehicles)
reduction in traﬃc in the CCZ. Putting these results together, the instrumental
variable estimates imply that the elasticity of housing values with respect to traﬃc
is -0.43. These results are robust across a battery of sensitivity analyses and placebo
tests. Compared to the previous literature, these estimates on the average marginal
willingness to pay to avoid traﬃc are much larger and are far less sensitive to spec-
iﬁcations. Additional results indicate that home buyers could have paid more for
better air quality and safer roads in the cordoned area.
My estimates indicate that the tolls generated substantial local wealth gains of
around ¿3.11 billion and ¿11.91 billion for home-owners in the CCZ and the WEZ
respectively relative to neighbours residing outside the zone. These gains measures
the local beneﬁts associated with the charge and suggested that the policy created
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a windfall for residents in the zone by creating a less congested and more conducive
living environment.
Given that congestion is fast becoming a salient issue for many cities around
the world, this problem has drawn considerable interests from policy makers and
economists. Yet, solutions such as constructing more roads (Duranton & Turner,
2011) and implementing fuel taxes (Anas & Lindsey, 2011) are notoriously ineﬀec-
tual in reducing traﬃc jams. My ﬁndings suggest that although congestion tolls
successfully reduce in traﬃc in the cordoned area, this may be at the expense of
neighbouring areas outside as substantial displacement of traﬃc across the bound-
ary is detected. Hence, to ensure that the policy is eﬀective in abating bottlenecks,
there must be proper management of traﬃc around and beyond the charge zone.
Also, it is imperative to provide a reliable and comprehensive public transport sys-
tem to encourage commuters to switch from driving.
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2.8 Data Appendix
A1. Description of Data
Table 2.9: Description of Variables used in the analysis
Panel A: Main Speciﬁcation Variables
Variable Source Description
Dependent Variable
Housing Price ( Yijkt ) Land Registry Natural logarithm of prop-
erty price of transaction i at
postcode k, neighbourhood j
at quarter q of year t
Traﬃc Flow ( Tijkt ) Department
Of Transport
Natural logarithm of traﬃc
ﬂow from vehicles with 4 or
more wheels for transaction
i at postcode k at year t
Collision Outcomes ( Art ) STATS19 Counts of collisions outcome
(Accidents, Slight injuries,
Serious injuries and Deaths)
at road section r at year-
month t
Air Pollutant (Pmt) London Air
Quality Net-
work
Natural logarithm of air
pollutant (NO2, NOX &
PM10) at monitoring sta-
tion m at year-month t
Housing Characteristics(X ′it)
New Sales Land Registry Dummy denoting whether
transaction i is new build
Terrace Land Registry Dummy denoting whether
the property type for trans-
action i is terrace
Leasehold Land Registry Dummy denoting whether
the tenure for transaction i
is leasehold
Location/Neighbourhood Characteristics (V ′jt)
Distance to the CCZ/WEZ
boundary
- Elucidian distance of post-
code j from the perimeter of
the CCZ/WEZ
Distance to nearest Grade 1
Park
Magic Elucidian distance of nearest
Grade 1 Park from postcode
j in km
Counts of Heritage Build-
ings
Magic Number of Heritage build-
ings within 200m from post-
code j
Thames River View Digimap Binary variable = 1 if post-
code j within 200m from
Thames River, 0 otherwise
Minority race residents Census 2001
& 2011
% of Asian/African/Middle
Eastern and other minority
race residents in OA
Unemployment rate Census 2001
& 2011
% of unemployed working
adults in OA
Uneducated residents Census 2001
& 2011
% of residents in OA with no
education qualiﬁcations
Lone parent households Census 2001
& 2011
% of single-parent house-
holds in OA
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A2. Additional Descriptive Statistics
(a) Minority ethnicity
(b) Lone parent households
(c) Driving to work
(d) Uneducated
(e) Unemployment Rate
(f) Car ownership
Figure 2.10: Census demographics around the WEZ. The solid line represents the
conditional average change of various demographics at a given distance from the
CC boundary and the dashed line represents the 95% conﬁdence interval. It is
constructed by regressing the % ∆ in demographics at Census Output Area with
boundary ﬁxed eﬀect and 100 meters distance bandwidths and coeﬃcient of each
distance dummy is plotted. Distance is negative when it is in the charged zone (Left
of dashed Line). There are a total of 1,727 output areas within 1.5 kilometres in
and out of the WEZ.
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Figure 2.11: The eﬀects of the WEZ on Traﬃc (Top) and House Prices (Bottom)
across distance around the CC boundary. Distance is negative when it in the charged
zone (Left of dashed line). The plotted coeﬃcients denote the localised conditional
changes of traﬃc/house prices at a given distance from the WEZ boundary. Tails
denote 95% conﬁdence interval. They are constructed by regressing traﬃc volume or
house prices against postcode and year-month ﬁxed eﬀects, observable housing and
neighbourhood covariates and 100 metres distance-bandwidth dummies interacted
with Postit and distance-bandwidth dummies interacted with CCit. Postit is equal
to one for observations after the WEZ is enforced, while CCit takes the value of one
for observations in the cordoned area after the WEZ is enforced. This ﬁgure plots
the coeﬃcients associated with these distance dummies.
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A3. Eﬀects of Other Congestion Charge Events on Traﬃc &
House Prices
In this section, I report the eﬀects of the other Congestion Charge events on
traﬃc and housing values. These events include (1) the increase in the charge from
¿5 to ¿8 from the 4th of July 2005 (CCZ2005) and (2) from ¿8 to ¿10 from the 4th
of January 2011 (CCZ2011), (3) the removal of the WEZ from the 24th December
2010 (RemWEZ) and (4) the increase in the charge from ¿10 to ¿11.50 from the
16th of June 2014 (CCZ2014). The sample windows for these events are deﬁned
by 2 years before and after the respective event dates. Refer to Figure 2.4 for more
details.
Overall, as reﬂected in Panel A of Table 2.10, most of the charge increments
do not materially improve traﬃc conditions. This could explain why these hikes
have no eﬀects on house prices, as documented in Panel B. The only exception is
during the charge increment in 2005 (CCZ2005). Restricting the analysis to areas
1 kilometre in and out the CCZ, I observe signiﬁcant reductions of traﬃc ﬂow at
around 2.98%. This works out to around 523 less vehicles every day. Corresponding
to these reductions, home prices are 1.28% higher in the CCZ although this esti-
mate is not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional levels. Interpreting these
estimates collectively, the elasticity of housing prices with respect to traﬃc volume,
as shown in Column (5) of Table 2.11, is around -0.43, which is fairly comparable
to earlier ﬁndings. Negligible impact of these hikes explain why none of the MWTP
to avoid traﬃc estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in Table 2.11. The immaterial
eﬀects of the charge increment are consistent with the ﬁndings reported by Agarwal
et al. (2015) who also show that the increase in the CC in Singapore do not aﬀect
residential transacted prices.
In other results, I observe a slight rebound in traﬃc ﬂow that ranges between
2.47% and 4.08% (482 - 798 vehicles) in response to the removal of the WEZ. This
surge in the traﬃc after the WEZ (366 - 839 vehicles) is taken away is remarkably
comparable to the eﬀects documented after the implementation of the WEZ (See
Table 2.5). These results reinforce the eﬀectiveness of the implementation of the CC
in reducing congestion. Contrary to expectations, I observe eﬀects of around 3.24%
to 3.77% that are too imprecise to be statistically signiﬁcant after the removal of
the WEZ. The muted eﬀects on home prices explain why the average MWTP on
traﬃc are imprecisely estimated32 across the board for the removal of the WEZ as
observed in Table 2.11.
32Even though the removal of the WEZ has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on traﬃc conditions, the
weak ﬁrst stage F-statistics (See Table 2.10) suggest that the instrument might have the
strength to obtain consistent estimate of the MWTP to avoid traﬃc.
2.8. Data Appendix 51
T
ab
le
2.
10
:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
Im
p
ac
t
of
th
e
ot
h
er
C
on
ge
st
io
n
C
h
ar
ge
ev
en
ts
on
T
ra
ﬃ
c
&
H
ou
se
P
ri
ce
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
5k
m
4k
m
3k
m
2k
m
1k
m
5k
m
4k
m
3k
m
2k
m
1k
m
P
an
el
A
:
F
ir
st
S
ta
ge
(L
og
T
ra
ﬃ
c)
P
an
el
B
:
R
ed
u
ce
d
F
or
m
(L
og
H
ou
se
P
ri
ce
)
C
C
Z
2
0
0
5
-0
.0
13
2
-0
.0
14
3
-0
.0
18
0
-0
.0
19
0
-0
.0
29
4b
0.
00
27
0.
00
45
0.
00
22
0.
00
83
0.
01
27
(0
.0
13
3)
(0
.0
13
2)
(0
.0
12
8)
(0
.0
12
9)
(0
.0
14
9)
(0
.0
13
0)
(0
.0
13
5)
(0
.0
14
3)
(0
.0
15
1)
(0
.0
18
6)
R
2
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
99
0.
99
0.
79
0.
78
0.
78
0.
77
0.
75
∆
T
ra
ﬃ
c
-2
34
-2
53
-3
18
-3
37
-5
27
.
.
.
.
.
∆
H
P
.
.
.
.
.
20
55
34
27
16
85
63
57
96
90
F
-s
ta
ts
0.
97
1.
17
1.
97
2.
17
3.
89
.
.
.
.
.
C
C
Z
2
0
1
1
-0
.0
15
6
-0
.0
09
5
-0
.0
10
7
-0
.0
01
6
0.
01
02
-0
.0
12
1
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
13
2
-0
.0
09
4
0.
02
80
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
14
8)
(0
.0
14
6)
(0
.0
14
4)
(0
.0
18
5)
(0
.0
27
6)
(0
.0
28
9)
(0
.0
30
8)
(0
.0
31
0)
(0
.0
30
3)
R
2
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
77
0.
77
0.
77
0.
77
0.
73
∆
T
ra
ﬃ
c
-2
39
-1
47
-1
65
-2
5
15
6
.
.
.
.
.
∆
H
P
.
.
.
.
.
-6
59
6
-5
69
6
-7
22
0
-5
15
3
15
46
2
F
-s
ta
ts
1.
12
0.
42
0.
54
0.
01
0.
31
.
.
.
.
.
R
e
m
W
E
Z
0.
03
21
b
0.
03
94
a
0.
03
66
b
0.
04
00
a
0.
02
44
0.
03
66
0.
03
47
0.
03
19
0.
03
28
0.
03
70
(0
.0
14
4)
(0
.0
14
6)
(0
.0
14
5)
(0
.0
14
6)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
24
5)
(0
.0
25
5)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
27
1)
(0
.0
29
5)
R
2
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
99
0.
80
0.
79
0.
78
0.
77
0.
74
∆
T
ra
ﬃ
c
63
9
78
5
72
9
79
8
48
2
.
.
.
.
.
∆
H
P
.
.
.
.
.
36
79
0
34
77
5
31
95
2
32
87
4
37
01
9
F
-s
ta
ts
4.
99
7.
31
6.
35
7.
55
2.
25
.
.
.
.
.
C
C
Z
2
0
1
4
-0
.0
03
2
-0
.0
06
1
0.
00
22
0.
00
15
0.
00
28
-0
.0
61
0
-0
.0
62
2
-0
.0
57
2
-0
.0
69
8
-0
.1
32
9b
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
05
3)
(0
.0
05
8)
(0
.0
04
1)
(0
.0
42
7)
(0
.0
43
0)
(0
.0
45
1)
(0
.0
46
4)
(0
.0
57
4)
R
2
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
0.
79
0.
79
0.
81
0.
80
0.
78
∆
T
ra
ﬃ
c
-5
1
-9
6
34
23
44
.
.
.
.
∆
H
P
.
.
.
.
.
-4
90
02
-4
99
58
-4
60
41
-5
58
19
-9
47
61
F
-s
ta
ts
0.
32
1.
15
0.
17
0.
07
0.
47
.
.
.
.
.
E
ac
h
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
(γ
)
is
fr
om
a
di
ﬀ
er
en
t
ﬁr
st
st
ag
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
of
eq
ua
ti
on
2.
2.
Sa
m
pl
e
is
co
ns
tr
ai
ne
d
to
pr
op
er
ti
es
w
it
hi
n
5
ki
lo
m
et
re
s
fr
om
th
e
C
C
Z
/W
E
Z
b
ou
nd
ar
y.
P
an
el
A
re
p
or
ts
th
e
ﬁr
st
st
ag
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
it
h
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
an
nu
al
av
er
ag
e
tr
aﬃ
c
vo
lu
m
e
as
th
e
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
.
P
an
el
B
su
m
m
ar
iz
es
re
du
ce
d
fo
rm
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
it
h
th
e
na
tu
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
ho
us
e
pr
ic
es
.
F
ou
r
ot
he
r
ev
en
ts
ar
e
ex
am
in
ed
:
(1
)
th
e
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
ch
ar
ge
fr
om
¿
5
to
¿
8
in
20
05
(C
C
Z
20
0
5)
,
(2
)
th
e
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
ch
ar
ge
fr
om
¿
8
to
¿
10
in
20
11
(C
C
Z
20
11
)
(3
)
th
e
re
m
ov
al
of
th
e
W
E
Z
in
20
10
(R
em
W
E
Z
)
an
d
(4
)
th
e
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
ch
ar
ge
fr
om
¿
10
to
¿
11
.5
0
in
20
14
(C
C
Z
20
14
).
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(i
n
pa
re
nt
he
si
s)
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
ou
tp
ut
ar
ea
.
c
p<
0.
10
,
b
p<
0.
05
,
a
p<
0.
01
.
2.8. Data Appendix 52
Table 2.11: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the impact of the other charge events
on House Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5km 4km 3km 2km 1km
ln(Traﬃc) - CCZ2005 -0.2041 -0.3135 -0.1225 -0.4352 -0.4304
(1.0233) (1.0112) (0.8029) (0.8587) (0.6845)
Obs 43169 34873 26588 18743 11060
R2 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.75
No.of Postcodes 7361 6042 4667 3259 1888
ln(Traﬃc) - CCZ2011 0.7741 1.0902 1.2334 5.7398 2.7304
(1.8886) (3.3888) (3.2590) (53.9422) (5.9623)
Obs 21098 17952 13729 9499 5508
R2 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.19 0.62
No.of Postcodes 3967 3440 2756 1964 1108
ln(Traﬃc) - RemWEZ 1.1398 0.8800 0.8714 0.8194 1.5180
(0.9530) (0.7470) (0.8183) (0.7652) (1.6835)
Obs 27122 22920 18372 13486 8545
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.70
No.of Postcodes 4190 3474 2748 2010 1235
ln(Traﬃc) - CCZ2014 18.9003 10.1860 -26.5141 -47.3229 -47.5710
(35.7493) (11.6536) (67.0420) (186.2897) (71.3023)
Obs 16064 12882 9349 6705 4068
R2 -2.18 -0.07 -1.62 -5.67 -3.49
No.of Postcodes 3092 2550 1886 1301 748
Each coeﬃcient is the IV estimate (βIV ) from a diﬀerent regression that measures the
direct elasticity between traﬃc volume and house prices using the diﬀerent CC
events as instruments that include 1) the increase in the charge from ¿5 to ¿8 in 2005
(CCZ2005), (2) the increase in the charge from ¿8 to ¿10 in 2011 (CCZ2011) (3) the
removal of the WEZ in 2010 (RemWEZ) and (4) the increase in the charge from ¿10 to
¿11.50 in 2014 (CCZ2014). Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of transacted
house prices. Sample is constrained to properties within 5 kilometres (Column 1) to 1
kilometre (Column 5) from the CCZ/WEZ boundary. See notes in previous tables for
details on the control variables included. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at output area. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
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A4. Additional Results for the WEZ
In this section, I provide results for the WEZ analogous to earlier speciﬁcations
that I have conducted for the CCZ. In particular, I constraint the sample of trans-
actions from 900 to 500 meters from the WEZ boundary in Table 2.12. Although
there are some evidences indicating that the introduction of the WEZ reduces traﬃc
ﬂow and increases home prices in the cordoned area, these results ﬂuctuate across
the diﬀerent samples. Moreover, low F-statistics (<10) suggests that WEZ is a weak
instrument with limited impact on improving traﬃc conditions. Using the WEZ as
an instrument could produce unreliable and overly inﬂated estimates of the hedonic
price schedule gradient.
Table 2.12: Reduced form & IV estimates of the WEZ on Traﬃc & House
Prices
900m 800m 700m 600m 500m
Panel A: First Stage (Log Traﬃc)
WEZ -0.0180c -0.0212c -0.0207 -0.0098 -0.0316c
(0.0107) (0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0170)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
∆ Traﬃc -419 -505 -469 -218 -717
F-stats 2.84 3.12 2.22 0.44 3.47
Panel B: Reduced Form (Log House Price)
WEZ 0.0573b 0.0334 0.0412 0.0352 0.0031
(0.0254) (0.0272) (0.0305) (0.0345) (0.0419)
R2 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73
∆ HP 87387 49606 56745 47444 4107
Panel C: IV Regressions
ln(Traﬃc) - WEZ -3.1821 -1.5741 -1.9944 -3.6093 -0.0989
(2.2443) (1.4907) (1.8881) (6.3134) (1.3213)
Obs 11110 9938 8770 7496 6388
R2 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.59 0.73
No.of Postcodes 1675 1469 1296 1110 921
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to prop-
erties within 900m (Column 1) to 500m (Column 5) from the WEZ boundary.
See notes in previous tables for details on the control variables included. Ro-
bust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at output area. c p<0.10,
b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
Similar observations can be made in Table 2.13. Noisy and small eﬀects from
the introduction of the WEZ on traﬃc ﬂow could explain why the willingness to
pay to avoid using the WEZ as an instrument is inﬂated and imprecisely estimated.
One notable result is the announcement eﬀects associated with the WEZ in Column
(1). It appears that homeowners are fairly optimistic about the impact of the WEZ,
as evidenced by the 2.7% (¿34,532) increase in home prices. These positive beliefs
could be driven by the eﬀectiveness of the CCZ in curbing traﬃc congestion. It is
also intriguing to observe that traﬃc volume went down by 4.77% (1037 vehicles).
One explanation is the possible spillover eﬀects from the implementation of the CCZ.
There could be less traﬃc passing through the WEZ towards the CCZ because of
the charge imposed.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Tests for the WEZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Announce Pcd>=5 North Transport Rem Near 50m Houses IDW
Panel A: First Stage (Log Traﬃc)
WEZ -0.0466a -0.0160 -0.0301a -0.0240b -0.0187c -0.0085 -0.0212b
(0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0113) (0.0135) (0.0100)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
∆ Traﬃc -1037 -362 -669 -534 -392 -193 -472
F-stats 20.30 2.29 8.41 5.84 2.76 0.40 4.44
Panel B: Reduced Form (Log House Price)
WEZ 0.0266 0.0639a 0.0654a 0.0681a 0.0647a 0.0582c 0.0731a
(0.0174) (0.0242) (0.0227) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0319) (0.0234)
R2 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.76
∆ HP 34532 91592 100413 104768 103284 88204 112700
Panel C: IV Regressions
ln(Traﬃc) -0.5710 -3.9998 -2.1686b -2.8407c -3.4598 -6.8249 -3.4534c
(0.3951) (3.0329) (1.0496) (1.4920) (2.3799) (11.7901) (1.9555)
Obs 19303 9987 10914 12490 10598 6453 12490
R2 0.74 0.54 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.35 0.66
No.of Postcodes 2951 1014 1776 1896 1635 975 1896
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to sales 1 km from the CC boundary
unless otherwise stated. In (1), the treatment period (CCit) is deﬁned by the announcement window and
begins the day the WEZ is announced oﬃcially by the Transport for London (TfL) and ends the day before
the CCZ is implemented. In (2), I remove any sales in postcodes with less than 5 repeated transactions over
sample period. In (3), I remove any sales south of the Thames River. In (4), I include distance to tube-by-year
and number of buslines-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. In (5), I exclude sales that are 100 meters or less from the charge
boundary (both inside and outside the zone). In (6), I remove any transactions that are beyond 50 meters from
the nearest roads that I can reliably measure traﬃc ﬂow. In (7), estimates are weighted inversely according the
distance from transacted property from matched road. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered
at output area. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
Figure 2.12 report estimates from placebo tests associated with fake pre-treatment
windows for the WEZ. Like the analysis before in Figure 3.8, I generate rolling 1-year
pre-treatment placebo windows for every quarter from 1996Q1 onwards till 2006Q1.
Placebo treatment period is between tfalse and tfalse+1year and the placebo window
is from tfalse − 1year to tfalse + 1year where tfalse represents every quarter 1 year
before the implementation of the WEZ. The new key regressor - WEZ ∗ tfalse - is
the interaction of a binary variable of whether the property i in the WEZ is sold
during the false treatment period. This falsiﬁcation test incorporates transactions
within 1 kilometre from the WEZ boundary. None of the placebo estimates are
bigger than the implementation eﬀects33 denoted by the dashed line. If anything,
home prices in the WEZ dipped before 2000 but these trends should not confound
earlier capitalization eﬀects on the WEZ.
33This WEZ estimate on house prices is obtained from Column (5) of Panel A from
Table 2.5.
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Figure 2.12: The WEZ Placebo Estimates during pre-treatment period. Each point
represents a diﬀerent regression where the treatment period is 1-year rolling window
from the corresponding quarter and the pre-treatment period is 1 year before the
quarter. The tails represent 95% conﬁdence interval and cross denotes that the
estimate is signiﬁcant at least at 10%, and is insigniﬁcant otherwise.
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Table 2.14: Reduced form estimates of the Congestion Charge Discount
on Traﬃc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5km 4km 3km 2km 1km
Discount 0.0023 0.0013 0.0088 0.0103 0.0178
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0099) (0.0120)
WEZ -0.0407a -0.0415a -0.0332a -0.0315a -0.0258a
(0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0098)
Obs 46819 39349 31814 24012 15161
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
No.of Postcodes 7576 6284 4979 3699 2232
Discount 0.0053 0.0152 0.0010 0.0220 0.0289
(0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0218)
RemWEZ 0.0388a 0.0486a 0.0465a 0.0639a 0.0546a
(0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0151)
Obs 51393 43746 35255 25554 15976
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
No.of Postcodes 7770 6458 5132 3763 2332
Each coeﬃcient is from a diﬀerent regression. Sample is constrained to sales
within 5km (Column 1) to 1km (Column 5). Discount is a binary variable
equals to one for sales made inside the discount zone after the WEZ is in-
troduced. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the traﬃc ﬂow.
Robust standard errors clustered at output area are reported in parenthesis.c
p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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A5. Eﬀects of the Congestion Charge on Air Quality and
Accidents
In this section, I provide some evidence to understand why home buyers are
willing to pay for better traﬃc in the cordoned area after the CC is introduced. In
particular, I examine how the eﬀects of the CC - both the CCZ and the WEZ - on
traﬃc collisions and air pollution.
Art = αr + δCCrt + ωt + εrt, (2.6)
Table 2.15 reports the key estimate (δ) from equation 2.6 for both the CCZ
and the WEZ. These regressions include road-level (αr) and year-quarter (ωt) ﬁxed
eﬀects and the key variable of interest, CCrt, is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 for roads inside the CCZ/WEZ after the charge is implemented. If the
reduction in traﬃc due to the introduction of CC makes roads safer, I expect δ to
be < 0. I constrain the analysis to roads within 3 kilometres from the CCZ/WEZ
boundary, with the notion being that this bandwidth covers the entire cordoned
area. Here, the dependent variables are the year-quarterly counts34 of collisions,
slight injuries, serious injuries and deaths collected at a particular section of the
road (r) at year-quarter (t). Given that the dependent variables are non-discrete
count outcomes, I further report Poisson estimates of δ.
As expected, small but signiﬁcant reductions in collisions are observed and es-
timates are fairly comparable between OLS and Poisson regressions. Speciﬁcally,
the counts of accidents and injuries went down by about 4.7 to 4.9% after the CCZ
is implemented. Although sizeable reductions in deaths are documented, they are
too imprecisely estimated to be statistically signiﬁcant. Conversely, I do not report
signiﬁcant reductions in collision outcomes after the WEZ is implemented. This is
understandable given that the Western Extension of the CC had a negligible eﬀect
on reducing traﬃc ﬂow in the ﬁrst place.
34The reason why this is not conducted at a monthly level is because traﬃc accidents
are fairly rare events and aggregation at a monthly level will lead to a disproportionate
number of zeros in the dataset.
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Table 2.15: Eﬀect of the CCZ & WEZ on Traﬃc Accidents
CCZ WEZ
Acc Slight Serious Deaths Acc Slight Serious Deaths
OLS -0.0150a -0.0147b -0.0028 -0.0140 0.0019 -0.0007 0.0019 -0.0040
(0.0045) (0.0066) (0.0039) (0.0107) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0112)
Obs 255789 243192 94271 6428 193431 182007 67578 5019
R2 0.26 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.04 0.01
No.of Road Segments 10671 10146 3932 268 8070 7593 2819 210
Poisson -0.048b -0.050c -0.002 -0.295 0.005 -0.010 0.013 -0.108
(0.023) (0.027) (0.056) (0.284) (0.034) (0.040) (0.089) (0.380)
Obs 255789 243192 94271 6428 193431 182007 67578 5019
Absolute -0.011 -0.012 -0.000 -0.015 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005
% ∆ -4.723 -4.910 -0.182 -25.560 0.544 -0.953 1.268 -10.229
No.of Road Segments 10671 10146 3932 268 8070 7593 2819 210
Dependent variable is the counts of accident outcomes collected at road segment r at quarter t. Acc is the total
counts of all collision, Slight is the number of slight injuries, Deaths is the total number of causalities from accidents.
Each coeﬃcient (δ) is from diﬀerent regressions that incorporate roads within 3 kilometres from the CCZ/WEZ
boundary estimated with year-quarter and road ﬁxed eﬀects. CCrt is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for
roads in the CCZ/WEZ after the charge is implemented. Robust standard errors, reported in the parenthesis, are
clustered at road-level
Pmt = αm + ϕCCmt +X
′
mtφ+ ωt + εmt, (2.7)
Table 2.16 reports the key estimate (ϕ), which captures the percentage change
in pollutants after the CCZ and WEZ are implemented from equation 2.7. The
dependent variables include the natural logarithm of various pollutants including
nitrogen oxide (NOX), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and particulate matter 10 (PM10) 35
collected at a monitoring station level (m) at month (t). Other than exploiting the
monthly variation of air quality within monitoring stations with station (αm) and
year-month (ωt) ﬁxed eﬀects, I further control for diﬀerences in wind speed, wind
direction, temperature, relative humidity and barometric pressure.
Panel A presents the eﬀects of the CCZ on air quality within the cordoned
area. A surprising and intriguing set of results emerges. The estimate implies that
after the CCZ is enforced, the concentration of NOX and NO2 are 4% and 1%
higher respectively although the estimates for NO2 are too imprecisely estimated
to be statistically signiﬁcant. This result is consistent with that reported by Green
et al. (2018). They explain that the implementation of the CC could lead to the
substitution of diesel-based vehicles, such as buses and taxis, in the charged zone
as they are waived from paying the CC. The combustion of diesel produces more
nitrogen oxides and this could explain the higher concentration of these pollutants
in the zone.
Moreover, given that I am comparing neighbourhoods very close to one another
around the boundary, another possibility is that air pollutants travel across space
35There are other pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, PM2.5 and ozone. However, miss-
ing observations across the sample period meant that there are insuﬃcient data points for
statistical analysis.
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into the cordoned area. Findings on PM10 support this hypothesis. In particu-
lar, I observe that the concentration of PM10 is about 4% lower after the CCZ is
introduced. This pollutant is considerably heavier and less airborne compared to
nitrogen oxides. Panel B performs similar analyses for the introduction of the WEZ
and reveal smaller eﬀects that are less precisely estimated in the same direction.
This is expected given that traﬃc conditions do not improve signiﬁcantly after the
WEZ is put in place.
All in all, these results suggest that the reduction in traﬃc from the implemen-
tation of the CC leads to safer roads and better air quality in the cordoned area
that could explain why homeowners are paying more for homes.
Table 2.16: Eﬀect of the CCZ & WEZ on Air Quality
Panel A:CCZ Panel B:WEZ
NOX NO2 PM10 NOX NO2 PM10
CCZ/WEZ 0.039c 0.010 -0.038b 0.018 0.023 -0.016
(0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) (0.026)
Obs 1422 1412 990 1215 1214 1118
R2 0.94 0.90 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.86
No.of.Stations 22 22 19 27 27 22
Treated 8 8 6 3 3 2
Absolute 5.93 0.65 -1.27 4.13 2.10 -0.46
Dependent variable is the natural log of pollutant collected at monitoring sta-
tion m at month t. Each coeﬃcient (ϕ) is from diﬀerent regressions that incor-
porate stations within 3 kilometres from the CCZ/WEZ boundary estimated
with year-month and monitoring station ﬁxed eﬀects. CCmt is a binary variable
that takes the value of 1 for stations in the CCZ/WEZ after the charge is im-
plemented. Control variables include wind speed, wind direction, temperature,
relative humidity and barometric pressure. Robust standard errors, reported
in the parenthesis, are clustered at district*year-month.
Chapter 3
Do Speed Cameras Save Lives?
3.1 Introduction
Every year, more than 50 million people are injured, with more than 1.2 mil-
lion people are killed by auto-mobile crashes around the world (Peden et al., 2004).
Likewise, across United Kingdom (UK), traﬃc collisions cause more than 160,000
injuries and 1,730 fatalities in 2015 (DfT, 2016). These crashes have disproportion-
ately aﬀected the younger generation. It is the leading cause of death for those
between 5 and 34 years old, accounting for more than 15% of their deaths and in-
ducing many life years lost1. In monetary terms, these accidents cost UK a total of
¿10.3 billion in 20152.
Speeding is one of the main reasons3 why crashes occur. According to Depart-
ment for Transport (DfT), speeding accounts for more than 24% of the fatal accidents
that occurred in UK in 2015. The severity of the crashes is also dependent on the
velocity of the colliding vehicles. Studies have shown that the fatality risk at 50
km/h is twice larger than the risk at 40 km/h, and more than ﬁve times larger than
the risk at 30 km/h (Rosén & Sander, 2009). Although speeding is often considered
a menial oﬀence to many, it is immense in determining both the probability and
gravity of crashes.
Diﬀerent interventions, such as traﬃc police, traﬃc lights, road humps, speed
limits, warning signs, vehicle-activated speed signs and speed enforcement cameras,
have been employed to deter speeding. Since the seminal paper by Peltzman (1975),
1Based on 2016 ﬁgures from Oﬃce for National Statistics, there are a total of 3,423
deaths from accidents. This is just slightly more than 10% of the 30,570 who passed on
from lung cancer. However, assuming that life expectancy is 79 for males and 82.8 for
females, based on the demographics of the victims, the total number of life years lost from
accident amounts to 117,285, which is almost half of the 264,424 life years lost from lung
cancer. Clearly, one is underestimating how detrimental traﬃc accidents can be by just
looking at casualty ﬁgures.
2These ﬁgures are much larger in United States. A federal study conducted by National
Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration reveals that estimated economic cost from motor
crashes is approximately US$242 billion in 2010 (Administration et al., 2014).
3Many other factors explain why traﬃc collisions occur. For instance, intoxication (Dee,
1999; Levitt & Porter, 2001a; Hansen, 2015), distraction from the use of mobile phones
(Abouk & Adams, 2013), failure to use seat belts (Levitt & Porter, 2001b; Cohen & Einav,
2003) and visibility (Ho et al., 2017) could increase the risk and severity of crashes.
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evaluating these measures has drawn considerable attention from economists. These
studies have examined the eﬀect of speed limits (Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2004;
van Benthem, 2015), traﬃc police (DeAngelo & Hansen, 2014) and red-light cam-
eras (Gallagher & Fisher, 2017) on traﬃc accidents. Falling back to the economic
models of crime (Becker, 1968), these instruments deter reckless driving through
punishment, such as ﬁnes, driving suspension and incarceration. One widely used
strategy that has drawn substantial interest from the transport safety literature,
but surprisingly scant attention from economists, is speed camera. These devices
are usually deployed at sites prone to collisions (e.g windy, hilly roads) or sites with
vulnerable pedestrians (e.g near schools, transportation nodes and petrol stations).
They penalize drivers for exceeding speed limits around the cameras.
In this paper, I estimate the eﬀects of ﬁxed speed cameras on reducing the occur-
rence and severity of collisions. To do so, I put together a rich dataset of more than
2,500 ﬁxed speed cameras across England, Scotland and Wales (Great Britain).
I rely on the STATS19 Road Accident Dataset that documents details (location,
number of injuries and fatalities etc.) of every reported collision since 1979. This
comprehensive dataset allows me to conduct the analysis at a ﬁne spatial scale and
capture how enforcement eﬀects change moving away from the camera. In short,
I compare accident outcomes before and after the camera is introduced with sim-
ilar non-camera sites using a quasi-experimental diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation
strategy.
For the estimates to be valid, it requires the mean diﬀerences in unobserved
characteristics between sites not to be correlated with the installation of enforcement
cameras. This assumption, however, is likely to be violated given the endogeneity in
site selection. Cameras are often found at areas prone to collisions (e.g more traﬃc,
sharp bends) and this selection process is likely to accentuate the diﬀerences between
sites with and without cameras. The diﬃculty in identifying the enforcement eﬀects
of cameras is further exacerbated by the fact that installations can happen even
when sites do not meet the selection rules (see Section 2). Moreover, the timing
of intervention is likely to be endogenous as well. It is more probable for sites
that experience a sharp increase in accidents to receive cameras. This means that,
regardless of intervention, collisions will probably to revert to lower levels, inducing
an over-estimation of enforcement eﬀects.
I adopt several strategies to address these endogeneity concerns. First, to partial
out time-invariant diﬀerences between sites, I include site ﬁxed eﬀects to exploit
the variation in collisions within each site before after the speed camera is installed.
Second, to avoid the bias from the obscure selection process, I restrict the analysis
to only sites that will ever have enforcement cameras and rely on time variation of
installation for identiﬁcation. Put diﬀerently, sites with camera installations in the
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future (but no cameras now) will be employed as reference groups for sites having
installations now. Third, I minimize observable diﬀerences by controlling for a rich
set of time-variant city level characteristics. The concern is whether there are region-
speciﬁc shocks that could be correlated with camera installations. Still there is the
issue whether "worse" sites are treated ﬁrst. This means that sites that received
cameras far apart in time may be incomparable. Thus, I restrict reference groups
to sites that received installations less than six years apart from those treated now.
Finally, I address the endogenous timing of installations with two strategies.
First, I plot the pre-treatment collision trends to show that cameras are not strate-
gically introduced after a spike in collisions. In fact, due to bureaucratic red-tapes,
cameras are often installed a few years later after the sharp spike, mitigating con-
cerns that the estimates are inﬂated by mean reversion eﬀects. Second, I exploit
the "switching-oﬀ" of speed cameras to capture the eﬃcacy of these devices. Due to
budget cuts, some local camera partnerships are forced to switch oﬀ their cameras.
I argue that this decision to cut funding is unlikely be driven by collision trends.
The question is whether shutting down of speed cameras attributes to a rebound in
traﬃc collisions.
Other than adopting a more careful identiﬁcation strategy, this paper improves
the existing literature (See Table 3.8 in Data Appendix for details) on several fronts.
First, in contrast to previous papers, which are usually city-speciﬁc analyses re-
stricted to a small sample of cameras, this paper draw inferences from a represen-
tative nationwide dataset to increase the external validity of the research. Second,
with ﬁne spatial temporal information on accidents and speed cameras, I can ac-
curately capture how enforcement eﬀects vary across space. Last but not least, I
provide a rigorous welfare assessment of speed cameras, after considering a exhaus-
tive list of beneﬁts and costs, to understand whether these cameras improve social
welfare.
The headline ﬁnding is that speed cameras reduce both the number and severity
of collisions. After installing a speed camera, the number of accidents and minor in-
juries reduce by 17%-39% and 17%-38% respectively, which corresponds to 0.89-2.36
less accidents and 1.19-2.87 less injuries per kilometre per year. As for seriousness of
the crashes, the number of fatalities and serious injuries are 0.08-0.19 and 0.25-0.58
lower per kilometre per year, which represents a drop of 58%-68% and 28%-55%
respectively. Installing another 1,000 speed cameras reduce around 1130 collisions4,
mitigate 330 serious injuries, and save 190 lives annually5, generating beneﬁts of
4These estimates are taken from the preferred speciﬁcation in Column (7) of Table 3.2.
5The ratio of lives save in my study is much higher than the average national accidents
death ratio over the last 10 years from 1995 to 2015 (1.02%). There are several expla-
nations to this ﬁnding. First, speed cameras are often found along roads with a much
larger proportion of death related accidents. The pre-treatment percentage of deaths from
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around ¿309 million6. These ﬁndings are robust across a range of speciﬁcations
that mitigates the risk of potential con-founders from driving the estimates.
I further allow enforcement eﬀects to vary across diﬀerent speed limits, road
types, and over distance. My results show that enforcement eﬀects are larger along
roads with higher speed limits. This could be due to the fact that these roads
are more dangerous as drivers commute at higher speeds. Enforcement eﬀects also
appear highly localised around 500 metres from the camera and dissipate moving
away. Beyond 1.5 kilometres from the camera, there are suggestive evidences of
rebounds in collisions, injuries and deaths, implying that drivers could have speed
up beyond camera surveillance and cause more accidents.
These ﬁndings are of interest for at least three reasons. First, the public has
always been concerned because of the huge amount of ﬁnes that are raked up by
these cameras. A total of 166,216 speed tickets was issued in England and Wales
in 2015, amounting to more than ¿31 million7. Interests groups8 have campaigned
vehemently against these instruments, believing that alternative strategies, such as
vehicle-activated speed limit sign, could be equivalently eﬀective in improving road
safety9. Second, there are concerns whether these devices could cause more collisions
due to "kangaroo" eﬀects (Elvik, 1997). That is when drivers abruptly slow down in
proximity to the camera or immediately speed up beyond surveillance. Thirdly, due
to budget cuts to the Road Safety Grants, many older obsolete wet-ﬂim cameras
are not upgraded and local governments10 are forced to switch oﬀ their cameras.
If ﬁxed speed cameras improve road safety, then these devices should be upgraded
and switched back on. The objective of this paper is to provide educated answers
to these questions through high quality data and rigorous empirical analyses.
My results verify the eﬃcacy of speed cameras in enhancing road safety. How-
ever, the limited enforcement eﬀects across space, together with mild rebound of
collisions further away, highlight the limitations associated with these ﬁxated de-
collisions around speed camera sites is 2.50% (see Table 3.1), which is more than twice
of the national ratio. Second, by reducing speed through deterrence, cameras could have
disproportionately mitigated more severe accidents. Another explanation is that speed
cameras are less eﬀective in preventing collisions compared to deaths. Possible kangaroo
eﬀects, such as sudden braking in front of camera, or speeding up beyond surveillance,
could have attributed to more collisions.
6This is obtained from multiplying the net beneﬁts from welfare analysis in Table 3.5
by 1,000.
7Read more at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38724301
8Read http://www.safespeed.org.uk/
9See https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080422/
debtext/80422-0003.htm for more information
10This include Oxfordshire, West Midlands, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire, Swindon and
Northamptonshire. Recent reports indicate that switching-oﬀ of cameras may have been
more widespread, raising greater concerns of the eﬃcacy of speed cameras.
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vices. My ﬁndings also show that switched-oﬀ "dummy" cameras can still enforce
speed limit and reduce collisions. Local government, therefore, should keep these
cameras as a deterrence whether or not they are operating. All in all, with technolog-
ical advancement, these older devices should be superseded with newer prototypes,
such as mobile and variable speed cameras, that can enforce speed limits over a
larger area with the ﬂexibility of redeployment .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a back-
ground to speed enforcement cameras in UK. Section 3 describes the identiﬁcation
strategy adopted in this paper. Section 4 outlines the data used in this paper and
Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings in this paper. Section 6 concludes the study.
3.2 Background
Diﬀerent enforcement cameras, including ﬁxed, mobile and variable speed, are
deployed across the United Kingdom. Fixed speed cameras, the earliest generation
of speed detecting devices, are ﬁrst introduced in 1992. Mobile and Variable11 speed
camera are newer prototypes that only grew in prominence in the last decade. For
an illustration of these devices, refer to Figure 3.1. The focus of this paper is on
ﬁxed speed cameras as I can reliably determine both the location and installation
dates. The minimum penalty for speeding is a ﬁne of ¿100 and 3 demerit points
but oﬀender could be ﬁned up to ¿2,500 and suspended from driving, depending on
how much the speed limit is exceeded.
Cameras are managed by a safety camera partnership, which is a joint collabora-
tion of police force, local government, highway agency and health authorities. They
work hand-in-hand to identify dangerous sites for enforcement. Sites that chosen for
installations must comply with the following national selection rules (DfT, 2004)12:
1. Length must be between 0.4 and 1.5 kilometres;
2. At least 4 killed and serious collisions (KSI) & 8 personal injury collisions
(PIC) per kilometre in the 3 years before installation13;
11Mobile speed cameras are ﬁxated on auto-mobiles with the ﬂexibility to be deployed
in diﬀerent locations but require manpower to operate. Variable speed cameras enforce
speed limit over a stretch by measuring average speed between two points on the road and
have the advantage of enforcing speed limit over longer distances.
12One other strategy is to utilize a regression discontinuity design over these rules and
to obtain some local estimates around these thresholds. This is not adopted due to the
following reasons. First, I do not have information on average speed, site length, suitability
that aﬀect whether a site receives camera enforcement. Furthermore, these rules are not
deterministic for installation. It is possible for sites to have installations without meeting
these rules, impeding identiﬁcation of eﬀects around these thresholds.
13One crash can result in multiple causalities. Adding up the number of slight injury
collisions and KSI will provide the PIC counts.
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(a) Fixed Speed (b) Average Speed
(c) Mobile Speed
Figure 3.1: Diﬀerent types of Speed Cameras used in United Kingdom
3. Suitable for the loading and unloading of cameras
4. At least 85% of the traﬃc is travelling is at or above the Association of Chief
Police Oﬃcers (ACPO) threshold based on speed surveys;
5. At least 20% of the drivers are exceeding speed limits;
6. No other more cost eﬀective solutions to improve road safety as determined
by the road engineers.
The ﬁrst two guidelines are considered more important for enforcement. While
not stated explicitly, I do observe that many of these cameras are near schools, bus
stops and petrol stations to ensure pedestrians safety. Even when some of the stated
requirements are not met, enforcement could still occur if a large number of non-fatal
collisions due to speeding is recorded. These sites are classiﬁed as exceptional sites.
This ambiguity impedes the use of selection rules to identify comparable reference
groups.
The local partnerships also decide whether to install mobile, average or ﬁxed
speed cameras. Fixed speed cameras are usually deployed when there are many ac-
cidents clustered around the sites. To commission new sites for camera installation,
partnerships are require to provide full details on these proposed sites for the forth-
coming year, subjected to the approval of the national board. They are allowed to
recover penalty receipts to cover the cost of camera installations and enforcement.
Since 2006, there are several amendments to the guidelines. In particular, the KSI
requirements fall from 4 to 3. A risk value is computed for each site and KSI and
PIC collisions are given 5 points and 1 point respectively. To qualify for camera
3.2. Background 66
installation, sites must have at least 22 points if the speed limit is 40mph or less
and have at least 18 points for speed limits beyond 50mph. For more details, refer
to DfT (2005).
Once installed, several clear signages must be placed less than 1 kilometre away
from the camera. This is to warn drivers about the presence of camera and to inform
them about the speed limit. Since 2002, all the cameras are painted in bold yellow
and must be visible at least 60 metres away if the speed limit is less than 40 mph
and must be visible at least 100 metres away if the speed limits are higher. This
is to ensure that drivers do not abruptly reduce speed around the camera to avoid
ﬁnes.
Most of the cameras across UK are Gatsometer BV Cameras that are single
direction and rear facing. This means the camera will only take images of the back
of a speeding vehicle so as not to blind the oﬀender and impede driving performance.
However, some of the newer cameras could be bi-directional14 or front facing15.
Majority of the cameras operate though radar technology although there are some
that rely on strips on the roads for speed detection (e.g Truvelo D-Cam, SpeedCurb).
If there is a dispute to the ﬁne, the white lines on the roads near the cameras will
provide a secondary instrument to determine 16 whether drivers exceed speed limits.
For an illustration on how speed cameras operate, refer to Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Illustration on how ﬁxed speed cameras operate
14Cameras installed in the central of the road could be turned periodically to target
motorists at either side of the road. Sometimes, multiple cameras could be installed on
both sides of the road. Newer devices such as the Truvelo D-Cam can take pictures at
both directions.
15The second most popular type is Truvelo Camera that takes an image of the speeding
oﬀender from the front using non visible infra-red ﬂashes. The advantage is that there will
be no disputes on who is driving the vehicle.
16The distance between each of the white lines represent 5mph. Several images of the
moving vehicle over time will illustrate whether driver is speeding.
3.3. Literature Review 67
3.3 Literature Review
Previous literature, largely from transport safety, shows that speed cameras re-
duce travel speed, accidents, injuries and fatalities near the camera (Gains et al.,
2004, 2005; Chen et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2009). These estimates, however, vary
substantially across diﬀerent studies. A survey of existing literature reveals speed
cameras reduce travel speed by between 1.7 and 4.4 miles per hour and crashes by
between 11% and 51%. For a review of the existing literature, refer to Wilson et al.
(2010).
Existing empirical work, however, suﬀers from substantial limitations that ques-
tions the validity of the estimates. For one, researches are often limited to a small
number of speed cameras constrained in a particular area (Chen et al., 2002; Gold-
enbeld & van Schagen, 2005; Jones et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2009), raising concerns
on the external validity of their ﬁndings. This paper overcomes this limitation by
analysing a more representative sample of cameras of up to 2,500 ﬁxed speed cameras
installed across England, Scotland and Wales.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, many studies are restricted to before-
and-after analysis with either no or loosely constructed control groups to account
for trends in accidents in the absence of camera enforcement (Christie et al., 2003;
Jones et al., 2008). Without controlling for the general downward trends of acci-
dents due to technological advancements over time, such as better brake system,
more robust car frame and improved road built, these studies are likely to overesti-
mate camera enforcement eﬀects. For studies with control groups, they address the
fact that camera location choices are endogenous. Selected camera sites are peculiar
accident "black" spots with many drivers exceeding speed limits such that those
without cameras are unlikely to be comparable. These diﬀerences, if unobserved
or imprecisely measured, will enter the speciﬁcation and confound the estimates.
Without due consideration to the endogenous site selection process, studies con-
struct reference groups based on either nearby roads (Newstead & Cameron, 2003;
Perez et al., 2007; Shin et al., 2009) or sites with similar observable road and traﬃc
characteristics (Keall et al., 2001; Cunningham et al., 2008).
To create more comparable reference groups, some studies rely on data-generating
methods like empirical bayes to identify reference groups with similar trends in ac-
cidents and traﬃc ﬂow (Elvik, 1997; Chen et al., 2002; Gains et al., 2004, 2005).
However, these studies fail to show how the reference groups are chosen. To clarify
on the matching process, Li et al. (2013) uses propensity score matching selection
guidelines. This is unlikely to improve identiﬁcation as sites can receive installa-
tions even without meeting all the requirements. Moreover, the surge in accidents
surrounding these qualiﬁed non-camera sites could be considered transient and is
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expected to decrease even without intervention. This post-treatment collision reduc-
tions could underestimate enforcement eﬀects. In this paper, I adopt the intuitive
strategy of using only sites with cameras. That is, sites with cameras in future will
be employed as reference groups for sites with installation now.
Another point neglected by the literature is how the eﬀectiveness of enforcement
cameras vary over distance. This is important as cameras could attribute to "kanga-
roo" eﬀects (Elvik, 1997). Several studies, including Newstead & Cameron (2003);
Mountain et al. (2004); Jones et al. (2008), try to break down the impacts across
distance but the lack of ﬁne spatial information on collisions mean that results are
often uninformative as distance bandwidths are often too big. Relying on ﬁne spatial
information on accidents and speed cameras, I can delineate enforcement eﬀects ev-
ery 100 metres (up to 2 kilometres) to understand whether cameras cause kangaroo
eﬀects.
Finally, there is a lack of analysis on how these enforcement cameras fare over
time and across diﬀerent speed limits. One of the few papers that addresses this
issue is Christie et al. (2003). Their study, however, is limited to an unrepresentative
sample of cameras over a short period. Utilising detailed information on speed
camera characteristics, and over a longer timespan, I inform how cameras perform
over time and across roads with diﬀerent speed limits. For a succinct summary of
the previous literature, refer to Table 3.8 in Data Appendix.
3.4 Data
To examine the eﬀect of speed cameras on accidents, I put together a few data
sources. First, I rely on STATS 19 Road Accident Database that provides detailed
information for each reported accident to the Police Force in England, Wales and
Scotland 17. Details including location, time, date, road conditions, vehicle type,
number of injuries, serious injuries and fatalities (pedestrians and inside the vehicle)
are recorded. Shapeﬁles that delineate the road network and boundaries of local
authority districts18 are provided by Ordinance Survey.
Details of the diﬀerent speed cameras are hand-collected from websites of various
camera partnerships provided by Department for Transport (DfT) 19. For most of
17It is possible that there could be under reporting of non-fatal accidents to the Police
Force but this should be less of an issue for more serious crashes. As long as the under
reporting of accidents is random across time and is not correlated with camera installations,
this should not aﬀect my estimates
18Local authorities are responsible of conferring government services within a district.
In total, there are 353 diﬀerent districts in England, 32 in Scotland and 22 in Wales.
19For more information on the list of https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
speed-camera-information
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the partnerships, location of camera, year of installation, speed limits and camera
type are provided. For areas that do not provide these data, I request access using
Freedom of Information Act (FOI).
Combining various sources of information using Geographic Information System
(GIS), I am able to match the location of speed cameras and accidents to the road
network. To visualize, refer to Figure 3.3. Imagine the line as a particular stretch
of road with a camera installed. With the exact location of each accident, I could
sum up the annual accident outcomes along the road that the speed camera i is
installed between k and k− 100 metres interval where k ∈ 100, ...1900, 2000 metres.
For instance, within 100 metres around the camera, all the accidents that take place
in area "A" in a particular year are taken into account. For my baseline estimates,
which examine the eﬀects 500 metres around the camera, I will aggregate all the
accidents that took place in areas "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E". Because I know
the total number of injuries, serious injuries and deaths associated with each auto-
mobile crash, I can construct these collision measures for the diﬀerent bandwidths
as well.
Figure 3.3: Illustration on how accident outcomes are computed across space
To capture the year-on-year variation in region-speciﬁc shocks, I rely on sev-
eral sources. Information on the Annual Average Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) is
collected from DfT. Details on the average earnings and number of hours worked
are complied from Annual Labour Force Survey. Data on population proﬁle are
collected from Nomis Population Estimates. For details on how the variables are
constructed, refer to Table 3.7 in Data Appendix.
3.5 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Methodology
The research design adopted in this paper is a ﬁxed eﬀect, quasi-experimental
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach estimated using count regressions models. This is
because collision outcomes follow an implicit count process that only takes non-
negative integer values. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which speciﬁes a
conditional mean function that takes negative values, one could possibly yield in-
consistent estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Therefore, I implement two count
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models, Poisson and Negative Binomial, that is estimated using maximum likelihood
estimators (MLE). The latter is adopted because it relaxes the assumption that the
conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance, allowing for over-dispersion in
the data. To correct for over-dispersion in Poisson regressions, following DeAngelo
& Hansen (2014), I report sandwich (robust) standard errors.
To examine the impact of speed cameras on traﬃc accidents, the following base-
line speciﬁcation is adopted:
E(Yijt) = exp(αi + γTit +X
′
jtφ+ θt + εijt), (3.1)
where Yijt is the counts of Y (Accidents, Slight Injuries, Serious Injuries,
Deaths20) within 0 to 500 metres from camera i in local authority j that is installed
in year t. The key variable of interest is Tit, a binary variable that equals to unity
after the speed camera is installed. If enforcement cameras can deter speeding and
improve road safety, I expect γ to be < 0.
αi represents site ﬁxed eﬀects that captures time invariant unobserved charac-
teristics that inﬂuence whether a camera is installed. For instance, sites that are
more precarious (e.g on a steep slope, windy roads) or are bypassing areas with
more vulnerable pedestrians (e.g schools, petrol stations) are more likely to receive
cameras. By including site ﬁxed eﬀects, I am now comparing the change in collision
outcomes for each site before and after the cameras become operational with the
changes in collision outcomes in some comparable sites.
I further include a vector of time variant city-level controls at local authority
j at year t (X ′jt). These variables include vehicle miles travelled, population size,
percentage of population between 18 to 25 years old, gross annual pay, hours worked
and weather conditions. This is to allay concern that there are regional shocks that
could be correlated with installation of cameras and inﬂuence collision outcomes.
For instance, if cameras are installed in areas with an increase in teen drivers that
could reduce road safety, γ could be underestimated. θt represent year ﬁxed eﬀects to
control for any time-speciﬁc macro factors that aﬀect traﬃc collisions across regions.
For example, technological advancements on car safety (better car frames, tires, air
bags) and roads quality can reduce both the occurrences and severity of collisions
over time. For more details on the description of the variables used in this paper,
refer to Table 3.7 in Data Appendix.
20According to the deﬁnition provided by the Department for Transport, slight injury is
deﬁned as an injury of minor character that do not require any medical attention. Serious
injury is when the injury causes the person to be detained in the hospital for medical
treatment and that the injury causes death more than 30 days after the collision. Deaths
is deﬁned as a human casualty who sustained injuries from the accident are die less than
30 days from the collision.
3.5. Identiﬁcation Strategy and Methodology 71
εijt is the error term and consistent estimation of γ requires E[εijt|Tit = 0]. This
is unlikely to be plausible even after controlling for camera and year ﬁxed eﬀects,
and partial-ling out time variant region speciﬁc shocks. Roads with enforcement
cameras are peculiar accident-prone sites with many drivers exceeding speed limits
and sites without cameras are likely to be very diﬀerent. The concern is whether
these unobserved diﬀerences between camera and non-camera sites inﬂuence collision
outcomes.
Hence, I restrict the sample to only sites with cameras and exploit the variation in
the timing of installation. Identiﬁcation of enforcement eﬀects stems from comparing
changes in accident outcomes around camera sites with changes around sites that
will have camera installations in the near future. This allow us to attenuate the
bias from the "black-box" selection procedure given that these sites will eventually
receive cameras in the future. The assumption is that sites having enforcement
cameras in the future are not that diﬀerent from sites having cameras installations
now.
However, it is plausible that "worse" sites receive installations ﬁrst such that
later-treated sites are not comparable. Therefore, I remove any observations that are
more than 3 years before and after the installation year. To visualize, refer to ﬁgure
3.4 that illustrates the timeline for a sample of four cameras (A,B,C & D). Unshaded
areas denote the window 3 years before and after the cameras are installed with
T = 0 representing pre-installation period and T = 1 representing post-installation
period. Shaded areas denote observations outside the +3,-3 window that are not
included in the analysis. In this example, CAM B and D are counterfactuals for
CAM C. CAM B provides the baseline (collision trends in the absence of camera
enforcement) from 1998 to 1999 and CAM D from 2000 to 2001 after CAM C is
installed. Conversely, CAM A is not a reference group for CAM C because the
treatment dates are too far apart. This also means that only a future recent treated
camera will enter as reference group.
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of time-lines for diﬀerent cameras in sample. Bold lines
represent the installation year and unshaded window denotes 3 years before and
after the camera is installed. Shaded areas denotes observations more than three
years before or after installation and are omitted from the analysis. T=1: Treatment
Period; T=0: Pre-Treatment Period
Still, there are concerns that the timing of the installation may be endogenous.
Consider the case that the camera is installed only after a sharp increase in collisions.
If that is the case, then γ could overstate the enforcement eﬀects as crashes could be
reverting to mean (falling) even without cameras. To verify, I plot the conditional
mean collision trends at 200 metres from the site 12 years before and after the speed
camera is installed in Figure 3.5. I construct this by regressing collision outcomes
on site ﬁxed eﬀects and a vector of local authority characteristics and each point
represents the respective year-from-installation dummies. Year 0 represents one
year before camera installation. Results show that collisions are already falling
before the cameras are installed, suggesting that there might have been additional
policing around these sites before cameras are put in place. The delay in installation
could be due to bureaucratic red-tapes. As explained in by the Department for
Transport(DfT, 2004), local camera partnerships are only allowed to request for
cameras installations once a year, subjected to the approval of the national safety
camera board. Installation could only be scheduled upon approval and the downtime
could take up to half a year. These delays in installation mean that my estimates
are unlikely to be inﬂated by any mean reversion eﬀects in collision.
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Figure 3.5: Conditional mean collision trends 200 metres from camera site 12 years
before and after the installation. Controls include camera ﬁxed eﬀects and a vector
of local authority characteristics (Gross Annual Salary, Vehicle Miles Travelled, %
of Population from 18 -25, Job Density, Hours Worked). Each dot denotes the
coeﬃcients from the number of years from installation dummies. Horizontal axis
denotes the number of years from treatment and year 0 is the year before the camera
is installed. Vertical axis measures the counts of collision outcomes. Dashed line
represents the 95% Conﬁdence Interval.
3.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I estimate the eﬀects of speed enforcement cameras on various ac-
cident outcomes. First, I provide some summary statistics before presenting baseline
estimates on the eﬀects of speed cameras. I then put these estimates through various
robustness and placebo tests that relax identiﬁcation assumptions. Subsequently, I
allow camera enforcement eﬀects to vary across diﬀerent speed limits, road types,
over time and distance. Finally, I compute welfare estimates associated with these
devices.
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.6 and 3.7 shows the temporal and spatial distribution of ﬁxed speed
cameras from 1992 to 2016. 24 cameras are ﬁrst installed in London in a pilot pro-
gram in 1992. Soon, other major cities like Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham
begin to adopt these devices. By 2000, there are more than 1,000 cameras dis-
tributed across more than half of the local authorities across Great Britain. Fixed
speed cameras remain the predominant instrument in enforcing speed limits with
another 1,368 devices deployed in the next 8 years. Most local authorities have at
least 1 speed camera by 2008. Since then, these devices become less popular as local
partnerships rely on newer prototypes, such as variable and mobile speed cameras,
for speed enforcement. Only 109 ﬁxed camera sites are added from 2008 to 2016. By
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2016, there are approximately 3,500 ﬁxed speed cameras across England, Scotland
and Wales. My dataset, which encompasses 2,548 cameras, covers more than 70% of
the population. The rest of the 30% are missing either because (1) the local camera
partnerships did not respond to data requests21 or (2) I am not able to accurately
determine the location of cameras based on the information provided.
Figure 3.6: Number of Speed Cameras and Local Authorities with speed cameras
from 1992 to 2016 across England, Scotland and Wales
Next, I present some basic summary statistics for pre-treatment accident out-
comes, camera, road and local authority characteristics in Table 3.1. Pre-treatment
accident outcomes are computed by averaging the number of collisions within 2
kilometres from the site and within ﬁve years before the camera is installed. For
instance, if a camera is installed in 2000, I will account for the collision outcomes
from 1995 to 1999. There are approximately 0.41 counts of accidents every 100
metres annually, resulting in 0.40 counts of slight injuries, 0.08 counts of serious
injuries and 0.01 counts of deaths. On average, the limit enforced by speed cameras
is around 37mph although bulk of the cameras impose a 30mph limit (more than
70%). Most of the cameras (75%) are installed in A Roads - primary routes that
are slightly smaller than motorways (or expressways). The rest are mostly installed
in B (11%) and Minor Roads (14%), with less than 2% of the cameras ﬁxed along
Motorways and C roads. There are not many ﬁxed cameras on Motorways because
variable speed cameras are usually deployed instead to enforce speed limit over a
longer distance. Also, approximately 80% of the cameras are located along busier
roads in populated urban areas.
As mentioned, one of the major concerns is that earlier camera sites are diﬀerent
21This include Warwickshire, Suﬀolk, Norfolk, Wiltshire and Swindon.
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(a) 24 sites (b) +1044 sites
(c) +1368 sites (d) +109 sites
Figure 3.7: Locations of Fixed Speed Cameras across England, Scotland and Wales
from 1992 to 2016.
from those receiving installation later. To examine if this is the case, I split the
sample into 5 groups (1992 to 1995, 1996 to 2000, 2001 to 2005, 2005 to 2010 and
2010 onwards) according to the year the cameras are installed. I do not ﬁnd sites
that have camera installations ﬁrst more dangerous than those having installations
later. No evident diﬀerences are also observed in camera/road characteristics, local
authority demographics and labour outcomes. If anything, there seems to be more
crashes and injuries for cameras that are installed after 2006. These cameras are
often found on roads with higher speed limit. One possible explanation is the change
in the guidelines for selecting camera sites. As a precaution, I remove these cameras
in my robustness tests but this do not materially aﬀect the results.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of camera sites across time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All 1992 - 1995 1996 - 2000 2001 - 2005 2006 - 2010 2011 - 2016
Pre-treatment Accident Outcomes
Accident/100m 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.50 0.44
(0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.40) (0.32)
Injuries/100m 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.64 0.58
(0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.51) (0.43)
Serious Inj/100m 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Deaths/100m 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Camera/Road Characteristics
Speed Limit 34.79 37.20 36.53 32.75 34.16 41.05
(9.33) (10.92) (10.73) (6.72) (9.39) (12.35)
A Road 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.79 0.77
(0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42)
B Road 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.12
(0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.27) (0.33)
C Road 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.00)
Motorway 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.19)
Minor Road 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.07
(0.33) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.33) (0.26)
Rural 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.14
(0.36) (0.38) (0.41) (0.32) (0.28) (0.35)
Camera/Road Characteristics
Gross Annual Salary 24245.93 25612.47 24170.51 23423.40 26221.43 23488.91
(4143.14) (4317.99) (3650.61) (4193.10) (4143.65) (2774.21)
Hours Worked 37.86 37.84 37.92 37.87 37.66 37.83
(0.67) (0.74) (0.62) (0.71) (0.56) (0.53)
Job Count 116533.02 118697.66 112070.20 112079.69 143444.02 109272.51
(95111.37) (92509.82) (84887.33) (93917.90) (120102.28) (90747.35)
Job Density 0.88 0.85 0.76 1.01 0.81 0.65
(2.61) (0.41) (0.23) (3.91) (0.42) (0.16)
% of Pop 18 to 25 9.38 9.29 9.11 9.56 9.42 9.73
(2.59) (2.44) (2.35) (2.92) (2.00) (1.82)
Population Size 219312.20 204907.15 221811.27 208318.24 262401.66 254666.19
(142834.82) (104695.46) (135361.03) (142054.29) (177959.39) (178190.47)
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.84 6.33 6.63 6.95 7.25 8.40
(1.95) (1.94) (1.95) (1.81) (1.99) (2.89)
VMT 2797.63 2425.91 2633.17 3271.23 2053.54 1619.41
(2685.05) (2370.39) (2566.26) (2878.41) (2368.73) (1410.15)
Number of Cameras 2548 314 754 1123 301 57
Note: Mean outcomes reported. Standard errors in parenthesis below. Observations further stratiﬁed accord-
ing to the year the camera is installed.
3.6.2 Eﬀects of Speed Cameras on Accidents
Baseline Estimates
Table 3.2 presents a set of baseline estimates from equation (1) that captures
the eﬀect of speed enforcement cameras on on various accident outcomes 500 me-
tres left and right of the camera, including number of Accidents, Slight Injuries,
Serious Injuries and Deaths. Due to space constraints, I only report results from
Poisson regressions. Findings from Negative Binomial regressions in Table 3.9 in
Data Appendix and are fairly similar. Only the coeﬃcients (γ) for key estimate
Tit are reported. To interpret these coeﬃcients, I compute the semi-elasticity (%∆)
by taking the exponential of γ before subtracting by 1. The absolute reductions
in collision outcomes (Absolute) are by computed by multiplying %∆ with the pre-
treatment mean of collision outcomes. Only ever-treated sites are analysed except of
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Column (6). In short, I am comparing changes in collision outcomes for sites after
camera installations with sites that have camera installations in the future. The
sample is smaller for Serious Injuries and Deaths. This is because there are several
sites that experience no fatalities or severe injuries over the sample period and these
sites are removed from the analysis.
Moving from left to right, additional covariates are included in the estimation.
In column (1), I analyse the entire sample of speed cameras from 1992 to 2016 and
limit the analysis to sites that I have a full set of control variables in the column
(2). In both speciﬁcations, I include site and year ﬁxed eﬀects but do not add any
control variables. I observe that enforcement cameras not only reduce the number
of crashes, but also abate the severity of collisions. It is also comforting to observe
that results are very consistent across the two columns, suggesting that the reduced
sample with control variables is fairly representative.
Next, I include a vector of time-variant local authority (LA) characteristics to
partial out regional speciﬁc shocks that could correlate with the camera installations
and aﬀect collision outcomes. This include demographic (population size and % of
population between 18 to 25) and labour characteristics (gross annual salary and
working hours). Controlling for these diﬀerences across LA has an inconsequential
eﬀect on the estimates. Subsequently, I control for the annual average vehicle miles
travelled (VMT) as more driving could induce more accidents. Estimates remain
fairly stable. I further include a number of weather controls including temperature
and wind speed. The concern is whether bad weather shocks, which could induce
more accidents, are correlated with camera installations. Doing so signiﬁcantly
reduces the sample by more than two-third due to missing data but again this do
not materially aﬀect the estimates.
In column (6), I include a sample of non-camera sites22 despite meeting the
selection guidelines (for more information refer to section 2). The rationale is to
understand the bias from incorporating non-treated sites based on some matching-
on-observables strategy frequently adopted in the previous literature. I observe that
estimated enforcement eﬀects are much smaller. This is consistent with the idea that
untreated sites experience a large fall in collision outcomes even without camera
installation. Because this surge in accidents is deemed to be transient, collision
outcomes could fall even in the absence of camera enforcement. This explains why
local camera partnerships choose not to install cameras around these sites. This
22To create a sample of non-camera sites, I ﬁrst place random points along major roads
(A & B roads) that are at least 2,000 metres from one another and 2,000 metres from the
nearest speed camera. Following that I calculate the yearly collision, injuries and death
counts within 500 metres from these random points. I only retain sites with more than 4
killed and serious injuries (KSI) and 8 personal injury collisions in a 3 year rolling window.
In total, I ﬁnd 694 sites that meet the selection criterion but are not treated.
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result shows that using non-camera sites coul underestimate the enforcement eﬀects
of speed cameras.
Furthermore, as mentioned, sites that receive installations later could be diﬀer-
ent from those earlier treated sites. Thus, in column (7), I restrict the reference
groups to just recently treated cameras by excluding any observations more than
3 years before and after the camera is installed. To illustrate, this is equivalent of
removing the shaded areas in Figure 3.4 from estimation. Like before, estimates
remain comparable, suggesting that the diﬀerences between earlier and later treated
sites are not confounding the estimates.
Overall, I document that speed cameras not only attribute to signiﬁcant reduc-
tions in the number of collisions, but also abate the severity of the crashes. Results
are fairly steady to the addition of controls. I observe substantial decreases for the
various accident outcomes signiﬁcant at 1% level. After an enforcement camera is
installed, the number of collisions are, on average, 17% to 39% lower, representing
an absolute reduction of 0.89 to 2.36 per kilometre per annum. The counts of Slight
injuries also decline by between 1.19 and 2.87 per kilometre per annum, which cor-
responds to a 17% to 38% decrease. There are between 0.25 and 0.58 less serious
injuries surrounding the camera, equivalent to a 28% to 55% fall from pre-treatment
levels. The largest eﬀects are documented for traﬃc fatalities. There are approxi-
mately 0.08 to 0.19 less fatalities per kilometre, which represents a substantial 58%
to 68% decline23 from pre installation levels.
Robustness & Alternative Explanations
Table 3.3 summarizes a battery of robustness tests that addresses concerns that
earlier estimates could be spuriously driven by other factors.
A1. Traﬃc Displacement : One issue is whether the installation of cameras induce
drivers to switch to non-camera roads. Therefore, the reduction in accidents could
be due to less traﬃc rather than camera enforcement24. To mitigate the possibility
that traﬃc displacement is driving the estimates, I limit my analysis to a sub-sample
of Motorways and A-Roads. The rationale is that there is less traﬃc displacement
along these major roads because there are less alternative routes available. Results
in Columns (1) are fairly similar compared to before, indicating that enforcement
eﬀects documented earlier are not driven by lighter traﬃc.
23This is because often there are very little reported deaths on roads, which is why the
small estimate could generate signiﬁcant changes.
24The straightforward solution is to include traﬃc as a control. This, however, will
not be advisable as traﬃc is likely to be a "bad" control. The implementation of speed
camera is likely to reduce traﬃc ﬂow by displacing them to neighbouring unmonitored
roads. Moreover, detailed road level traﬃc data is only available for a small sub-sample of
roads.
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Table 3.2: Eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes within 500 metres
from Camera using Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Baseline Demo VMT Weather Non-CAM -3,+3
Accidents -0.469a -0.488a -0.268a -0.243a -0.184a -0.095a -0.222a
(0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017)
Obs 66868 25720 25720 25720 7383 35929 9841
Absolute -2.11 -2.36 -1.44 -1.32 -0.89 -0.82 -1.13
% ∆ -37.43 -38.65 -23.54 -21.55 -16.78 -9.09 -19.88
No.of CAM 2481 1555 1555 1555 659 2249 1481
Slight -0.412a -0.483a -0.278a -0.253a -0.185a -0.057a -0.207a
(0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
Obs 57224 21355 21355 21355 5483 31564 8175
Absolute -2.25 -2.87 -1.82 -1.67 -1.19 -0.64 -1.33
% ∆ -33.74 -38.29 -24.30 -22.34 -16.87 -5.56 -18.70
No.of CAM 2123 1294 1294 1294 518 1988 1223
Serious -0.788a -0.747a -0.454a -0.414a -0.326a -0.326a -0.373a
(0.015) (0.022) (0.033) (0.034) (0.074) (0.028) (0.042)
Obs 63280 23650 23650 23650 6539 33823 8306
Absolute -0.58 -0.57 -0.39 -0.37 -0.25 -0.35 -0.33
% ∆ -54.55 -52.63 -36.49 -33.93 -27.81 -27.84 -31.15
No.of CAM 2346 1428 1428 1428 572 2115 1240
Deaths -0.956a -1.071a -1.029a -1.018a -1.124a -0.761a -0.858a
(0.041) (0.073) (0.116) (0.119) (0.209) (0.093) (0.153)
Obs 42924 11394 11394 11394 2787 18765 2843
Absolute -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 -0.19
% ∆ -61.57 -65.75 -64.28 -63.85 -67.51 -53.27 -57.59
No.of CAM 1591 683 683 683 220 1155 426
CAM FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Demographics 3 3 3 3 3
VMT 3 3 3 3
Weather 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent Poisson regression esti-
mated using Maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y count where
Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of camera. Ab-
solute is the number of reductions in accident outcomes computed by multiplying
the % ∆ with the pre-treatment mean of Y . % ∆ is the proportional change (semi-
elasticity) of collision outcomes after treatment and is computed by taking exp(γ)−1.
In Column (1), I include the entire sample of cameras. In Column (2), I restrict the
sample to sites that I have full set of co-variates. In Column (3), I control for popu-
lation size, % of 18 to 25, Gross Annual Pay & hours worked. In Column (4), I con-
trol for the annual average vehicle miles travelled (VMT). In Column (5), weather
controls are added into the speciﬁcation. In Column (6), I include a sample of non-
camera sites that are eligible for camera installations. In Column (7), I constraint
the analysis to observations just 3 years before and after from the year of installa-
tion. Sandwich (robust) standard errors are reported in the parentheses. c p<0.10,
b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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A2. Change in Selection Rules : In 2006, there are major changes on how sites are
selected for camera enforcement. The problem is whether newer guidelines cause
these latter sites to be less comparable. Thus, in column (3), I remove sites that
receive installations from 2006 onwards. Removing these later treated sites appear
to reduce my estimates marginally but inconsequentially. Cameras installed before
2006 appear to reduce more accidents but much lesser slight and serious injuries,
suggesting that the newer selection rules are more eﬀective in identifying dangerous
roads for camera enforcement.
A3. Omitted Variable Bias : Next, I rely on the rich information associated with
each camera to further mitigate observable diﬀerences. To do so, I match each each
site with another site based on the following rules: (1) within 5 kilometres from
one another; (2) same rural-urban classiﬁcation; (3) same road type (A, B, C, Mi-
nor or Motorways); (4) similar speed limits; (5) within 5 years from one another
in installation dates; (6) within 70% - 130% in pre-treatment collision outcomes.
The objective is to benchmark each site with the most similar yet-to-be treated site.
This rigorous matching process reduce the sample to 214 sites. I include both site
ﬁxed eﬀects and pair-match ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with years in the analysis. In
other words, I am now computing changes in collision outcomes before and after
the camera is installed, and benchmarking these changes in collision outcomes with
the closest reference site matched based on observable characteristics. This proce-
dure does not materially aﬀect the estimates as signiﬁcant reductions across various
collision outcomes are observed.
A4. Endogenous Timing : One of the main concerns is whether a camera is only
introduced after a sharp increase in collisions, inﬂating enforcement eﬀects. While
the timing of introduction may be endogenous, the timing for switching cameras
oﬀ is less aﬀected by collision trends. Due to budget cuts, some local partnerships,
including Avon and Somerset and West Midlands, are forced to turned oﬀ their
cameras 25. Although these cameras are no longer in operation, local government
usually leave them in place as "dummy" cameras to deter speeding. To ensure that
these switched-oﬀ cameras are benchmarked against comparable reference groups, I
further restrict the control group to sites in adjacent local authorities. This reduces
the sample to 174 cameras, with 55 cameras in switched-oﬀ areas. Results summa-
rized in Column (7) and (8) indicate that enforcement eﬀects are much weaker as
compared to before. Although these "dummy" cameras still reduce accidents and
slight injuries, the absolute eﬀects are less than half compared to operating cameras.
25There are more areas that have shut down their devices. This include Cleveland,
Durham, Northamptonshire and North Yorkshire. Avon and Somerset and West Midlands
are selected because I can accurately determine the locations of these switched-oﬀ devices
and the local partnerships publicly announce that these cameras are out of operation.
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Moreover, these switched-oﬀ devices no longer reduce serious injuries and deaths.
These ﬁndings suggest that some informed drivers are no longer adhering to the
speed limits and their reckless driving behaviors are diluting enforcement eﬀects.
A5. Spurious Timing : Next, I mitigate the issue whether enforcement eﬀects are
spuriously documented outside treatment periods. To do so I generate 1,000 ran-
dom treatment dates at least 5 years before the cameras are installed. For instance,
if a camera is installed in 1997, the random generated year will be between 1980
and 1992. These placebo regressions are computed using OLS as it is too compu-
tationally intensive for MLE. Cumulative probability and probability density of the
estimated γ from 1,000 diﬀerent placebo regressions for accidents and deaths esti-
mated using OLS are plotted in Figure 3.8. Dash lines denote the estimated eﬀects
of speed cameras from the preferred speciﬁcation from Column (5) of Table 3.2. It
is comforting to observe that all but two estimates from these 1,000 placebo regres-
sions are larger (more positive) than the treatment eﬀects, increasing the conﬁdence
that earlier ﬁndings are not spuriously driven in pre-installation periods.
(a) Accidents (b) Deaths
Figure 3.8: 1,000 Placebo Regressions with random generated treatment dates be-
fore camera installation on Accidents & Deaths estimated using OLS: Probability
Density Function (PDF) top, Cumulative Density Function (CDF) bottom. Dash
line denotes estimates from Column (6) of Table 4.3.
3.6. Empirical Results 82
Table 3.3: Robustness Tests
Major Roads No 2006-2016 Matched Pairs Switch Oﬀs
Accidents -0.248a -0.243a -0.165a -0.224a
(0.018) (0.019) (0.028) (0.082)
Obs 19152 19936 3304 2814
Absolute -1.58 -1.20 -1.73 -0.54
% ∆ -21.95 -21.61 -15.24 -20.06
No.of CAM 1159 1208 214 174
Slight -0.245a -0.261a -0.184a -0.269a
(0.020) (0.022) (0.033) (0.104)
Obs 16566 16143 3052 2814
Absolute -1.89 -1.56 -2.13 -0.84
% ∆ -21.75 -22.98 -16.84 -23.59
No.of CAM 1004 982 196 174
Serious -0.412a -0.389a -0.174b 0.113
(0.036) (0.041) (0.080) (0.507)
Obs 18382 18405 2348 972
Absolute -0.40 -0.32 -0.34 0.00
% ∆ -33.75 -32.22 -15.97 12.01
No.of CAM 1110 1114 200 59
Deaths -0.987a -0.822a -1.064b -0.068
(0.125) (0.149) (0.480) (0.247)
Obs 9958 7988 230 2427
Absolute -0.12 -0.11 -0.39 -0.02
% ∆ -62.74 -56.06 -65.50 -6.55
No.of CAM 596 480 64 150
CAM FE 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3
LA Controls 3 3 3 3
Pair-FE* Year 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent poisson regression.
Dependent variable is the annual Y count where Y=accident, injuries, se-
rious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of camera. The speciﬁcation
adopted is similar to that of Column (4) in Table 3.2. In columns (1), I
restrict the analysis to cameras in A-Roads and Motorway to alleviate the
eﬀects of traﬃc displacement on collisions. In columns (2), I remove cam-
eras installed from 2006 onwards as they could be diﬀerent from the other
cameras. In columns (3), I match each site with another site based on lo-
cation, pre-treatment accident outcomes and various road characteristics.
I exploit the variation now between two speed cameras by including pair-
ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects. In columns (4), I restrict the
analysis to areas that turn oﬀ their cameras and counties that are contigu-
ous to these areas. Sandwich (robust) standard errors are reported in the
parenthesis. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
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Eﬀects across Road Types, Speed Limits & Time
Next, I allow the eﬀectiveness of speed cameras to vary across diﬀerent road
types, speed limits and over time with the following speciﬁcation:
E(Yijt) = exp(αi + γw(Tit ∗H′w) +X ′jtφ+ θt + εijt), (3.2)
where the H′w represents a vector of binary variables that equals to unity denoting
the diﬀerent:
1. Speed limits (30,40,50,60 & 70)
2. Road Classes (Motorway, A, B & Minor)
3. Years after treatment (1,2...10 years after installation)
In short, I am allowing enforcement eﬀects to vary across these characteristics.
Speciﬁcations for speed limits and road types are summarized in Panel A and B
of Table 3.4 respectively. Only the key estimates γw are reported.
From Panel A, although I ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvement in road safety across
diﬀerent speed limits, the largest enforcement eﬀects are documented along roads
with higher speed limits. Speciﬁcally, the number of collisions are, on average, 50%
lower along 60mph roads after a speed camera is installed. This is much larger than
the 22% reduction along 20mph roads. The number of serious injuries and deaths are
81% and 95% lower after speed cameras are installed along 60mph roads and nuch
smaller eﬀects of around 36% and 41% are observed for serious injuries and deaths
respectively along 20mph roads. There are several explanations to these ﬁndings.
First, drivers along the lower speed limit roads are already commuting slowly and
reductions in speed achieved by cameras do not matter much in reducing the gravity
of collisions. Second, attenuated enforcement eﬀects for more binding speed limits
suggest that drivers may be forced to hastily drop speed to avoid ﬁnes. This could
cause more accidents via kangaroo eﬀects.
Panel B summarizes the results of camera enforcement eﬀects on diﬀerent road
types. Motorways are inter-city major roads for long distance travelling. A-Roads
are slightly less important compared to Motorways but can still be considered trunk
roads that provide large scale transport links. B-Roads are slightly smaller linkage
roads for traﬃc between A-Roads and Minor roads. Minor Roads are smallest roads
that connect local traﬃc, linking an estate/village with the larger road links. I do
not observe stark diﬀerences in enforcement eﬀects across the diﬀerent road types.
This is except for Motorway in which no signiﬁcant reduction in slight injuries and
deaths are reported. This is likely due to a sample issue as only 1% of the cameras
are found along Motorways.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes
across road types and speed limits
Panel A: Speed Limit
Accidents Slight Serious Deaths
Speed Limit 20 -0.247a -0.130b -0.446b -0.514
(0.066) (0.066) (0.211) (1.007)
-21.91 -12.23 -35.96 -40.19
-1.34 -0.92 -0.39 -0.07
Speed Limit 30 -0.227a -0.241a -0.356a -0.891a
(0.017) (0.020) (0.035) (0.124)
-20.31 -21.43 -29.98 -58.98
-1.24 -1.61 -0.32 -0.11
Speed Limit 40 -0.371a -0.358a -0.657a -1.277a
(0.036) (0.040) (0.067) (0.238)
-30.99 -30.10 -48.14 -72.11
-1.89 -2.25 -0.52 -0.13
Speed Limit 50 -0.213a -0.217a -0.538a -1.188a
(0.057) (0.063) (0.138) (0.285)
-19.15 -19.49 -41.62 -69.52
-1.17 -1.46 -0.45 -0.13
Speed Limit 60 -0.697a -0.598a -1.645a -3.060a
(0.162) (0.203) (0.275) (0.755)
-50.21 -45.01 -80.70 -95.31
-3.07 -3.37 -0.87 -0.18
Speed Limit 70 -0.314a -0.291c -0.709b -1.505a
(0.115) (0.163) (0.286) (0.307)
-26.94 -25.21 -50.79 -77.80
-1.64 -1.89 -0.55 -0.14
Obs 24871 20522 22833 11004
No.of CAM 1503 1243 1378 659
Panel B: Road Type
A Road -0.232a -0.243a -0.393a -0.990a
(0.017) (0.019) (0.035) (0.121)
-20.70 -21.60 -32.49 -62.84
-1.26 -1.62 -0.35 -0.12
B Road -0.325a -0.345a -0.514a -1.289a
(0.040) (0.053) (0.077) (0.301)
-27.77 -29.19 -40.20 -72.44
-1.70 -2.19 -0.43 -0.13
Minor Road -0.317a -0.340a -0.645a -1.346a
(0.055) (0.094) (0.096) (0.344)
-27.20 -28.82 -47.52 -73.98
-1.66 -2.16 -0.51 -0.14
Motorway -0.262a -0.105 -0.496c -0.135
(0.077) (0.141) (0.283) (0.470)
-23.05 -9.95 -39.13 -12.62
-1.41 -0.75 -0.42 -0.02
Obs 25720 21355 23650 11394
No.of CAM 1555 1294 1428 683
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γw from a diﬀerent pois-
son regression from equation 3.2 estimated using maximum
likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y counts where
Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left
and right of camera. I allow the eﬀects to vary across dif-
ferent speed limits and road types in Panel A and B respec-
tively. The speciﬁcation adopted is similar to Column 4 of
Table 3.2. Sandwich (robust) standard errors are reported
in parentheses. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
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Next, I examine the eﬀectiveness of speed cameras over time. Results are sum-
marized in Figure 3.11. Results reveal that cameras remain eﬀective and in fact
become more potent in reducing collisions and fatalities over time. Weaker eﬀects
in the beginning suggest that some drivers could be unfamiliar with the locations
of camera and abruptly drop speed to avoid ﬁnes. This could cause collisions and
dilute enforcement eﬀects. Over time, drivers learn about these locations and are
less prone to reckless braking, explaining stronger enforcement eﬀects.
Eﬀects over Distance
A major drawback of ﬁxed speed cameras is that they might cause more accidents
further away from the camera. This is know as "kangaroo" eﬀects - when drivers
abruptly halt in response to camera signs to avoid being ﬁne, or accelerate beyond
surveillance. To precisely capture how the eﬀects change with distance from the
camera, the following speciﬁcation is estimated:
E(Y k−100,kijt ) = exp(α
k−100,k
i + γT
k−100,k
it +X
′k−100,k
jt φ+ θ
k−100,k
t + εijt) (3.3)
where k represents the various distance bandwidths (eg. 0 to 100m, 100m to 200m...
1900m to 2000m) up to 2 kilometres left and right of the camera. In brevity, I
am estimating the enforcement eﬀects for every 100m bandwidth to identify how
enforcement eﬀects vary moving away from the camera. I achieve this by running
stratiﬁed regressions for every k and k − 100 bandwidth for k ∈ 100, ...1900, 2000
metres. If the eﬀects are highly localised, I expect γk to be more negative as k is
smaller. If there are displacement of accidents, I would expect γk to be positive
outside camera surveillance.
Figure 3.10 summarizes the estimated eﬀects of speed enforcement cameras at
every 100m from the camera using Poisson regressions. Results from Negative Bino-
mial models are summarized in Figure 3.12 in Data Appendix. Like before, results
are fairly similar across these two models. Precisely, I am capturing the change in
accident outcomes every 100 metres. Every dot denotes γk for a diﬀerent distance
bandwidth between k to k − 100 from the camera where k = 100, ....2000. Dashed
lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval. The coeﬃcients can be interpreted as
number of accident outcomes per 100 metre.
Unsurprisingly, I ﬁnd localised enforcement eﬀects around the camera that dissi-
pate quickly across distance. Reductions are largely around 0 to 500 metres around
the camera and strongest eﬀects are reported closest to the camera. This result is
fairly consistent across the diﬀerent accident outcomes. Beyond 700 metres from
the device, ﬁxed speed cameras are no longer able to enhance road safety. Moving
further away at around 1500 metres from the camera, there are suggestive evidence
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of kangaroo eﬀects as I report small rebound in the number of collisions, serious
injuries and deaths. A small proportion of drivers could have speed up beyond
the surveillance of cameras, inducing more collisions post implementation. How-
ever, these eﬀects are quite small compared to the enforcement eﬀects and are too
imprecisely estimated to be statistically signiﬁcant.
3.6.3 Welfare Analysis
This section reports a welfare analysis on speed cameras to understand whether
these devices improve social welfare. The costs include the ﬁxed and operating costs
of camera and the time delays incurred by bypassing drivers, while the beneﬁts
include the savings from less collision, injuries and fatalities. Fines from speed-
ing tickets are not considered as the government could redistribute these revenues
through public spending. The parameters considered are summarized in Table 3.5.
For the beneﬁts, I rely on the savings per traﬃc accidents, injuries and deaths
computed by Department of Transport (DfT)26. These values account for both (1)
casualty-related costs (loss output, medical and ambulance, human costs) and (2)
accident-related costs (property damage, insurance and administrative and police
costs). Total savings are computed by multiplying earlier estimates on reductions
with the savings on per capita or accident basis.
For the costs, I obtain approximated time delays from speed cameras from Gains
et al. (2005). Speed is around 10kmh slower after the camera is installed. Taking the
average speed limit of 58kmh27 (30mph) and a distance of 1km around the camera,
drivers incur a delay of around 0.2 minutes (or around 12 seconds) whenever they
bypass a speed camera. According to the average traﬃc ﬂow along roads provided by
DfT, I estimate that there are approximately 3,600 vehicles bypassing each camera
every day, corresponding to around 1.3 million vehicles annually. Assuming the
average occupancy per car is 1.5, time delays incurred by all bypassing vehicles
amount to more than 7,000 hours every year28.
To compute loss of income from time delays, I rely on the estimates on the value
of time savings and the purposes of journey from DfT (2014). I assume that 5.0% of
the journeys are made for work, 20% are for commuting towards or from the place
26For more information, refer to https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/254720/rrcgb-valuation-methodology.pdf
27Since most of the speed cameras impose a 30mph speed limit, time delays will be
computed based on the scenario that drivers commute, on average, at a speed limit of
30mph before camera installation. Drivers are assumed to slow down around 500m left
and right of the camera. Time delays per driver per trip is therefore approximately equal
to DistancearoundcameraOriginalSpeed−Reductions .
28This is likely to over-estimate the time delays given that accidents can cause traﬃc
bottlenecks that can increase travel time.
3.6. Empirical Results 88
F
ig
u
re
3.
10
:
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
o
f
S
p
ee
d
C
a
m
er
a
o
n
A
cc
id
en
t
O
u
tc
o
m
es
a
t
1
0
0
m
In
te
rv
a
ls
(l
ef
t
a
n
d
ri
g
h
t
o
f
ca
m
er
a
)
fr
o
m
P
o
is
so
n
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s.
E
a
ch
d
o
t
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
fo
r
ev
er
y
1
0
0
m
et
re
s
d
is
ta
n
ce
b
a
n
d
w
id
th
.
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
ca
n
b
e
in
te
rp
re
te
d
a
s
p
er
1
0
0
m
et
re
.
C
o
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
(γ
k
)
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
3
.3
.
S
p
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
o
n
is
si
m
il
a
r
to
th
a
t
o
f
C
o
lu
m
n
(4
)
in
T
a
b
le
3
.3
.
D
o
t
in
d
ic
a
te
s
th
a
t
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
ll
y
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
a
t
le
a
st
a
t
1
0
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
cr
o
ss
in
d
ic
a
te
s
o
th
er
w
is
e.
9
5
%
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
en
ce
In
te
rv
a
ls
a
re
d
en
o
te
d
b
y
th
e
ta
il
s.
3.6. Empirical Results 89
of work, and the rest of the 75% of the journeys are for non-work purposes (e.g
leisure trips). The values of travel time (VOT) per hour are much higher at ¿26.42
for work, and ¿6.65 and ¿5.90 for commuting and non-work purposes respectively.
Multiplying the total number of hours delayed with the estimated proportion of
journeys for various purposes and their respective VOTs, the total loss of income due
to delays per speed camera amounts to around ¿50,000 per annum. Taking the cost
of installing a ﬁxed speed camera at ¿309,000 and the operating and maintenance
cost at around ¿12,500 per annum, the total cost of installing a speed camera per
annum is around ¿121,000.
Table 3.5: Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis per speed camera across Great Britain
Parameter Source Value per Unit Net Cost/Beneﬁt/Year
Savings from avoiding Accidents
Damage-only DfT(2015) ¿2,142 1.13×£2, 142 = £2, 420
Slight Injuries DfT(2015) ¿15,450 1.33×£15, 450 = £20, 549
Serious Injuries DfT(2015) ¿200,422 0.33×£200, 422 = £66, 139
Deaths DfT(2015) ¿1,783,556 0.19×£1, 783, 556 = £338, 876
(A)Total Beneﬁts ≈ ¿430,000
Time Delays
Speed Reductions Gains(2005) 9.65kmh 1km
58kmh−9.65km − 1km58kmh ≈ 0.206mins
Average No. of Cars DfT(2016) 3,600 cars/day 3, 600× 365 = 1, 314, 000
Average Occupancy/car DfT 1.56/car
Total Time Loss (h) 1, 314, 000× 0.206
60
× 1.56 ≈ 7, 038hrs
Journey By Purpose DfT (2014)
Work 5.0% (¿26.42/h) 5.0%× 7, 038×£26.42 = £9, 297
Commuting 20.3% (¿6.65/h) 20.3%× 7, 038×£6.65 = £9, 501
Others 74.7%(¿5.90/h) 74.7%× 7, 038×£5.90 = £31, 018
(B)Loss of Income from delays ≈ ¿50,000
Cost of Cameras
Fixed Cost Parliament(2008) ¿50,000 £50, 000× 1.18 = £59, 000
Operating Cost Hooke(1996) ¿8,560 £8, 560× 1.45 = £12, 441
(C)Total Camera Costs per year ≈ ¿71,000
(D)Total Costs ≈ B+C=¿121,000
Net Costs/Beneﬁts ≈ A-D=+¿309,000
Note: All the dollar values are adjusted to 2015 price levels. Estimates on savings from avoiding accidents are
obtained from Column (7) of Table 3.2. Fixed Costs include planning, signage, installation and procurement,
and other ﬁxed costs. Operating costs include operation, administrative, maintenance, publicity and liaison
costs that recurs annually. These ﬁgures are obtained by averaging across a sample of cameras installed 10
study areas across UK in ﬁnancial year 1995/96.
It is important to highlight that the estimated beneﬁts from this analysis are
likely to underestimate the actual beneﬁts realized as I did not factor in other
non-pecuniary perks. These include environmental beneﬁts from slower travelling
speed that could save more fuel, reduce emissions and improve health outcomes
(van Benthem, 2015). Enforcement cameras could also enhance crime intelligence
as images from these devices could help to solve other crimes (Hooke et al., 1996).
Even without considering these perks, each speed camera generates net beneﬁts of
¿309,000 per annum, which is more than twice the cost of implementing a speed
camera.
Next, I conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses to the welfare estimates in Table
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Welfare Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Beneﬁts ¿200,000 ¿281,000 ¿280,000 ¿270,000 ¿222,000 ¿35,000
25% ↓ in eﬀectiveness 3 3
50% ↑ in traﬃc 3 3
25% of journey work trips 3 3
50% ↑ in cost 3 3
25% ↓ in VSL 3 3
Note: All the dollar values are adjusted to 2015 price levels. In Column (1), I reduce the
eﬀectiveness of speed cameras by 25%. In Column (2), I increase the traﬃc that bypasses
speed cameras by 50%. In Column (3), I change the composition of trips such that 25% of
the journeys made now are for work purposes. In Column (4), the cost of installing and op-
erating ﬁxed speed cameras are now 50% higher. In Column (5), I reduce the cost of death
from collisions by 25%.
3.6. Diﬀerent assumptions on the eﬀectiveness, time delay and cost associated with
speed cameras do not aﬀect the main ﬁndings. If I assume that the cameras are 25%
less eﬀective as before, I still observe positive beneﬁts fall to around ¿200,000. If the
amount of traﬃc bypassing speed cameras goes up by 50%, the net beneﬁts dipped
to around ¿281,000. If the percentage of trips made for work purposes increases
to 25%, the beneﬁts reduce to ¿280,000. If the cost of installing and operating a
speed camera increase by 50%, the beneﬁts fall to around ¿270,000. Finally, cutting
the value of statistical life (VSL) from traﬃc collisions by 25% reduce the beneﬁts
considerably to around ¿222,000. This is understandable considering the bulk of
the welfare from speed cameras is from the reduction of fatalities from accidents. In
the worst case scenario when I consider that all the following conditions happen, I
still observe substantial beneﬁts of around ¿35,000, which represents around 30%
of the cost. All these results suggest that installing speed cameras improve social
welfare.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper utilizes micro geo-coded dataset on traﬃc accidents to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of speed enforcement cameras. These devices deter reckless driving on
roads particularly prone to collisions by imposing ﬁnes when drivers exceed speed
limits. In contrast to earlier literature, this paper addresses the selection bias by
analyzing only sites that will ever have a speed camera installed. The empirical
strategy is a quasi-experimental diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework that relies on
comparing accident outcomes before and after a speed camera is installed with other
sites that will experience installation in the near future.
Assuming a linear relationship between cameras and collisions, putting another
1,000 speed cameras on roads could reduce approximately 1130 crashes, preventing
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around 330 serious injuries and in turn, saving 190 lives every year and generating
beneﬁts up to ¿309 million. These results remain robust across a range of speciﬁ-
cations that relaxes the identiﬁcation strategies. Dwelling further, however, reveal
that these eﬀects are largely localised within 0 to 500 metres from the camera and
there are suggestive evidence of a rebound in collisions further away from the cam-
era. This illustrates the possibility of drivers speeding up beyond the surveillance
of cameras and inducing more accidents. Nevertheless, simple cost-beneﬁt analysis
reveals that the perks from installing a camera are much larger than the cost of
cameras, suggesting that these devices improve social welfare. But with technology
advancement, newer prototypes, such as mobile and variable speed cameras, should
be considered to circumvent the weaknesses associated with ﬁxed speed cameras to
more eﬀectively deter speeding.
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3.8 Data Appendix
Table 3.7: List of Variables
Variable Source Description
Dependent Variable (Yijt )
Accident STATS19 Number of Accidents at site i in LA j
in year t
Slight Injuries STATS19 Number of Slight Injuries at site i in
LA j in year t
Serious Injuries STATS19 Number of Serious Injuries at site i in
LA j in year t
Deaths STATS19 Number of Deaths at site i in LA j in
year t
Local Authority Characteristics(X ′jt)
Gross Annual
Salary
Annual Labour
Force Survey
Average Gross annual salary at LA j
Hours worked Annual Labour
Force Survey
Average number of hours worked in LA
j
Job Density Nomis Number of Jobs per unit area of LA j
(hectare)
% of 18 to 25 Nomis Population
Estimates
Percentage of population aged 18 to 25
in LA j
VMT DfT Annual average vehicles miles travelled
in LA j
Max Temperature MIDAS Annual average max air temperature
in LA j
Min Temperature MIDAS Annual average min air temperature in
LA j
Wind Speed MIDAS Annual average wind speed in LA j
Camera/Road Characteristics
Speed Limit - Binary variable denoting whether
speed camera in site i has a speed limit
of l where l=30,40,50,60 or 70
Road Type - Binary variable denoting whether
speed camera in site i in road type r
where r=Motorway, A, B, C or Minor
Rural ONS Rural Urban
2011 classiﬁcation
Binary variable denoting whether
speed camera in site i is in rural area,
otherwise it is located in urban area
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Table 3.8: Review of Existing Literature on Speed Camera Evaluation
Authors Dataset Methodology Results
Chen et al. (2002) 12 Photo Radar
Programs (PRP)
over 22km along a
highway in British
Columbia, Canada,
2 years pre post
EB 2.8 km/h (3%) ↓ in speed; 7% ↑ in traf-
ﬁc; overall 16% ↓ in collisions across en-
tire corridor with positive spillover ef-
fects at non PRP locations. Unlike cam-
eras, drivers are unsure of PRP deploy-
ment
Christie et al.
(2003)
101 Mobile Speed
cameras in South
Wales, UK, 3 years
pre, 1 year post
BA with circle and
route based mea-
sures
50% (1.8) ↓ in injury crashes; eﬀects are
within 300 to 500m and no longer sig-
niﬁcant beyond; eﬀects are stable across
time and similar for 30mph and 60-
70mph roads
Cunningham et al.
(2008)
Mobile Speed cam-
eras in Charlotte,
North Carolina, US,
5 years
BA with compara-
ble reference groups
constructed based
on characteristics
10% ↓ in collisions, decrease in travelling
speed
Elvik (1997) 64 Speed cams in
Norway,
EB 20% ↓ in injury crashes; 12% ↓ in prop-
erty crashes; eﬀects are largely driven by
road sections with warrants - a certain
level of crash and speed limit for the use
of speed limit.
Gains et al. (2004,
2005)
2,300 speed cam-
eras across 23 areas
across UK, 3 years
pre post
BA & EB 6% ↓ in speed; 91% ↓ in excessive speed-
ing (>15mph); 22% ↓ in collisions; 42%
↓ in casualties
Goldenbeld & van
Schagen (2005)
28 Rural Roads in
Friesland, Nether-
lands, 5 years pre
and 8 years post
BA with other ru-
ral roads as compa-
rables
4 km/h ↓ in speed; overall 21% ↓ in col-
lisions and casualties
Hess & Polak
(2003)
43 ﬁxed speed cams
in Cambridgeshire,
England, over 11
years
ARIMA, BA with
comparable ref-
erence sites, long
pre-treatment pe-
riod to mitigate
RTM
18% ↓ in collisions & 32% ↓ in injury
crashes
Jones et al. (2008) 29 mobile cams in
Norfolk, England,
for 4 years
BA with 48 ﬁxed
speed cam sites as
comparables
18% ↓ in collisions & 35% ↓ in fatal
crashes; no evidence of migration of ac-
cidents
Li et al. (2013) 771 ﬁxed speed cam
sites across Eng-
land, 9 years
DID-PSM, EB;
reference groups
by matching on
observables
23-31% (0.9-1.4) ↓ in collisions; 0.12 -
0.34 ↓ in fatal crashes; eﬀects smaller
with PSM & localised within 200m ; no
spillovers of accidents
Li & Graham
(2016)
771 ﬁxed speed cam
sites across Eng-
land, 9 years
DID-PSM, EB;
reference groups
by matching on
observables
Cameras are more eﬀective in reducing
collisions on riskier sites, measured by
higher historical collision counts.
Keall et al. (2001) Visible and Hidden
cameras in 4 regions
in New Zealand, 1
year pre and post
BA with matching
on road characteris-
tics for comparables
0.7 km/h ↓ in speed; overall 11% ↓ in
collisions, 19% ↓ casualties; hidden cam-
eras has a more general eﬀect across
road
Mountain et al.
(2004)
62 ﬁxed speed
cams across Great
Britain, 3 years pre
post
EB 35% ↓ in speeding, 26% (1.36) ↓ in colli-
sions, 34% (0.31) ↓ in fatal crashes 500m
from cam; eﬀects ↓ moving away from
cam
Mountain et al.
(2005)
79 enforcement
schemes (17 mobile,
62 ﬁxed) across
Great Britain, 3
years pre post
EB 4% ↓ for every 1mph ↓ in speed ;Larger ↓
reported for lower speed roads; Vertical
deﬂections (speed humps) more eﬀective
in reducing speed and accidents
Newstead &
Cameron (2003)
Speed cameras in
Queensland, Aus-
tralia, over a 5 year
span (2006 to 2007)
Poisson BA with
reference sites more
than 6km away
21% ↓ in non-injury crashes, 31% ↓ in
injury crashes, largest eﬀects localised
within 2km
Perez et al. (2007) 8 mobile cams in
Barcelona, Spain
BA Poisson regres-
sions with nearby
reference sites
9 mph ↓ in speed; 27% ↓ in collisions and
injuries, greater eﬀects on weekends
Shin et al. (2009) 6 speed cameras in
Scottsdale, Arizona
US, over a 2 year
span (2006 to 2007)
BA, EB with
nearby reference
sites
9 mph ↓ in speed; overall 44-55% ↓ in
all collisions, 28-48% ↓ in injury crashes,
but no eﬀect on rear-end crashes; no dis-
cernable spillovers
EB - Empirical Bayes, BA - Before and after analysis, DID - Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence
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Table 3.9: Eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes within 500 metres
from Camera using Negative Binomial Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Baseline Demo VMT Weather Non-CAM -3,+3
Accidents -0.489a -0.520a -0.280a -0.268a -0.212a -0.168a -0.232a
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017)
Obs 66868 25720 25720 25720 7383 35929 9841
Absolute -2.18 -2.47 -1.49 -1.43 -1.01 -1.40 -1.18
% ∆ -38.68 -40.52 -24.40 -23.47 -19.07 -15.48 -20.70
No.of CAM 2481 1555 1555 1555 659 2249 1481
Slight -0.433a -0.527a -0.423a -0.379a -0.332a -0.221a -0.310a
(0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.036) (0.013) (0.021)
Obs 57224 21355 21355 21355 5483 31564 8175
Absolute -2.35 -3.07 -2.59 -2.36 -1.99 -2.28 -1.89
% ∆ -35.16 -40.97 -34.52 -31.52 -28.27 -19.84 -26.67
No.of CAM 2123 1294 1294 1294 518 1988 1223
Serious -0.785a -0.758a -0.533a -0.499a -0.447a -0.403a -0.443a
(0.016) (0.018) (0.034) (0.039) (0.079) (0.025) (0.044)
Obs 63280 23650 23650 23650 6539 33823 8306
Absolute -0.58 -0.57 -0.45 -0.42 -0.32 -0.41 -0.38
% ∆ -54.40 -53.15 -41.30 -39.31 -36.07 -33.15 -35.81
No.of CAM 2346 1428 1428 1428 572 2115 1240
Deaths -0.934a -1.006a -1.048a -1.018a -0.950a -0.756a -0.883a
(0.043) (0.071) (0.108) (0.109) (0.185) (0.077) (0.131)
Obs 42924 11394 11394 11394 2787 18765 2843
Absolute -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.19
% ∆ -60.69 -63.41 -64.95 -63.85 -61.32 -53.04 -58.63
No.of CAM 1591 683 683 683 220 1155 426
CAM FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Demographics 3 3 3 3 3
VMT 3 3 3 3
Weather 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent Negative Binomial regression
estimated using Maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y count
where Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of cam-
era. Absolute is the number of reductions in accident outcomes computed by multi-
plying the % ∆ with the pre-treatment mean of Y . % ∆ is the proportional change
(semi-elasticity) of collision outcomes after treatment and is computed by taking
exp(γ) − 1. In Column (1), I include the entire sample of cameras. In Column (2),
I restrict the sample to sites that I have full set of co-variates. In Column (3), I
control for population size, % of 18 to 25, Gross Annual Pay & hours worked. In
Column (4), I control for the annual average vehicle miles travelled (VMT). In Col-
umn (5), weather controls are added into the speciﬁcation. In Column (6), I include
a sample of non-camera sites that are eligible for camera installations. In Column
(7), I constraint the analysis to observations just 3 years before and after from the
year of installation. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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Chapter 4
Beauty Pays for Crime? Evidence
from Sentencing Outcomes
4.1 Introduction
According to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution, all citizens
must be guaranteed equal protection from laws. This implicitly means that when
facing trial, all defendants should not be treated diﬀerently based on unimportant
factors, such as physical appearance, race, gender etc. Judges are entrusted with
the task of upholding this principle. Although for more serious oﬀences, the jury
will agree upon whether to convict a suspect, judges decide on the harshness of the
punishment. They are required to be impartial and not be inﬂuenced by personal
experiences, emotions or other unimportant factors. Their verdict should ultimately
be based on laws and evidences presented in the courts. Yet, time and time again,
judges have been in the spot light for the inconsistency in the punishment for con-
siderably similar oﬀences.
Diﬀerent extraneous factors have been identiﬁed to inﬂuence judicial outcomes.
Numerous studies have shown that outcome for football games (Eren & Mocan,
2016), duration from food breaks (Danziger et al., 2011), media attention (Lim
et al., 2015), race of jury (Anwar et al., 2012), judge (Shayo & Zussman, 2011) and
defendants (Abrams et al., 2012; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2014), and gender of defen-
dants (Mustard, 2001) can impact judicial rulings. These studies seem to suggest
that these "expert" decision makers are easily swayed by unimportant factors.
In this paper, I contribute to the existing literature by evaluating whether fa-
cial attractiveness of criminals impact sentencing outcomes. This is motivated by
the prevalence of the discrimination against the physically unattractive in multi-
ple contexts. It has been long documented that labour markets discriminate based
on appearance as attractive individuals earn higher wages while plain looking peo-
ple are penalized with poor labour market outcomes (Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994;
Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998; Graham et al., 2016). Researches suggest that better
looking people earn more because they appear to be more conﬁdent with superior
communication skills (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006). Being attractive also reduces
the propensity for young adult to engage in criminal activities (Mocan & Tekin,
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2010). This bias towards more attractive individuals is also documented widely out-
side labour markets. While better-looking politicians appear to win more votes in
elections (Berggren et al., 2010), lenders also trust better looking borrowers more
than unattractive counterparts (Duarte et al., 2012; Ravina et al., 2008; Jenq et al.,
2015). Looks could also impede human capital accumulation. Hatﬁeld & Sprecher
(1986) suggest that better-looking adolescents are showered with more attention
from teachers that can improve their conﬁdence and social skills. Supporting this,
Mocan & Tekin (2010) show that less physically attractive teenagers have poorer
test scores.
Despite the burgeoning evidences on the disparity in judicial sentencing due
to extraneous factors, and the pervasiveness of bias against the unattractive in
diﬀerent settings, the literature linking appearance of felons and sentencing outcomes
is remarkably limited. This is probably because the empirical analysis is beset with
multiple challenges. First, measuring attractiveness is challenging as it is hard to
clearly deﬁne what constitutes beauty. Measures widely used in the psychology
literature to deﬁne attractiveness1 include facial symmetry, averageness and sexual
dimorphism. Furthermore, as the saying goes, beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder.
The deﬁnition of attractiveness could vary tremendously across cultures and time.
The argument made by many academics is that there seems to be consensus among
individuals on the standards of beauty within culture and time. To circumvent this
problem, studies often require diﬀerent respondents2 to rate the same subjects to
obtain an objective measure of attractiveness. This resource-intensive research set
up, however, meant that the sample sizes are usually small, questioning the external
validity of these studies.
Even if appearance is accurately measured, there could be unobserved con-
founders that correlate with facial attractiveness and inﬂuence judicial sentenc-
ing. For instance, if labour market outcomes are aversely aﬀected by appearance
(Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998), labour market penalties
could incentivise unattractive individuals to engage in illicit activities. Higher socio-
economic status could allow attractive felons to engage in more reputable attorneys
who can reduce the severity of their sentences. All these factors could exacerbate
the sentencing gap between the better and worse looking criminals.
Bearing these challenges in mind, this research contributes to the existing lit-
1This list is by no means exhaustive. Other measures used include grooming, youthful-
ness, babyfaced-ness and expression. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency in the deﬁni-
tion of attractiveness.
2For instance, in the seminal study by Hamermesh & Biddle (1994), assessors of between
7 and 50 years old are asked to rank the same images and their responses appear to be
highly correlated. Similarly, Mocan & Tekin (2010) rely on diﬀerent evaluators to assess
beauty to obtain a representative measure of attractiveness.
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erature on several fronts: I conduct the analysis to a universe of almost 300,000
convicted criminals from 1998 to 2015 in Florida to increase the representativeness
of my ﬁndings. This is possible because I rely on a facial recognition algorithm
on the mugshots to accurately delineate various facial features (eyes, nose, mouth,
forehead and jawline) and compute facial symmetry to approximate attractiveness.
Third, I exploit the random assignment of cases to judges in the courts in Florida.
This means that cases are randomly allocated to judges not based on the appear-
ance of the felon. Finally, to mitigate the risk of observed diﬀerences between better
and worse looking criminals from biasing the estimates, I control for a rich set of
covariates that includes (1) physical attributes of felons (age, height, weight, race,
tattoo, eye and hair color), (2) case facts (crime type, number of concurrent charges,
whether is the principal criminal) and (3) criminal history (counts and types of pre-
vious oﬀences).
The main ﬁnding is that judges hand out lenient sentences to criminals with
more symmetrical faces. The disparity in punishment between criminals with more
symmetric faces, at the 25th percentile, and criminals with less symmetric faces,
at the 75th percentile, is around 1.0% to 1.9% of the mean sentence length, which
amounts between 17 and 32 days. These results hold across a battery of sensitivity
analyses. This bias against less attractive felons appears to vary across race, gender
and type of crimes. The eﬀects are smaller associated with black inmates, suggesting
that cross-race judgement of facial symmetry could be weaker than within race as
most of the judges in Florida are white. Conversely, female felons with more sym-
metrical features are given harsher sentences. This reversal in relationship could be
explained by paternalism towards female felons as asymmetric facial features could
be correlated with sympathetic life circumstances. I further observe the eﬀects of
facial symmetry on sentences are weaker for serious oﬀences (e.g murder, manslaugh-
ter), suggesting that judges have less ﬂexibility to depart from sentencing guidelines
for high proﬁle cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, I review several
streams of literature related to this research, before describing the data and how
I measure attractiveness using facial symmetry. Subsequently, I will illustrate the
institutional background of judicial sentencing before highlighting the identiﬁcation
strategy adopted in this paper. Finally, I will present the ﬁndings before concluding
the research.
4.2 Literature Review
There are several streams of literature particularly related to this research. The
ﬁrst line of research is understanding what deﬁnes attractiveness. The three main
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components prominent in psychology are averageness (Langlois & Roggman, 1990),
symmetry (Scheib et al., 1999), and sexual dimorphism (Perrett et al., 1998). An
average face has mathematically mean trait values of the population and is low
in distinctiveness. A symmetrical face has physiognomy features that are highly
proportional. Sexual dimorphism refers to facial traits that emerge during puberty,
signalling sexual maturity and reproductive potential.
These measures of facial attractiveness each has their pros and cons. For in-
stance, an average face is usually created out of compositing many digitized faces
that confounds averageness with symmetry and smoothness of the skin (Alley &
Cunningham, 1991). It is also challenging to deﬁne the standards of "attractive"
sexual dimorphism. For instance, it is subjective to consider what is a distinctive
jawline. Conversely, among the diﬀerent measures, it is the most straightforward to
measure facial symmetry as it is based on the proportionality of various facial fea-
tures. Numerous studies have also shown that facial symmetry is highly correlated
with attractiveness Grammer & Thornhill (1994); Perrett et al. (1999); Jones & Hill
(1993). Hence, this paper will focus on facial symmetry to measure attractiveness.
Why do attractive faces matter? They are desirable because they reﬂect func-
tional optimality, disease resistance, development stability and signal better mate
quality (Rhodes, 2006). An attractive face could also draw positive ﬁrst impressions
and elicit desirable traits - a popular stereotype of what is beautiful is good (Dion
et al., 1972). Previous literature has shown that attributes such as trustworthiness,
competency, sociability and conﬁdence etc. are highly correlated with ratings of
facial attractiveness. For a summary of the existing literature, refer to Feingold
(1992) and Langlois et al. (2000). All these results suggest that facial attractiveness
could matter in the courtroom.
Despite the copious amount of research indicating that judicial decisions are
swayed by extraneous factors, existing literature on the presence of discrimination
on appearance in the courtroom is largely limited to the ﬁeld of psychology. The
bulk of these studies conclude that appearance matters as judges tend to hand
out favourable sentences to better looking felons. Stewart (1980) conducted an
observational analysis for 74 defendants from Pennsylvania during trials, requiring
observers to rate them on attractiveness, grooming and cleanliness etc. Although he
ﬁnds that attractive defendants receive lighter sentences, appearance do not matter
for conviction rates. Zebrowitz & McDonald (1991) examine the impact of baby-
facedness and attractiveness for a sample of 504 cases from the small claims court in
Massachusetts. They report that the appearance of defendants and plaintiﬀs matter
as judges side youthful-looking individuals. Whether attractiveness matters also
depends on the type of crimes committed. Attractiveness could work against felons
who committing crimes that rely on their appearances (Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). The
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bias against less attractive felons also appears to be implicit. Subjects seem unaware
of their bias against the uglier suspects despite recommending lighter sentences and
lower conviction rates for better looking felons (Efran, 1974).
A review of the existing literature reveals several shortcomings. Many of these
studies mentioned above, especially earlier ones, are laboratory experiments that
are not only constrained to a limited sample, but also require non-judge subjects
to make judicial decisions outside courtroom settings. Hence, it is unlikely that
the results from these ﬁeld experiments are going to be representative or reﬂective
of actual sentencing outcomes. Even for observational studies, most of them are
fairly dated and lack information on cases and felons. These limitations restrict the
analyses to parsimonious regression models plagued with omitted variable bias.
Economics researches on the discrimination in judicial sentencing have made
more headway in detecting prejudice. Most of these papers focus on understand-
ing racial and gender bias in judicial outcomes. These studies rely on random
assignment of cases to judges and a richer set of control variables to improve the
identiﬁcation of discrimination. Researches have provided overwhelmingly support
for racial or gender bias in capital punishment (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2014), bail
(Ayres & Waldfogel, 1994), probability of being convicted (Mustard, 2001; Abrams
et al., 2012) and sentence length (Abrams et al., 2012; Butcher et al., 2017). Most
of these studies report favourable treatment towards females and whites. Several
studies seek to understand the underlying motivations for discrimination in policing
with some innovative strategies. For instance, Knowles et al. (2001) examine the
guilty rates for motor vehicle searches across diﬀerent races. The idea is that if
race is indicative of the propensity to carry contraband substance - consistent with
statistical discrimination - then even if the number of searches are higher for a par-
ticular group, the guilty rates should be very similar across races. Indeed, they ﬁnd
evidence supporting statistical discrimination. Rank-order tests3 are conducted to
detect whether judges are consistent in the judgement towards felons belonging in
diﬀerent groups (Park, 2017; Butcher et al., 2017).
Overall, it is surprising to ﬁnd no studies on appearance bias in judicial out-
comes in the economics literature despite the sheer volume of work illustrating the
discrimination against the less attractive in multiple settings. This is a gap that
this paper aims to ﬁll.
3This strategy is ﬁrst adopted by Anwar & Fang (2006) on motor vehicle searches. The
idea is that taste-based discrimination prevails if white police oﬃcers search black motorists
more than black oﬃcers and vice versa. However, if both black and white oﬃcers are more
prone to search black motorists, then race might be signalling some latent criminality and
statistical discrimination prevails.
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4.3 Data
The main source of data is from the OBIS database provided by the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC). This comprehensive database documents infor-
mation for a universe of convicted felons, including those released, those currently
under supervision and incarceration from 1997 onwards. For each case record, de-
tails on the sentencing outcomes and case facts, which include length of sentence,
date of sentencing and oﬀence committed, number of concurrent charges, type of
crime and location of court, are reported. Other details recorded for each felon in-
clude criminal history, gender, race, age, height, weight, body tattoos and residential
address.
To assess facial attractiveness of the convicts, I ﬁrst scrape inmate mugshots from
FDOC. These pictures are usually taken when inmates are initially incarcerated in
the facility. Using a facial recognition package, I extracted 69 facial landmarks from
each of the mugshots4. These features delineate the top of the forehead, eyebrows,
eyes, nose, lips and jaw line. An illustration is shown in the Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: An illustration of the 69 facial features extracted & how facial symmetry
is computed
Using the location of these facial landmarks, I measure the distance of the left
and right features from the middle of the face denoted by the dashed line. A total of
seven features, which include eye brows (r1 & l1), eyes (r2, l2), interocular (r3, l3),
middle face (r4 & l4), nose (r5 & l5), mouth (r6 & l6) and lower face (r7 & l7), are
accounted for. I ﬁrst measure the absolute diﬀerence between the distance of the
4The algorithm is written by Vahid Kazemi and Josephine Sullivan to locate facial
landmarks rapidly using machine learning. For more details, refer to Kazemi & Sullivan
(2014).
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left (ln) and right (rn) for each of the 7 features, before averaging them to compute
facial symmetry for each inmate (FSi) as shown in equation 4.1. Details of these
features are summarized in Table 4.1.
FSi =
7∑
n=1
|rn − ln|
7
(4.1)
Table 4.1: Facial Symmetry Ratios
Feature Computation Description
Eyebrows r1 − l1 Right Brow - Left Brow
Eyes r2 − l2 Right Eye - Left Eye
Interocular r3 − l3 Right Interocular - Left Interocular
Middle Face r4 − l4 Right Face Width - Left Face Width
Nose r5 − l5 Right Nose Width - Left Nose Width
Mouth r6 − l6 Right Mouth Width - Left Mouth Width
Lower Face r7 − l7 Right Bottom Face Width - Left Bottom Face Width
While the pros of using facial symmetry to proxy for attractiveness are that it is
straightforward to measure and it provides a continuous measure of attractiveness,
there are some cons with using facial symmetry. First, FSi only measures horizontal
symmetry and will not account for inmates with disproportionately wide or long
faces. Therefore, I include face-width-height ratio as an additional control in the
robustness tests (See Table 4.5).
Another concern is that facial symmetry captured from mugshots could be inac-
curately measured from badly taken pictures. For instance, if the inmates' head is
tilted to the left or right when the mugshot is taken (See Figure 4.2), it is possible
for faces to be asymmetrical even though this might not be true. The concern is
whether deﬁant inmates, who receive harsher sentences, take poorer mugshots. To
correct for measurement error in facial symmetry from poorly taken mugshots, I
compute various adjustment angles that account for how slanted the face is. First,
I calculate eye-adjustment angle (k) - the angle between the actual eye-line and the
horizontal eye-line. Then, I account for the nose-adjustment angle (d) - the angle
between the actual nose-line and the vertical nose-line. For illustration of tilted
and well-taken mugshots, and how I compute these adjustment angles, refer to Fig-
ure 4.2. A well-taken mugshot should have a ﬂat horizontal eye-line and a vertical
nose-line as observed in Figure 4.2c.
When taking mugshots, inmates could also be facing left or right, or could be
lifting their heads up or down, aﬀecting facial symmetry. Hence, I further compute
the absolute of the diﬀerence between right eye-to-face-edge (Dr) and left eye-to-face-
edge distance (Dl), and the absolute diﬀerence between forehead-eyebrow distance
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(a) This image has been re-
moved as the copyright is
owned by another organisa-
tion
(b) This image has been re-
moved as the copyright is
owned by another organisa-
tion
(c) This image has been re-
moved as the copyright is
owned by another organisa-
tion
Figure 4.2: Examples of side-way tilted mugshots that could aﬀect facial at-
tractiveness. To ﬁnd d and k, one can do it using Pythagoras Theorem where
d = Cos−1(V erticalNoseLength
ActualNoseLength
) and k = Cos−1(HorizonalEyeLength
ActualEyeLength
). Source: Florida
Department of Corrections
(Du) and mouth-chin distance (Dd). These measures are illustrated in Figure 4.3.
(a) This image has been removed as the copy-
right is owned by another organisation
(b) This image has been removed as the copy-
right is owned by another organisation
Figure 4.3: Examples of left or right facing and up or downward facing mugshots
that could aﬀect facial attractiveness. To account for this I calculate the |Dr −Dl|
and |Du−Dd| and include these measures as controls. Source: Florida Department
of Corrections
4.4 Institutional Background
Sentencing guidelines are adopted in Florida since 1983 to eradicate disparity
in punishments between similar oﬀences to ensure fairness, and to make sure that
felons are adequately punished for their transgressions. A scoresheet is prepared for
each defendant by the state attorney, before being presented to the defense counsel
and signed oﬀ by the judge. Oﬀences are categorized into 10 levels, depending on
the severity of the crime that is based on the purported level of harm inﬂicted on the
community. The more severe the crime, the more points will be allocated. Additional
points could be given depending on the way the crime is committed5 and the criminal
history of the felon. The total points will determine the severity the punishment6.
Although the points determine the recommended sentencing, judges are allowed to
depart from the recommendations if proper reasons7 could be provided.
5Additional points could be given if the felon inﬂicts victim injury or made sexual
contact, the felon has serious oﬀence history, there is a use of ﬁrearms or the crime is gang
related.
6Oﬀenders receiving 44 points or less could receive a non-state prison sanction, while
those exceeding will be given a minimum sentence in months by subtracting the points
received by 28 before decreasing the value by 25%.
7Departure of sentences could occur depending on whether the defendant is juvenile,
whether the defendant is an accomplice, and whether the defendant is able to appreciate the
criminal nature of the conduct. For more information, refer to http://www.dc.state.fl.us/
pub/sen_cpcm/cpc_manual.pdf.
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Sentencing guidelines went through major changes8 over the years. The Criminal
Punishment Code (CPC) became eﬀective on the 1st October 1998. The new code
not only lowers the threshold for incarceration, but also increases the maximum
sentences permitted. Under CPC, the maximum sentence is determined by the
maximum provided in statute 775.082 rather than being capped by the 25% upward
discretion under previous guidelines. Adhering to the statutory maximum means
that potentially all felony oﬀenders could be incarcerated, and that they are likely
to receive longer sentence lengths9. With more ﬂexibility given to judges to depart
from the guidelines, it is more likely for extraneous factors, such as appearance, to
have a consequential eﬀect on judicial outcomes.
4.5 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Methodology
To estimate the impact of facial symmetry on sentencing length, I specify the
following equation:
Dijct = αj ∗ δc + γFSi +X ′ijφ+M ′iω + θt + εijct, (4.2)
where Dijct is the natural logarithm of the sentence length measured in days for
defendant i committing crime type j and trialled in court c at time t. The key
variable of interest, FSi, is the absolute deviation from the perfect facial symmetry.
This is measured based on the average symmetry from 7 diﬀerent facial features as
described earlier in Table 4.1. Hence, γ captures the percentage change in sentencing
length from a one unit increase in deviation from a perfectly symmetrical face. If
judges are favoring felons with symmetric facial features, I would expect γ to be >
0.
X ′ij represents a vector of personal characteristics, case facts and criminal history
associated with defendant i committing crime type j. Personal details include race,
gender, age, tattoos (counts of visible tattoos), height, weight, hair and eye colour.
By partial-ing out the eﬀect of height and weight, this paper focuses on the impact
8The ﬁrst reforms took place in 1994. New guidelines were created in response to
the epidemic of certain oﬀences, such as crack-related crimes, the passage of unfunded
mandatory minimum sentence legislation and the population boom to reduce the strain on
correction facilities. The objective is to ensure that state incarceration will be enforced on
repeated oﬀenders who are threatening the society committing serious or violent crimes.
These reforms include better categorization of the oﬀences, and allowing additional points
to be given for repeated oﬀenders and for the manner the crime is committed. In 1995,
the guidelines were amended again. Point values were increased in a variety of areas and
additional policy levers were created to permit tougher punishments. These guidelines
went through more modiﬁcations in 1997 and 1998 that further exacerbates sanctions.
9Based on the new code, a felon charged with life felony could receive life imprisonment,
while 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree could receive jail terms of up to 30, 15 and 5 years respectively.
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of physiognomy on judicial outcomes. As the majority of the inmates are either
black or white males, I restrict the analysis to these groups, which makes up more
than 88% of the sample, to reduce heterogeneity in the sample. I will examine the
diﬀerential eﬀects of facial symmetry on sentencing outcomes across diﬀerent races
and gender in subsequent sections.
Case facts accounted for include the number of concurrent charges and whether
the felon is the principal criminal. Those playing lesser roles in the transgression
are less culpable and could be given lighter sentences. I further control for the
criminal history of each defendant by including the total number of times the felon
has been previously incarcerated as a regressor. The idea is that serial oﬀenders
are subjected to heftier punishment to deter re-oﬀending. M ′i represents a vector of
mugshot related characteristics. These variables include various adjustment angles
and distances that correct for badly taken mugshots that could aﬀect the measure-
ment of facial symmetry. Refer to Figure 4.2 and 4.3 for more information. I also
control for the image data size as the fuzziness of the mugshots could exacerbate
measurement error.
δc represents court ﬁxed eﬀects that are indicators for the court responsible for
handling the case. αj are indicators denoting the type of crime committed. Relying
on the detailed information provided for each sentence, I classify the oﬀences into
1294 unique categories10. I include the interaction of crime (αj) and court (δc) ﬁxed
eﬀects 11. In other words, I am exploiting the variation of facial symmetry and
sentences between felons committing the same crime type j and trial in the same
court c. Adding crime-court ﬁxed eﬀects not only mitigates the risk of time-invariant
unobserved diﬀerences between oﬀences from confounding the estimates, but also
ensure that eﬀects are not induced by the variation of harshness in sentencing across
courts.
θt denotes month and year ﬁxed eﬀects for both the oﬀence and sentencing dates
that controls for general trends in the sentencing across counties over time. Due
to major changes in sentencing guidelines over the sample period, I restrict the
sample to oﬀences committed after the passing of the Criminal Punishment Code
on the 1st of October 1998. εijct represents the standard errors that are clustered
at court-by-year levels. The assumption is that E[εijct|FSi = 0].
10For more information on how the diﬀerent transgression are classiﬁed, refer to http:
//www.dc.state.fl.us/appcommon/offctgy.asp
11This speciﬁcation is chosen also because I do not have information on the judges. Ide-
ally, I would like to include judge ﬁxed eﬀects and exploit the variation in facial symmetry
and sentencing within judge and crime type. Given the lack of judicial details, interact-
ing the crime and court ﬁxed eﬀects ensures that I am closer to exploiting within judge
variation given that there seems to be some specialization in the types of crimes that are
handled by judges in a court.
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4.6 Empirical Results
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
All Above Median Below Median Diﬀerence
(More Symmetric) (Less Symmetric)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Diﬀ T-stats
Sentencing Outcomes
Sentence Length (Years) 4.65 5.56 4.61 5.56 4.88 5.76 0.27 23.97
Personal Traits
Age 34.63 10.84 34.32 10.52 34.61 10.89 0.29 13.32
Height(feet) 5.27 0.40 5.27 0.39 5.28 0.40 0.01 17.32
Weight(lbs) 182.82 35.79 182.07 35.05 183.13 36.08 1.06 14.90
Black 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.02 20.50
Hispanic 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 -0.00 -6.76
White 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 -0.02 -17.46
Female 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 -0.03 -37.62
Counts of Tattoos 3.30 3.89 3.36 3.94 3.33 3.90 -0.03 -3.39
Have Face Tattoos 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 -0.00 -0.46
Case Related Characteristics
Principal Criminal 0.99 0.08 0.99 0.08 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.80
No. of Charges per Case 4.83 12.39 4.72 11.89 5.05 12.84 0.33 13.16
No. of previous oﬀences 1.18 3.98 1.17 3.95 1.19 4.12 0.02 2.72
Assault 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.00 6.86
Drug 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 -0.01 -9.67
Manslaughter 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.00 -1.06
Murder 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.00 5.92
Other Crimes 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 -0.00 -5.96
Property Crime 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.00 4.16
Robbery 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.00 7.16
Sex 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.01 19.65
Theft 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 -0.01 -6.69
Weapon 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.00 2.79
All represents the entire sample of 807,013 sentences from 278,240 inmates . Above Median represents a group
of inmates with facial features more symmetrical that the median face, while Below Median represents a group
of inmates with facial features less symmetrical than the median face. Diﬀerence captures the absolute diﬀerence
in the mean of observable covariates between the Above and Below Median and T-statistics denote the statistical
signiﬁcance of such diﬀerences.
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of sentencing outcomes, observable
personal and case related characteristics surrounding the felons in the analysis. I ﬁrst
report statistics for the entire sample, before stratifying the sample into above and
below median facial symmetry. I further report the diﬀerences-in-mean for various
observable characteristics. These preliminary results show whether felons with more
symmetric facial features are diﬀerent from others in observable characteristics.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in sentencing outcomes. On average, criminals
with more proportional facial features serve sentences that are 0.27 years (about
3 months) shorter, suggesting that judges are more lenient to those felons with
more symmetrical faces. In terms of personal traits, I observe that inmates with
less symmetrical facial features are, on average, 0.3 years older, around 1 pound
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heavier, and have fewer tattoos. There are, on average, a slightly bigger proportion
of black inmates and smaller proportion of white inmates with facial symmetry below
median.
Surrounding case related characteristics, more facially symmetrical criminals are
charged with 0.34 fewer counts of concurrent oﬀences compared to those below
median symmetry. There are no stark diﬀerences in terms of the types of crime
committed although less facially symmetry criminals are more prone to be convicted
for sex related oﬀences, and less likely to be remanded for theft and drug crimes.
Overall, although there are disparities associated with personal traits and case-
related facts between criminals with above and below median facial symmetry, these
diﬀerences are unlikely to bias the estimates as they are controlled for in the regres-
sion analyses as shown in the subsequent sections.
4.6.2 Baseline Results
Table 4.3 presents the baseline estimation of γ from equation 4.2. On top of
restricting the sample to white and black male felons, I further truncate the top and
bottom 1% of facial symmetry to alleviate the possibility of outliers from driving the
results. Column (1) shows results from a parsimonious model with only crime*court
ﬁxed eﬀects and indicators for the months and years of sentencing and oﬀence dates.
Put diﬀerently, I am comparing the eﬀect of facial symmetry of criminals committing
the same crime type and being sentenced in the same court on their sentencing
outcomes. This amounts to more than 14,000 ﬁxed eﬀects (from 20 Circuit Courts)
associated with almost 280,000 diﬀerent felons. Results suggest that a unit increase
in deviation from a perfectly symmetrical face increases sentencing length by 0.2%.
Putting these estimates into perspective, the sentencing gap between the felon at
the 25th percentile and the felon at the 75th percentile in facial attractiveness is
approximately 17 days, which corresponds to around 1% of the mean sentence length.
I extend the baseline model by including observable inmate characteristics in Column
(2). Indicator variables for age, race, ethnicity and the presence of face tattoos, the
counts of tattoos, height and weight of the inmate are controlled for. These personal
traits do not appear to matter much as the estimates remain fairly similar to before.
Next, I add a vector of photo-related characteristics into the analysis. These con-
trols include (1) the image data size of the photo, which accounts for the resolution
of the picture, (2) the nose and eye adjustment angles that measure how tilted the
face is, and (3) the absolute face to eye ratio that measures whether the inmate is
facing sideways, and (4) the forehead to mouth-chin ratio that captures whether the
inmate is facing up or downwards. This speciﬁcation accounts for measurement error
associated with using facial symmetry to measure attractiveness because of poorly
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Table 4.3: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FSi 0.002
a 0.002a 0.004a 0.003a 0.005b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
FS2i -0.000
(0.000)
Quintile1 -0.031a
(0.008)
Quintile2 -0.029a
(0.008)
Quintile3 -0.026a
(0.007)
Quintile4 -0.012c
(0.006)
Obs 807037 802952 795944 795944 795944 795944
R2 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57
No. of Inmates 278483 277166 274972 274972 274972 274972
Crime*Court FEs 14118 14089 14021 14021 14021 14021
Absolute Eﬀects (25% → 75%) 17.32 15.80 31.31 23.81 32.62 .
%∆ (25% → 75%) 0.99 0.90 1.81 1.37 1.88 .
Crime*Court Fixed Eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year Month Fixed Eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inmate Details 3 3 3 3 3
Photo Details 3 3 3 3
Case Facts 3 3 3
Dependent variable is logarithm of total number of days of sentence i by felon j. Key Independent
variable, FSi, measures the deviation from a perfectly symmetrical face. Absolute eﬀects report
the sentencing gap in the number of days moving from the 25th to 75th percentile in facial
attractiveness, Crime*Court ﬁxed eﬀects is the interaction of j diﬀerent categories of crime with
c court ﬁxed eﬀects. Year Month Fixed eﬀects include both year and month dummies for date
of sentencing. Inmate characteristics include race, age, height, weight, number of tattoos and
whether the tattoos are visible. Photo Characteristics entail adjustment angle, distances and
picture size. Case facts include the number of charges included in the same case, whether felon i
is the principal criminal, and detailed criminal history capturing the number of times the felon i
has been incarcerated, and the number of times felon i commit the same crime j. Standard errors
are clustered in court*year level. Columns (5) and (6) report the non-linear relationship between
facial attractiveness and sentencing. In Column (5), FS2i is the squared term of FSi. ln Column
(6), continuous measure of facial attractiveness is divided into quintiles where Quintile1 takes the
value of 1 for inmates classiﬁed in the ﬁrst quintile (most attractive) or otherwise zero while Q5,
the base (excluded) group, takes the value of 1 for inmates in the last quintile (least attractive) or
otherwise zero. Standard errors clustered at court-by-year levels are reported in the parenthesis.
c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
taken mugshots. Indeed, controlling for these diﬀerences increases sentencing gaps
considerably to 31 days, suggesting that measurement error in facial symmetry could
have attributed to attenuation bias.
In Columns (4), I control for details of the case that include the number of
concurrent charges, whether the felon is the principal criminal and the criminal
history that is measured by the number of times the felon has been convicted for
the same crime type before. These details should aﬀect the harshness of sentencing
and controlling for these diﬀerences should mitigate the concern that unattractive
felons could be serial criminals prone to committing more severe transgressions.
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Accounting for these diﬀerences marginally reduces sentencing gap to 24 days but
the eﬀects remain statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
Next, I examine whether the relationship between facial attractiveness and harsh-
ness of sentencing could be non-linear. That is, whether judges show stronger
favouritism to the most attractive felons. I ﬁrst include the quadratic term of fa-
cial symmetry (FS2i ) in Column (7). Although the squared term is not statistically
signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient is negative and the inclusion appears to accentuate the
estimates. This suggests that the most attractive felons could enjoy the sharpest
reductions in sentences. Now, the sentencing gap is around 25 days moving from
the 25th to the 75th percentile in facial symmetry.
I further divide facial symmetry into quintiles, with Quintile1 representing the
top quintile of felons with the most symmetrical faces and Quintile5, the omitted
reference group, representing felons with the least symmetrical faces. The diﬀerence
in sentence length between the most (Quintile1) and least attractive felons (Quin-
tile5) is 3.1%, which corresponds to a gap of 44 days. This magnitude of favouritism
decreases as faces become less proportional as evidenced by the smaller estimated
eﬀects moving down the quantiles. The diﬀerence in sentencing between felons in
the fourth quintile (Quintile4) and the least attractive faces are smaller at 1.2%,
which works out to be around 21 days. This sharp drop in eﬀects moving into the
fourth quintile suggests that judges are siding more on criminals with distinctively
more symmetrical facial features.
In summary, my baseline results reveal that the facial symmetry aﬀects the
sentencing outcomes. In particular, criminals with more symmetrical faces are given
shorter sentences for the crimes they committed compared to criminals with less
symmetrical faces. Further analysis suggests that the bias towards criminals with
more proportional faces could be non-linear. Judges appear to hand out the most
lenient punishments to the most proportional faces and this preferential treatment
is smaller as faces become less symmetric.
4.6.3 Heterogeneous Eﬀects
Next, I explore whether the eﬀects of facial symmetry on sentencing vary between
diﬀerent groups. I analyse the relationship separately for black, white, male and
female felons12. Results are summarized in Table 4.4.
Columns (1) and (2) report the eﬀect of facial symmetry on sentence length
for black and white felons respectively13 for the entire population of inmates and
12Result are similar when I combine the analysis with interaction variables. They are
available upon request.
13In other unreported results, I include other minority races including Asian and His-
panics. This takes up about less than 4% of the sample. Similar to the blacks, I do not
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for those released. It appears that eﬀects of facial symmetry on sentencing are
fairly consistent between black and white felons although the estimates are slightly
larger for white inmates. To put the estimates into perspective, compared to the
75th percentile, a white inmate at the 25th percentile in facial symmetry serve, on
average, 27 fewer days. Conversely, black inmates with more proportional facial
features serve, on average, 20 fewer days. Why are the eﬀects stronger for white
inmates? One possible explanation is that more than 91% of the judges in Florida
are white. Cross-race judgement for attractiveness could be slightly weaker than
within race assessment (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Bernstein et al., 1982). White
judges could be more able to discern facial symmetry for white felons, explaining
slightly larger eﬀects associated with white felons.
Columns (3) and (4) further breakdown the analysis to male and female felons.
Results in Column (3) are similar to that reported in Column (4) of Table 4.3. It
is very interesting to observe a reverse in the relationship for female felons. Now,
comparing the sentencing outcomes for female inmates at the 25th percentile with
the 75th percentile in facial symmetry, holding all other factors constant, I observe
a 32 day reduction in sentencing length. While an in-depth analysis of this intrigu-
ing result is out of the purview of this paper, the divergence in eﬀects for female
felons could stem from the fact that judges are paternalistic towards women be-
lieving that they are physically weaker (Moulds, 1978; Spohn, 1999). Unobserved
sympathetic life circumstances, such as mental illness, poverty and addiction, could
be correlated with facial symmetry and these factors could explain why less attrac-
tive female defendants are less harshly punished. Refer to (Starr, 2014) for more
detailed discussion of possible explanations to male-female sentencing gaps.
Next, I explore how the eﬀect of facial symmetry on sentencing outcomes to
manifest across diﬀerent crime types. This is estimated by allowing bias to vary
across the 9 major crime types. I interact the indicator variable of each crime with
FSi and coeﬃcients of this interaction term are plotted in Figure 4.4. A few notable
observations can be made. It is interesting to observe that criminals with more
proportional facial features are more likely to get away with lighter sentences for
sex-related transgression although the estimates are too imprecisely estimated to be
statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the ﬁndings reported by Jacobson
(1981) that the outcome of rape cases could be inﬂuenced by the appearance of
defendants and plaintiﬀs. Furthermore, more serious transgressions, such as murder
and manslaughter, are more equitably sentenced regardless of the facial symmetry
of the felons. This suggests that judges may have less ﬂexibility to depart from the
sentencing guidelines for more higher proﬁle cases.
ﬁnd that judges favoured more proportional faces for races other than white
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Table 4.4: Eﬀects of Gender & Race on Discrimination of Facial Attractiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black White Male Female
FSi 0.003
b 0.004a 0.003a -0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs 336513 456281 795944 117757
R2 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.52
No. of Inmates 124364 149826 274972 40079
Absolute Eﬀects (25% → 75%) 20.25 26.80 25.36 -31.50
%∆ (25% → 75%) 0.86 0.95 0.91 -1.53
Refer to the notes from earlier Table 4.3 for more information. In Columns
(1) & (2), I stratify the analysis to Black and White inmates, allow the
discrimination to vary between black and white felons. In Columns (3) &
(4), I stratify the analysis to Male and Female inmates. This group of 40,079
female inmates are previously omitted from the analysis . c p<0.10, b p<0.05,
a p<0.01.
4.6.4 Robustness Tests & Alternative Interpretations
Table 4.5 summarizes the ﬁndings from a battery of robustness tests that examine
the validity of the results.
Table 4.5: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FWHR Zipcode FE Age<=70 <=5 Crime After2005 <=90% High Res Crime#Time
FSi 0.003
a 0.004a 0.003a 0.004a 0.002b 0.005a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs 795944 469951 794298 640159 582299 639113 626907 758672
R2 0.57 0.36 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.64
No. of Inmates 274972 176864 274382 260270 200996 221208 206671 264247
Crime*Court FEs 14021 8157 13999 13426 12529 13051 13193 66291
Absolute Eﬀects (25% → 75%) 23.08 18.88 25.19 28.16 15.04 26.92 32.52 23.51
%∆ (25% → 75%) 1.33 1.69 1.45 1.72 0.89 1.56 1.74 1.37
Refer to notes in Table 4.3 for more information. The speciﬁcation adopted is similar to Column (6) in Table 4.3. In Column (1), I account
for face-width-height ratio of each inmate. In Column (2), I include zipcode ﬁxed eﬀects that control for the zipcode of the released inmate.
In Column (3), I remove any inmates that are older than 70 years old. In Column (4), any felons that are charged with 5 or more crimes are
omitted from the analysis. In column (5), I only examine inmates sentenced after 2005. In column (6), I exclude the top 10% least attractive
faces. In column (7), any low resolution images less than 12,000 bytes are removed from the sample. In column (8), I include crime*year*court
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at court-by-year levels are reported in the parenthesis. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
1. Vertical Symmetry: As mentioned before, face symmetry only accounts for hori-
zontal symmetry and do not account for faces that could be disproportionately wide
or long. Therefore, I include face-width-height ratio (FWHR) as an additional con-
trol in Column (1). FWHR is computed by taking the ratio of the face height and
the face width. This do no matter much as documented sentencing gaps remain
fairly similar to before.
2. Zipcode Fixed Eﬀects: If less attractive felons have poorer labour market outcomes
(Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998) and prevent them from
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Figure 4.4: Eﬀects of facial attractiveness on sentencing outcomes across diﬀerent
crimes. Each dot denotes the estimated eﬀect (γ) of facial symmetry on the sen-
tencing outcomes for each crime type. Tails indicate the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The speciﬁcation is similar to Column (5) of table 4.3 but I allow the discrimination
towards facial attractiveness to vary across the 9 major crime types. Other crimes
include escape from correction facility, kidnapping, racketeering, crime on elderly
and other violent crimes.
hiring better attorney to defend their cases, criminals with less symmetric faces
could be more harshly sentenced due to their lower socio-economic status (SES).
Thus, I proxy for SES based on the neighbourhood of residence with the inclusion of
zipcode ﬁxed eﬀects. The assumption is that inmates living in same zipcode should
have fairly similar economic background. Doing so reduces the sample considerably
by more than 40% as I only have residential address for released inmates. After
accounting for disparity in SES, as shown in Column (2), the sentencing gap remains
signiﬁcant at around 19 days moving from the 25th to 75th percentile in facial
symmetry. The smaller absolute sentence gaps despite larger estimated eﬀects could
be because sentencing lengths are on average shorter for those who are already
released at the point of analysis.
3. Age Eﬀects: If ageing felons have less symmetrical facial features, and judges
are sympathetic towards elderly criminals, it is plausible that earlier estimates are
underestimating the eﬀect of facial symmetry on sentencing. Thus, in Column (1),
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I remove any inmates who are more than 70 years old from the analysis14. Results
remain similar to before in terms of both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance,
ameliorating the concerns that earlier eﬀects could be driven by age.
4. Serial Felons: Given that less attractive individuals could be forced to engage in
illicit activities due to poorer labour outcomes (Mocan & Tekin, 2010), the concern
is whether criminals with less proportional facial features are more likely to be
repeated oﬀenders. Since the harshness of punishment is inﬂuenced by the number
of concurrent and historical charges, less attractive criminals could be more harshly
sentenced even when there is no discrimination against appearance. Therefore, I
limit the analysis to felons with 5 or less concurrent and historical charges in Column
(2). Removing repeated oﬀenders from the sample has a negligible impact on the
estimates, suggesting that the discrimination against criminals with less symmetric
faces are not driven by recalcitrant oﬀenders.
5. Measurement Error: As mentioned, it is plausible that facial symmetry could
be subjected to measurement error that could lead to attenuation bias. I consider
the following cases that increase the risk that facial symmetry could be wrongly
measured:
(1) Dated Pictures: The mugshots taken may not reﬂective of the appearance
of inmates when facing trial. This might be the case as mugshots are updated
periodically in the correction facilities. Although previous researches have argued
that appearance is highly correlated over time (Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994), for
inmates who are incarcerated for an extended period, the outlook in these pictures
could still be diﬀerent from how inmates appear in courts. Hence, I limit the analysis
to more recent cases post 2005 to ensure that the mugshots are reﬂective of the felons'
appearance during trial. Now, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in facial
symmetry increases sentence length by almost 15 days, which represents a gap of
0.9%.
(2) Resolution of mugshots: Measurement error could also be intensiﬁed
by the fuzziness of the images. Hence, I remove the bottom 25% of the images
measured by the ﬁle size. Results summarized in Column (5) indicate that sentenc-
ing gaps between the 25th and 75th percentile are slightly higher now at 26 days
when constrained to a sample of higher quality mugshots. This suggests that the
measurement error associated with blurred photos are not driving the results.
14Results remain very stable even when I constraint the analysis to felons not more than
40 years old.
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4.6.5 Discussion
There are still several issues yet to be addressed in this paper. Most of them
are driven by the lack of data. One concern is the potential bias that arises from
sample selection. In this analysis, I only observe cases when the felon is found guilty.
If judges are lenient towards felons with more symmetric facial features, then my
sample comprises of felons with asymmetric faces and felons with symmetric faces
but some unobserved factors that could increase their conviction rates. This means
that convicted felons with asymmetric faces are unlikely to be comparable with those
convicted felons with symmetric faces.
Ideally, I would like to address this issue using a two-stage Heckman correction
model but this would require me to observe all the cases, including suspects who are
charged but not found guilty. Unfortunately, this data is not available. But how will
this selection bias aﬀect my estimates? Presumably, better-looking individuals found
guilty are more likely to have stronger evidence presented against them. Conversely,
bad-looking felons are more likely to be involved in borderline cases with weak
evidence against them. Hence, based on evidences presented in courts, criminals
with more symmetric faces are more likely to receive heftier punishment, which will
attribute to an underestimation of discrimination on facial symmetry by judges. It
is comforting to observe signiﬁcant eﬀects of facial symmetry on sentencing even in
the presence of selection issues.
Another issue is that I do not have judge identiﬁers for each case. However, this
should not be a major concern given that cases are randomly assigned to judges in
Florida. Judges allocated to cases with better-looking felons should not be diﬀerent,
on average, from judges assigned to cases with worse-looking felons. Second, there
are no details on the sentencing cells that each felon is allocated to based on the
points given for the crime(s). This could exacerbate unobserved severity between
cases. I address this limitation by including indicator variables for micro-crime cat-
egories, which are much ﬁner than sentencing cells. This is permissable given that
I have detailed information on the crimes committed by each felon that allows me
to exploit variation of facial symmetry and sentencing outcomes within these pre-
cisely deﬁned crime types. In addition, the enhanced ﬂexibility of judges to depart
from recommended sentences under the Criminal Punishment Code also meant that
sentencing cells could be less eﬀective in controlling for the severity of crimes.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine whether the appearance of an inmate, measured by facial
symmetry, aﬀects sentencing outcomes. This research contributes to the burgeoning
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literature that documents the pervasiveness of appearance-based discrimination in
diﬀerent contexts, and the malpractices of judges allowing extraneous factors such
as race, gender and emotions to inﬂuence decision-making.
This study employs facial recognition algorithms on mugshots of convicted felons
to locate 69 diﬀerent facial landmarks, including forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, ears
and jawline to compute facial symmetry associated with each inmate. This auto-
mated way of detecting facial features allows this study to be conducted at much
larger scale, incorporating the entire universe of more than 200,000 inmates in
Florida. This is an improvement from previous studies that are usually restricted
to small sample sizes as researchers are required to painstakingly collect multiple
attractiveness ratings from respondents on subjects to objectively measure appear-
ance. To address the concern of omitted con-founders from biasing the estimates,
I include a rich set of controls on personal characteristics and case-related facts
associated with each inmate, and crime-by-court ﬁxed eﬀects. Put diﬀerently, I
am examining the eﬀects of facial symmetry of inmates conducting the same crime
(1294 categories) and being trialled at the same court (20 courts) on their sentencing
outcomes.
Using a universe of sentencing outcomes associated with criminals from Florida,
I observe that judges hand out harsher sentences to criminals with asymmetric facial
features. The disparity in punishment between criminals with more symmetric faces,
at the 25th percentile, and criminals with less symmetric faces, at the 75th percentile,
is around 1.0% to 1.9% of the mean sentence length, which corresponds to between
17 and 32 days. Additional analyses reveal that this bias against felons with less
proportional faces could vary across race, gender and type of crimes.
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4.8 Data Appendix
Table 4.6: List of Variables
Variable Source Description
Dependent Variable (Dijct)
Log(Sentence) OBIS The natural logarithm of the sentence
length (in days) of inmate i for crime
type j
Facial Attractiveness(FSi)
Facial Symmetry - Absolute deviation from a perfectly
symmetrical face measured based on
the locations of eyebrows, eyes, mid
face, nose, mouth and lower face for
inmate i
Personal Characteristics(X ′ij)
Gender OBIS Binary variable denoting whether in-
mate i is male or female
Ethnicity OBIS Binary variable denoting whether in-
mate i is black, white, hispanic or oth-
ers
Address OBIS Zipcode of the residential address of
inmate i upon release
Age OBIS Age of inmate i at sentencing date
Height OBIS Height of inmate i
Weight OBIS Weight of inmate i
Eye Color OBIS Binary variable denoting eye color of
inmate i
Hair Color OBIS Binary variable denoting hair color of
inmate i
Total Tattoo
Counts
OBIS Total counts of tattoo for inmate i
Facial Tattoo
Counts
OBIS Counts of facial tattoo for inmate i
Criminal History(X ′ij)
Concurrent
Charges
OBIS Number of concurrent charges for in-
mate i during sentence
Criminal History OBIS Total counts of historical charges
for inmate i similar to the sentence
charged
Mugshot Characteristics(M ′i)
Adjustment Angle - Average of eyeline angle and noseline
angle of inmate i
Face Edge to Eye
Ratio
- ratio of the distance from left face edge
to left eye corner and the distance from
right face edge to right eye corner for
inmate i
Forehead-Bottom
Ratio
- Ratio of the distance between forehead
and eyebrow to the distance between
chin and mouth of inmate i
Picture Size - The picture size for inmate i in kilo-
bytes
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